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=<b>NOTE: This is for 2011= ==. For 2010, see [[2010 BPP Field Exam Paper Short List==Papers]]</b>.
See Notes from Steve's institution notes section [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Steve%20Tadelis%20Institutions%20Notes.pdf here]. * [[Prendergast. C. 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms."]] Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1):7-63* Holmstrom, Bengt (1982) Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Economics 13(2):324-340 * [[Klein Crawford Alchian (1978) - Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process]], Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2):297-326. * [[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership]]: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, 94(3) pp. 691-719. * [[Tadelis, Steven and Oliver Williamson (2011) Transaction-Cost Economics]], to appear in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, Eds. The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press * Levin, Jonathan (2003) "Relational incentive contracts," American Economic Review, 93(3):835l857. * [[Garicano (2000) - Hierarchies And The Organization Of Knowledge In Production]], Journal of Political Economy, 108(5):874-904.
=2010=
[[2010 BPP Field Exam Papers]]
→Tadelis
<nowiki>*This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Papers]]</nowiki>
===Innovation (Mowery)===
Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991)]], "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]
#[[Gibbons (2005) - Four Formalizable Theories Of The Firm |Gibbons, Robert (2005)]], "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2005)%20-%20Four%20formalizable%20theories%20of%20the%20firm.pdf pdf]
#[[Alonso_Dessein_Matouschek_Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008)_-_When_Does_Coordination_Require_CentralizationWhen Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]] , "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, volVol. 98(1), pp. 145-179.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf]#[[Bolton_Farrell_%281990%29_Bolton Farrell (1990) -_Decentralization_Duplication_And_DelayDecentralization Duplication And Delay |Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990)]] , "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf]
# [[Bloom, Nicholas, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen (2009) “The Organization of Firms Across Countries,”]] NBER Working Paper 15129 (["http://www.stanford.edu/ ~nbloom/w15129.pdf" link])
See also: [[ECON224]]
====Tadelis====
====Yuchtman====
#'''[[Tadelis (2001) - The Market For Reputations As An Incentive Mechanism |Tadelis, S. (2001)]]''', "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20The%20Market%20for%20Reputations%20as%20an%20Incentive%20Mechanism.pdf pdf]
#'''[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]]''', "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf]
