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tags={},
filename={[[Cockburn MacGarvie (2006) - Entry And Patenting In The Software Industry]].pdf}
}
 
@article{cockburn2011entry,
title={Entry and Patenting in the Software Industry},
author={Cockburn, I.M. and Macgarvie, M.J.},
journal={Management science},
volume={57},
number={5},
pages={915--933},
year={2011},
abstract={To what extent are firms kept out of a market by patents covering related technologies? Do patents held by potential entrants make it easier to enter markets? We estimate the empirical relationship between market entry and patents for 27 narrowly defined categories of software products during the period 1990-2004. Controlling for demand, market structure, patent quality, and other factors, we find that a 10% increase in the number of patents relevant to market reduces the rate of entry by 3-8%, and this relationship intensified following expansions in the patentability of software in the mid- 1990s. However, potential entrants with patent applications relevant to a market are 2-3 times more likely to enter it. Finally, patents appear to substitute for complementary assets in the entry process, as patents have both greater entry-deterring and entrypromoting effects for firms without prior experience in other markets.},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={Software},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={As all industry participants have responded to increased incentives to obtain patents, the “thicket” in these markets has grown dramatically, imposing greater and greater transactions costs on all firms.... As discussed above, it may not be just the absolute number of patents in an area that can deter entry, but also the total cost to an entrant of licensing its way through the thicket. One salient feature of patent thickets is the potential for higher costs associated with negotiating with many parties. To the extent that there are fixed costs of conducting a negotiation, having to deal with more parties will drive up costs of obtaining licenses. There may also be transactions costs associated with bargaining and coordinating negotiations with multiple licensors... But transactions costs associated with thickets may have interesting dynamic effects: while incumbents enjoy increased protection for current innovations, larger thickets will also raise their costs of introducing future generations of innovations.},
tags={},
filename={[[Cockburn Macgarvie (2011) - Entry And Patenting In The Software Industry]].pdf}
}
tags={},
filename={[[Cockburn MacGarvie (2009) - Patents Thickets And The Financing Of Early Stage Firms]].pdf}
}
 
@article{cockburn2011entry,
title={Entry and Patenting in the Software Industry},
author={Cockburn, I.M. and Macgarvie, M.J.},
journal={Management science},
volume={57},
number={5},
pages={915--933},
year={2011},
abstract={To what extent are firms kept out of a market by patents covering related technologies? Do patents held by potential entrants make it easier to enter markets? We estimate the empirical relationship between market entry and patents for 27 narrowly defined categories of software products during the period 1990-2004. Controlling for demand, market structure, patent quality, and other factors, we find that a 10% increase in the number of patents relevant to market reduces the rate of entry by 3-8%, and this relationship intensified following expansions in the patentability of software in the mid- 1990s. However, potential entrants with patent applications relevant to a market are 2-3 times more likely to enter it. Finally, patents appear to substitute for complementary assets in the entry process, as patents have both greater entry-deterring and entrypromoting effects for firms without prior experience in other markets.},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={Software},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={As all industry participants have responded to increased incentives to obtain patents, the “thicket” in these markets has grown dramatically, imposing greater and greater transactions costs on all firms.... As discussed above, it may not be just the absolute number of patents in an area that can deter entry, but also the total cost to an entrant of licensing its way through the thicket. One salient feature of patent thickets is the potential for higher costs associated with negotiating with many parties. To the extent that there are fixed costs of conducting a negotiation, having to deal with more parties will drive up costs of obtaining licenses. There may also be transactions costs associated with bargaining and coordinating negotiations with multiple licensors... But transactions costs associated with thickets may have interesting dynamic effects: while incumbents enjoy increased protection for current innovations, larger thickets will also raise their costs of introducing future generations of innovations.},
tags={},
filename={[[Cockburn Macgarvie (2011) - Entry And Patenting In The Software Industry]].pdf}
}
tags={},
filename={[[Cockburn MacGarvie Muller (2010) - Patent Thickets Licensing And Innovative Performance]].pdf}
}
 
