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Baron (2001) - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation (view source)
Revision as of 19:50, 23 October 2009
, 19:50, 23 October 2009→Vote Recruitment in Client Politics
Legislators have ideal points: <math>z \backsim U \left [ - \frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2} \right ]</math> with the median legislator's ideal point denoted <math>\, z_m = 0</math>.
The utility function of legislators is additively-seperable with a term representing their constituent's preferences and a term for the resources provided to them by the client:<math>U \left( w , z \right ) = -\alpha(w-z) + r_w, \quad \alpha>0</math> where <math>\, \alpha</math> represents the intensity of preferences.
The Interest seeks <math>U \left( w , z \right ) = -\alpha(w-z) + r_wx > 0, \quad x \alpha>0ge y</math> where <math>\alpha, y</math> represents is the intensity of preferences. The Interest seeks status quo and the Agenda is <math>x > 0,\quad x \ge y,\quad A=\{x,y\}</math> where x is the policy, y is the status quo and A is the agenda.
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