PTLR Up Group Processed BibTeX
Revision as of 19:37, 25 March 2013 by imported>Ed
This page is part of the Patent Thicket Litature Review
Notes
This page contains the processed Up Group BibTeX entries. With the exception of the first entry (Andrews) they all need reviewing and correcting.
The Processed Up Group BibTeX Records
@article{aggarwal2009modes,
title={Modes of Cooperative R&D Commercialization by Start-Ups},
author={Aggarwal, Vikas A. and Hsu, David H.},
journal={Strategic Management Journal},
volume={30},
number={8},
pages={pp. 835-864},
year={2009},
abstract = {This study empirically examines the determinants of heterogeneous firm-level cooperative R&D commercialization strategies. While the volume of interfirm collaboration has increased dramatically in recent decades, the determinants of firm-level choices among alternate modes of such cooperative activity remain relatively understudied. We develop a conceptual model of factors determining collaborative mode choice at the organizational portfolio level. These factors include the firm-level appropriation environment, in which deal-level choices have portfolio-level spillover implications, as well as governance capabilities developed by the firm over time. Using a random sample of innovating biotechnology start-ups, we assemble a firm-year panel dataset that aggregates transaction-level collaboration data to the firm-year level, allowing us to characterize firms' portfolios of collaborative deals. We find broad empirical support for our model, suggesting that a firm's appropriation environment and governance capabilities strongly influence portfolio-level collaboration mode choices. In addition, we explore the implications of governance capability development, finding that experience with particular modes, as well as deviations from existing capabilities, impact firm valuation.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={Weakly Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={A firm’s patent portfolio can enable the firm to mitigate appropriation concerns that arise across multiple deals. This occurs when patents are not specific to an individual deal, but rather apply across multiple technology commercializa- tion projects. Such an intellectual property port- folio can thus act as a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2000), making it more difficult for collaborative partners to expropriate the innovating firm’s tech- nology.11 The degree of protection afforded by such a portfolio will, of course, necessarily be dependent on the degree to which patents are rel- evant across multiple commercialization projects.},
thicket_def={Def1},
thicket_def_extract={Such an intellectual property portfolio can thus act as a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2000), making it more difficult for collaborative partners to expropriate the innovating firm’s technology.},
tags={Cooperative R&D, Decision-making},
filename={Aggarwal Hsu (2009) - Modes Of Cooperative R And D Commercialization By Start Ups.pdf}
}
@article{allison2003business,
title={The Business Method Patent Myth},
author={Allison, J.R. and Tiller, E.H.},
journal={Berkeley Tech. LJ},
volume={18},
pages={987},
year={2003},
abstract={Internet business method patents have been roundly criticized by most observers as being singularly inferior to most other patents. Many have even argued that business methods should not be patentable subject matter. As a result, Congress and the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) singled them out for special treatment. All of these criticisms were, however, voiced without empirical support. We gathered data on most Internet business method patents issued through the end of 1999 and compared them with a large contemporaneous data set of patents in general. We also compared them with patents in fourteen individual technology areas within the general patent data set. Our comparison focused on several metrics that we believe serve as good proxies for patent quality and value. We found that Internet business method patents appear to have been no worse than the average patent, and possibly even better than most. They also appear to have been no worse, and possibly even better, than patents in most individual technology areas. These findings lead us to question the conventional wisdom that Internet business method patents were uniquely deficient. We briefly explore some possible explanations for the chasm between the accepted view and what we believe to have been the reality, including the possibility that negative opinions about these patents may have been the result of an information cascade. More importantly, we believe that efforts to single out these patents for special treatment not only lacked sound justification in the particular case but also reveal more fundamental problems associated with ex ante definitions to carve out any particular technology area for different treatment.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={empirical},