@misc{entezarkheir2010patent,
title={Patent Thickets and Market Value: An Empirical Analysis},
author={Entezarkheir, M.},
year={2010},
abstract={The pro-patent shift of the United States has created a patent thicket. This has made the use of other firms’ innovations more costly, due to higher transaction costs and the possibility of hold up. Using a panel data on publicly traded US manufacturing firms from 1979 to 1996, this study finds a negative impact from the patent thicket on the market value of the firm. I also find that firms with larger patent portfolios experience a smaller effect, likely because stronger bargaining position lowers the occurrence of the hold-up problem for these firms. The advantage of larger firms is even more prominent following the pro-patent shift. My results also capture heterogeneity in the impact of the patent thicket across industries.},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Hold-up, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={I study how the fragmentation of the ownership of complementary patents impacts the market value of the firm. This fragmentation builds a patent thicket, which contains a set of overlapping patents.3 The patent thicket requires obtaining permission from several right holders to commercialize a product. Firms that face a fragmented technology market have to pay higher transaction costs and royalty payments to license external patents, because they are confronted with larger number of entities in the thicket. They are more prone to opportunistic behaviour by external entities, since the likelihood of infringing other firms’ patents is high. They are also more exposed to the risk of being litigated against by other patent holders. The patent thickets hold several costs for the firms with cumulative innovations. They cause the “complement problem” which was first formally examined by Cournot (1838).12 Shapiro (2001) extends the Cournot idea into the context of intellectual property. He indicates right holders in the thicket make the prices of invented products much larger than their marginal costs by imposing the licensing fees. The result is lower consumer welfare and joint profit of right holders. Heller and Eisenberg (1998) also show that the licensing fees in the thicket lead to underinvestment in innovation or the “tragedy of anti-commons.” Furthermore, Shapiro (2001) shows that the dense thickets increase the transaction costs of firms, because identifying complementary patents is harder and more costly. Innovators usually find about all of the patents after bearing sunk costs. This means the innovator is faced with a hold-up problem.},
tags={},
filename={[[Entezarkheir (2010) - Patent Thickets And Market Value An Empirical Analysis]].pdf}
}
tags={},
filename={EPO (2012) - Workshop on Patent Thickets.pdf}
}
 
@misc{entezarkheir2010patent,
title={Patent Thickets and Market Value: An Empirical Analysis},
author={Entezarkheir, M.},
year={2010},
abstract={The pro-patent shift of the United States has created a patent thicket. This has made the use of other firms’ innovations more costly, due to higher transaction costs and the possibility of hold up. Using a panel data on publicly traded US manufacturing firms from 1979 to 1996, this study finds a negative impact from the patent thicket on the market value of the firm. I also find that firms with larger patent portfolios experience a smaller effect, likely because stronger bargaining position lowers the occurrence of the hold-up problem for these firms. The advantage of larger firms is even more prominent following the pro-patent shift. My results also capture heterogeneity in the impact of the patent thicket across industries.},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Hold-up, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={I study how the fragmentation of the ownership of complementary patents impacts the market value of the firm. This fragmentation builds a patent thicket, which contains a set of overlapping patents.3 The patent thicket requires obtaining permission from several right holders to commercialize a product. Firms that face a fragmented technology market have to pay higher transaction costs and royalty payments to license external patents, because they are confronted with larger number of entities in the thicket. They are more prone to opportunistic behaviour by external entities, since the likelihood of infringing other firms’ patents is high. They are also more exposed to the risk of being litigated against by other patent holders. The patent thickets hold several costs for the firms with cumulative innovations. They cause the “complement problem” which was first formally examined by Cournot (1838).12 Shapiro (2001) extends the Cournot idea into the context of intellectual property. He indicates right holders in the thicket make the prices of invented products much larger than their marginal costs by imposing the licensing fees. The result is lower consumer welfare and joint profit of right holders. Heller and Eisenberg (1998) also show that the licensing fees in the thicket lead to underinvestment in innovation or the “tragedy of anti-commons.” Furthermore, Shapiro (2001) shows that the dense thickets increase the transaction costs of firms, because identifying complementary patents is harder and more costly. Innovators usually find about all of the patents after bearing sunk costs. This means the innovator is faced with a hold-up problem.},
tags={},
filename={[[Entezarkheir (2010) - Patent Thickets And Market Value An Empirical Analysis]].pdf}
}
tags={},
filename={[[UKIPO (2011) - Patent Thickets An Overview]].pdf}
}
 
