7,613
edits
Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control (view source)
Revision as of 19:14, 29 September 2020
, 19:14, 29 September 2020no edit summary
{{Article
|Has page=Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control
|Has bibtex key=
|Has article title=Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control
|Has author=Baron, D.
|Has year=1991
|In journal=
|In volume=
|In number=
|Has pages=
|Has publisher=
}}
[http://www.edegan.com/wiki/images/3/3f/Baron_%281991%29_-_Bargaining_Majoritarian_Incentives_Pork_Barrel_Programs_and_Procedural_Control.pdf Full-text PDF]
* Proposals are fully characterized by <math>b\in B</math> and net benefits are <math>z_{i}=b_{i}-T/n</math>.
* Payoffs are discounted: <math>\delta^{\tau}z_{i}=U_{i}(z,\tau)</math>. Extensive form is the same as before for closed rule.
Structure of game:
* P is drawn (which implies a ratio of B/T).
* A random legislator is chosen to distribute B. Note that per the above, all T are distributed equally no matter what.
* Legislators vote against the status quo, in which everyone gets nothing and is taxed nothing.
Stationarity implies members are paid their continuation value in equilibrium in exchange for their votes. <math>\delta v(g,t), \forall t\in\Tau</math>