industry={Internet},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={A patent thicket is just one instance of portfolio value, because a group of patents on related technologies can have a value greater than the sum of its parts even if the patents do not create overlapping rights in the same product. Re- gardless of the particular manifestation of portfolio value, previous research has not captured this aspect of patent value, and we have not ascertained a way to estimate the effect of a patent’s contribution to a portfolio apart from whatever stand-alone value it may or may not have.},
thicket_def={refs shapiro, quotes shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro has called “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.” Carl S. Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,},
tags={patent quality, internet business methods are patentable, inter-industry comparison of patents and prior art references},
filename={Allison Tiller (2003) - The Business Method Patent Myth.pdf}
}
@article{andrews2002genes,
title={Genes And Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights},
author={Andrews, L.B.},
journal={Nature Reviews Genetics},
volume={3},
number={10},
pages={803--808},
year={2002},
abstract={Concerns about human gene patents go beyond moral disquiet about creating a commodity from a part of the human body and also beyond legal questions about whether genes are unpatentable products of nature. New concerns are being raised about harm to public health and to research. In response to these concerns, various policy options, such as litigation, legislation, patent pools and compulsory licensing, are being explored to ensure that gene patents do not impede the practice of medicine and scientific progress.},
discipline={Policy Report},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Economist Carl Shapiro elaborates on the problems created by a‘patent thicket’.Using traditional economic analysis, he has shown how, when several monopolists exist that each control a different raw material needed for development of a product, the price of the resulting product is higher than if a single firm controlled trade in all of the raw materi- als or made the product itself 18. However, the combined profits of the producers are lower in the presence of complementary monopolies. So, if there are several patent holders whose permission is needed to create a gene therapy (and any one of them could block the production of the gene therapy), ineffi- ciencies in the market are created, potentially harming both the patent holder and the patent users.},
thicket_def={def23},
thicket_def_extract={Economist Carl Shapiro elaborates on the problems created by a ‘patent thicket’. Using traditional economic analysis, he has shown how, when several monopolists exist that each control a different raw material needed for development of a product, the price of the resulting product is higher than if a single firm controlled trade in all of the raw materials or made the product itself. However, the combined profits of the producers are lower in the presence of complementary monopolies. So, if there are several patent holders whose permission is needed to create a gene therapy (and any one of them could block the production of the gene therapy), inefficiencies in the market are created, potentially harming both the patent holder and the patent users.},
tags={IPR Policy, Effects on Research},
filename={Andrews (2002) - Genes And Patent Policy Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights.pdf}
}
@article{aoki2008promoting,
title={Promoting Access to Intellectual Property: Patent Pools, Copyright Collectives, and Clearinghouses},
author={Aoki, R. and Schiff, A.},
journal={R\&D Management},
volume={38},
number={2},
pages={189--204},
year={2008},
abstract={This paper reviews and compares patent pools, intellectual property (IP) clearinghouses, and copyright collectives as systems for promoting efficient access to licensable IP in a ‘market for technology’. These systems promote downstream use of innovations by economizing on search and transaction costs in licensing, as well as potentially mitigating the conditions that lead to the ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’ and other coordination problems in multilateral licensing. We compare and classify different systems in terms of their features, review some existing systems, and discuss their economic characteristics.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Some similar issues are discussed by Shapiro (2001), who considers the strategies that firms may use to reduce the effects of a patent thicket on their ability to innovate. Shapiro considers the strategies of cross licensing, patent pools, and cooperative standard setting. Our paper is complementary to Shapiro’s in that our analysis is at the level of the market for technology, rather than an individual firm.},
thicket_def={Def1},
thicket_def_extract={In the context of patents, a proliferation of IP rights may result in a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2001) that can increase costs for downstream activities such as cumulative innovation and the development of new products that combine multiple existing innovations.},
tags={Pools, Collectives, Clearinghouses},