@article{von2012incidence,
title={Incidence and Growth of Patent Thickets-The Impact of Technological Opportunities and Complexity},
author={von Graevenitz, G. and Wagner, S. and Harhoff, D.},
journal={Journal of Industrial Economics},
year={2012},
abstract={We investigate incidence and evolution of patent thickets. Our empirical analysis is based on a theoretical model of patenting in complex and discrete technologies. The model captures how competition for patent portfolios and complementarity of patents affect patenting incentives. We show that lower technological opportunities increase patenting incentives in complex technologies while they decrease incentives in discrete technologies. Also, more competitors increase patenting incentives in complex technologies and reduce them in discrete technologies. To test these predictions a new measure of the density of patent thickets is introduced. European patent citations are used to construct measures of fragmentation and technological opportunity. Our empirical analysis is based on a panel capturing patenting behavior of 2074 firms in 30 technology areas over 15 years. GMM estimation results confirm the predictions of our theoretical model. The results show that patent thickets exist in 9 out of 30 technology areas. We find that decreased technological opportunities are a surprisingly strong driver of patent thicket growth.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention, Hold-up, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={The literature on patent thickets shows that several institutional arrangements allow firms to disentangle overlapping property rights - these include licensing, patent pools, standard setting as well as litigation (Shapiro, 2001, Scotchmer, 2005). There is some evidence that firms holding a large share of patents within a given technology benefit substantially from their patent portfolio and may be able to reduce the likelihood of hold-up... Secondly, the conditions under which strategic complementarity is likely to arise in our model fit our current understanding of settings in which patent thickets arise very well. These are settings in which technologies are highly complex, in which many firms seek to build large patent portfolios and in which the combination of multiple parties’ technologies yields the best standards and products... This is attributed to firms’ efforts to reduce potential hold-up by opportunistic patentees owning critical or blocking patent rights – a situation which is associated with the existence of patent thickets... To test our model we derive a new measure of complexity of blocking relationships in patent thickets.},
tags={},
filename={[[vonGraevenitz (2012) - Incidence And Growth Of Patent Thickets]].pdf}
}
tags={},
filename={[[Ziedonis (2004) - Dont Fence Me In]].pdf}
}
 
@article{von2012incidence,
title={Incidence and Growth of Patent Thickets-The Impact of Technological Opportunities and Complexity},
author={von Graevenitz, G. and Wagner, S. and Harhoff, D.},
journal={Journal of Industrial Economics},
year={2012},
abstract={We investigate incidence and evolution of patent thickets. Our empirical analysis is based on a theoretical model of patenting in complex and discrete technologies. The model captures how competition for patent portfolios and complementarity of patents affect patenting incentives. We show that lower technological opportunities increase patenting incentives in complex technologies while they decrease incentives in discrete technologies. Also, more competitors increase patenting incentives in complex technologies and reduce them in discrete technologies. To test these predictions a new measure of the density of patent thickets is introduced. European patent citations are used to construct measures of fragmentation and technological opportunity. Our empirical analysis is based on a panel capturing patenting behavior of 2074 firms in 30 technology areas over 15 years. GMM estimation results confirm the predictions of our theoretical model. The results show that patent thickets exist in 9 out of 30 technology areas. We find that decreased technological opportunities are a surprisingly strong driver of patent thicket growth.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention, Hold-up, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={The literature on patent thickets shows that several institutional arrangements allow firms to disentangle overlapping property rights - these include licensing, patent pools, standard setting as well as litigation (Shapiro, 2001, Scotchmer, 2005). There is some evidence that firms holding a large share of patents within a given technology benefit substantially from their patent portfolio and may be able to reduce the likelihood of hold-up... Secondly, the conditions under which strategic complementarity is likely to arise in our model fit our current understanding of settings in which patent thickets arise very well. These are settings in which technologies are highly complex, in which many firms seek to build large patent portfolios and in which the combination of multiple parties’ technologies yields the best standards and products... This is attributed to firms’ efforts to reduce potential hold-up by opportunistic patentees owning critical or blocking patent rights – a situation which is associated with the existence of patent thickets... To test our model we derive a new measure of complexity of blocking relationships in patent thickets.},
tags={},
filename={[[vonGraevenitz (2012) - Incidence And Growth Of Patent Thickets]].pdf}
}
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