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Baron (2001) - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation (view source)
Revision as of 14:06, 16 October 2009
, 14:06, 16 October 2009no edit summary
How competition among interest groups should be modelled (to reflect reality) depends four main factors: the '''sequence or simultaneity''' of offers, whether lobbyists can make more than one offer or not (i.e. the '''number of rounds'''), the nature of the offers (i.e. '''point or menu offers'''), and the '''number of offers accepted''' (generally one or all) . The bullets below give the appropriate model for some of these instances:
*Simultaneous, 1 round, point offers, 1 accepted: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonel_Blotto Colonel Blotto] type games
*<math>\left \uparrow \frac{Sequential move, point offers, 1 accepted: Groseclose & Synder, Groseclose & Banks.*Simultaneous, 1 round, 1 accepted, point offers: All pay auctions*Simultaneous, 1 round, 1 accepted, menu offers: Common agency models, e.g. '''Grossman & Helpman (1994)''' In the last case it should be stressed that '''resource offers by the principals are specified as a}{b} \right</math>function of the decision my the agent'''.