filename={Aoki Schiff (2008) - Promoting Access To Intellectual Property.pdf}
}
@inproceedings{arundel2003strategic,
title={Strategic Patenting},
author={Arundel, A. and Patel, P.},
booktitle={Background report for the Trend Chart Policy Benchmarking Workshop" New Trends in IPR Policy},
year={2003},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy},
research_type={Theory, Statistics from other papers},
industry={General, Public Research},
thicket_stance={Neutral},
thicket_stance_extract={Although there has been extensive discussion in the literature on patent thickets and licensing hold-ups, we know very little about how serious this problem is today or if it has slowed technological progress.},
thicket_def={Pro, quotes and refs shapiro, heller eisenberg},
thicket_def_extract={This has been called a patent thicket, or a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology” (Shapiro, in press).},
tags={offensive and defensive use of patents, discussion of balancing incentives and strategic patenting, IPR Reform},
filename={Arundel Patel (2003) - Strategic Patenting.pdf}
}
@article{attaran2004patents,
title={Patents do not Strangle Innovation, but Their Quality Must be Improved},
author={Attaran, A.},
journal={Bulletin of the World Health Organization},
volume={82},
number={10},
pages={788},
year={2004},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy Report},
research_type={discussion},
industry={Pharma},
thicket_stance={Weakly Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={Possibilities and facts are not the same thing, however, and there is surprisingly little empirical data to show that the patent thicket is subtracting from the rate of innovation or society's benefit from it. Maybe that is happenning without anyone noticing, but the available evidence suggests otherwise.},
thicket_def={def11},
thicket_def_extract={"As Professor Correa writes, the resulting thicket of patents could 'deprive society of the benefits[of] ... widespread use and dissemination of basic scinetific ideas. Possibilities and facts are not the same thing, however, and there is surprisingly little empirical data to show that the patent thicket is subtracting from the rate of innovation or society's benefit from it. Maybe that is happening without anyone noticing, but the available evidence suggests otherwise."...the resulting lack of legal certainty harms everyone...},
tags={Against Thickets!},
filename={Attaran (2004) - Patents Do Not Strangle Innovation But Their Quality Must Be Improved.pdf}
}
@article{ayres2007tradable,
title={Tradable Patent Rights},
author={Ayres, Ian and Parchomovsky, Gideon},
journal={Stanford Law Review},
volume={60},
number={3},
pages={863--894},
year={2007}
abstract={Patent thickets may inefficiently retardcumulative innovation. This Article explores two alternative mechanisms that may be used to weed out patent thickets. Both mechanisms are intended to reduce the number of patents in our society. The first mechanism we discuss is price-based regulation of patents through a system of increasing renewal fees. The second and more innovative mechanism is quantity-basedregulation through the establishmentofa system of Tradable Patent Rights. The formalization of tradable patent rights would essentially create a secondary market for patent permits in which patent protection will be bought and sold. The Article then discusses how price and quantity regulationcan be combined to effect superiorweeding.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Written Theory},
industry={Various},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Patent thickets are especially harmful in cumulative innovation settings. In such settings, the need to secure licenses from multiple patentees, each possessing a veto power over the production of new innovation (1) dramatically increases bargaining costs between patentees and subsequent innovators; (2) creates a potential for hold-ups; and (3) lowers the profits of the original patentees. Patent thickets also harm regular users of patented products and technology by making it more expensive for users to gain access to the relevant product or technology.},
thicket_def={Multiple Overlapping Patents},
thicket_def_extract={A particularly disconcerting result of the increase in the number of patents is the emergence of patent thickets: multiple patents that cover a single product or technology.},
tags={price and quantity based regulation, regulation, tradable patent rights},
}
@article{barnett2009isintellectual,
title = {Is Intellectual Property Trivial?},
author = {Barnett, Jonathan M.},
journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
volume = {157},
number = {6},
pages = {pp. 1691-1742},
year = {2009},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={theory, empirical},
industry={general},
thicket_stance={neutral},
thicket_stance_extract={But normative analysis of intel- lectual property coverage must be dynamic (and complex) if it is to be realistic: that is, it must anticipate that any downward adjustment in intellectual property coverage will trigger a variety of possible market responses that may neutralize or even reverse the adjustment, result- ing in (i) no net change in access costs, (ii) a net reduction in access costs, or (iii) in the most perverse case, even a net increase in access costs coupled with a reduction in innovation gains.},
