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Baron (2001) - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation (view source)
Revision as of 16:07, 23 October 2009
, 16:07, 23 October 2009no edit summary
In the last case it should be stressed that '''resource offers by the principals are specified as a function of the decision my the agent'''.
==Vote Recruitment in Client Politics==
A slightly simplified version of the model used now follows.
Legislators have ideal points: <math>z~U[-\frac{1}{2},frac{1},{2}, with the median legislator's ideal point denoted z_m</math>.
The utility function of legislators is additively-seperable with a term representing their constituent's preferences and a term for the resources provided to them by the client:
<math> U(w,z)=-\alpha</math>
