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Baron (2001) - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation (view source)
Revision as of 16:30, 23 October 2009
, 16:30, 23 October 2009→Vote Recruitment in Client Politics
A slightly simplified version of the model used now follows.
Legislators have ideal points: <math>z \backsim U[-\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2}]</math> with the median legislator's ideal point denoted <math>z_m=0</math>.
The utility function of legislators is additively-seperable with a term representing their constituent's preferences and a term for the resources provided to them by the client:
<math>U(w,z)=-\alpha(w-z)+r_w, \alpha>0</math> where <math>\alpha</math> represents the intensity of preferences.
The Interest seeks <math>x > 0, x \ge y, A=\{x,y\}</math> where x is the policy, y is the status quo and A is the agenda.
<math></math>