thicket_def={def12},
thicket_def_extract={This is a common theme of the expanding literature on "anticommons" effects, whereby proliferating intellectual property rights creates a "thicket" that impedes subsequent innovation. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller... Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg...},
tags={Overview of Patent-based IP},
filename={Barnett (2009) - Is Intellectual Property Trivial.pdf}
}
@article{barnett2009property,
title = {Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes},
author = {Barnett, Jonathan M.},
journal = {The Yale Law Journal},
volume = {119},
number = {3},
year = {2009},
pages = {pp. 384-456},
publisher = {The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.},
copyright = {Copyright © 2009 The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.},
abstract = {It is commonly asserted that innovation markets suffer from excessive intellectual property protections, which in turn stifle output. But empirical inquiries can neither confirm nor deny this assertion. Under the agnostic assumption that we cannot assess directly whether intellectual property coverage is excessive, an alternative query is proposed: can the market assess if any "propertization outcome" is excessive and then undertake actions to correct it? This process-based approach takes the view that innovator populations make rent-seeking investments that continuously select among innovation regimes that trade off securing innovation gains (which tends to demand more property) against reducing transaction costs and associated innovation losses (which tends to demand less). If we can identify the conditions under which privately interested investments in lobbying, enforcement, and transactional arrangements are likely to yield socially interested propertization outcomes, then the underlying datum at issue—whether there is "too much" intellectual property—can be determined indirectly at some reasonable degree of approximation. This approach identifies a "property trap" effect where, under high coordination costs, the regime selection mechanism is prone to fail: litigation risk and associated transaction cost burdens drive innovators to overconsume state-provided property rights. Conversely, under low coordination costs, the regime selection mechanism is prone to succeed: adversely affected entities that rely substantially on outside sources for innovation inputs have incentives to undertake actions that weaken property-rights coverage, including constrained enforcement, forming cooperative arrangements, or even forfeiting intellectual property to the public domain. Counterintuitively, these relationships imply that large firms that rely substantially on outside sources for innovation inputs tend to have the strongest incentives and capacities to take actions that correct overpropertization outcomes. Preliminary evidence is drawn from the semiconductor, financial services, and information technology industries.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={theory},
industry={general, semiconductor},
thicket_stance={Weakly Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={Popular and scholarly commentary widely assumes that certain innovation markets -especially multicomponent markets such as biotechnology, software, and information technology- suffer from thickets of overlapping property rights that restrain and encumber research and development activities, thereby slowing, rather than promoting, innovative output. But this often-repeated statement loses considerable force given that empirical inquiries to identify patent thickets or related "anticommons" effects in these markets have so far failed to confirm or reject any inhibitory effect on innovation activity},
thicket_def={def12, def0},
thicket_def_extract={...the widely expressed view that innovation markets suffer from an intellectual property thicket (or "anticommons") where a misguided proliferation of property rights stifles innovative output beneath access restrictions, dispute-resolution actions, and other administrative burden},
tags={IP Regime Selection, Against Thicket},
filename={Barnett (2009) - Property As Process How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes.pdf}
}
@article{baron2010patent,
title={Patent Quality and Value in Discrete and Cumulative Innovation},
author={Baron, J. and Delcamp, H.},
journal={CERNA Working Paper},
number={2010-07},
year={2010},
abstract={This article compares the relationship between patent quality and patent value in discrete and cumulative innovation. Using factor analysis and a set of various commonly used patent quality indicators including claims, citations and family size, we build a quality factor jointly driving all indicators for 9255 patents. We then test the significance of this quality factor for predicting patent renewal after 4, 8 and 12 years in an ordered logistic regression. Whereas we establish a robust and significant link between patent quality and value in samples of discrete and complex technology patents, there is no significant link for patents that are essential to technological standards. Consistently, neither the quality factor nor any single indicator allows predicting litigation on an essential patent. We conclude that while there is a robust link between patent quality and value in discrete innovation, this link is much weaker in cumulative innovation. Nevertheless, this affects only narrow, yet highly relevant, technological fields. There is no evidence that cumulativeness affects the relationship between quality and value in whole technological classes classified as “complex” by the literature.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={ICT},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The core prediction of the patent thicket theory is thus that the link between patent quality and patent value erodes. If the link between the value of a patent and the significance of the underlying innovation is weakened, so is the capacity of the patent system to reward innovators for socially desirable innovation activity ... The primary determinant of patent value is the capacity of blocking other patents... Furthermore, among these essential patents with blocking power over a standard, patent quality is no longer a determinant of patent value.},
thicket_def={Def2},
thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets are webs of overlapping and mutually blocking patents held by different owners. Mutually blocking patent rights result from cumulative innovation, where no technological component can be marketed individually without the technological complements potentially protected by patent rights of different companies. Patent thickets have a clear impact on patent strategies, as they provide incentives to file blocking patents.},
tags={Standards, Essential Patents},
filename={Baron Delcamp (2010) - Patent Quality And Value In Discrete And Cumulative Innovation.pdf}
}
@article{baron2010strategic,
title={Strategic Inputs into Patent Pools},
author={Baron, J. and Delcamp, H.},
journal={Cerna working paper},
year={2010},
abstract={This article explores what factors determine the decision of a patent pool to accept new inputs. We propose a dynamic analysis of 1337 U.S. patent inputs into 7 important pools. This analysis highlights a trade-off between firm and patent characteristics as the determinants of inclusion of patents into pools. For instance we prove that firms already member of the pool or holding large patent portfolios are able to include lower quality patents. These findings can be explained both by bargaining power and information asymmetry. In particular, as measured by a new indicator, insiders and firms practicing the technology file patents that are better aligned with the criteria of essentiality.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical, Econometric Model},
industry={ICT},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={One aspect of this patent proliferation is the « patent thicket » problem 5. The patent thicket describes a situation in which holders of different patents that are all necessary for complying with a standard mutually block each other in the implementation of the standard.},
thicket_def={References shapiro, quotes shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={The creator of this term defines the patent thicket as « a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology. » (Shapiro, 2001)..},
tags={patent pools, inputs, theory on pool patent inputs},
filename={Baron Delcamp (2010) - Strategic Inputs Into Patent Pools.pdf}
}
@inproceedings{baron2011patent,
title={Patent Pools and Patent Inflation},
author={Baron, J. and Pohlmann, T.},
booktitle={Conference Proceedings: 4th ZEW Conference on the Economics of Innovation and Patenting},
year={2011},
abstract={This article provides empirical evidence that patent pools contribute to the patent inflation around technological standards. Building upon theoretical propositions drawn from Dequiedt and Versaevel (2007) and a database of 64.619 declarations of essential patents to major international Standard Developing Organizations (SDO), we investigate how patent pools influence the number of patents on a standard over time. While the high number of patents in ICT technologies is increasingly recognized as hampering the implementation of standards, this is the first thorough empirical analysis of the driving factors of this patent inflation. We control for a wide array of factors relating to standardization and the technological field to isolate the incremental effect of patent pools. We find that patent pools increase the number of essential patents especially through patent races in view of patent pool creation. To a lower extent, we also find evidence for opportunistic patent introductions into existing patent pools.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theoretical, Empirical, Econometric},
industry={ICT},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={In view of these benefits, patent pools are seen as indispensable instruments in cutting through the patent thickets in ICT.},
thicket_def={Refs Shpiro},
thicket_def_extract={Patent pools are seen as a potential solution to inefficiencies resulting from dense “thickets” of overlapping patents (Shapiro, 2001).},
tags={patents losing quality as more are being added to pools, uncertainty about pools ability to nurture R&D},
filename={Baron Pohlmann (2011) - Patent Pools And Patent Inflation.pdf}
}
@article{barpujari2010patent,
title={The Patent Regime and Nanotechnology: Issues and Challenges},
author={Barpujari, I.},
journal={Journal of Intellectual Property Rights},
volume={15},
number={3},
pages={206--213},
year={2010},
abstract={The emergent field of nanotechnology (NT) is currently very active worldwide with respect to intellectual property rights (IPR), especially patents, with both developed and developing countries joining in the nano-patents race. With the emergence of any new technology, nanotechnology creates opportunities as well as challenges in adapting the patent regime to its particular context. There is some consensus that patenting NT innovations poses more porblems than other technologies, owing to their multi-disciplinary character, cross-sectoral applications, broad claims as well as difficulties in fulfilling the patentability criteria of novelty, non-obviousness and industrial application. This is aggravated by a lack of standardized terminology which impedes easy identification of nano-patents and also the fact that patent offices may not be well-equipped to handle nanotechnology. These problems are likely to be compounded for developing and least developed countries, which irrespective of their state of technological advancement, and capacity of the domestic regime, are obliged to confed IPR in the new technology. This paper seeks to examine the challenges which patenting of NT entails for the patent regimes of nations and how these could be addressed. it relies on a study of the patent regimes and case laws of other countries, namely, the United States to draw lessons for India. The low volume of NT patent applications and grants at the Indian Patent office and lack of Indian case laws on teh subject make the discussion anticipatory and suggestive in nature. The paper finally arrives at certain recommendations, to help reconcile the need to incentivize innovation in the new technology, with the imperative of ensuring that the public interest is served and access to the patented knowledge is not hindered.},
discipline={Policy Report},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Nanotechnology},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The patent thicket like situation in nanotechnology created as a result of many broad, building block patents, could seriously impede developing country researchers from engaging in research in nanotechnology},
thicket_def={def27},
thicket_def_extract={When holders of such broad patents refuse to license their patents or license these on exclusive basis or at prohibitive prices or with restrictive conditions, it leads to the growth of patent thickets impeding downstream research in nanotechnology. The existence of a high number of such patents with broad and sometimes, overlapping claims adds to the problem of thickets and leads to the fragmentation of the patent landscape.},
tags={problems of patentability, special categories for nanotech, problems with too many restrictions on patent quality.},
filename={Barpujari (2010) - The Patent Regime And Nanotechnology Issues And Challenges.pdf}
}
@article{barton2002antitrust,
title = {Antitrust Treatment Of Oligopolies With Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios},
author = {Barton, John H.},
journal = {Antitrust Law Journal},
volume = {69},
number = {3},
pages = {pp. 851-882},
abstract = {},
language = {English},
year = {2002},
publisher = {American Bar Association},
copyright = {Copyright © 2002 American Bar Association},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={theory},
industry={general, ict},
thicket_stance={Weakly Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Oligopolists holding cross-infringing patents may actually reduce innovation by restricting entry into the oligopoly},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Oligopolies, Antitrust, Mutual Blocking},
filename={Barton (2002) - Antitrust Treatment Of Oligopolies With Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios.pdf}
}
@article{baumol2004entrepreneurial,
title = {Entrepreneurial Enterprises, Large Established Firms and Other Components of the Free-Market Growth Machine},
author = {Baumol, William J.},
journal = {Small Business Economics},
volume = {23},
number = {1},
pages = {pp. 9-21},
abstract = {The paper studies the principal influences accounting for the unprecedented growth and innovation performance of the free-market economies. It indicates that vigorous oligopolistic competition, particularly in high-tech industries, forces firms to keep innovating in order to survive. This leads them to internalize innovative activities rather than leaving them to independent inventors, and turns invention into an assembly-line process. The bulk of private R&D spending is shown to come from a tiny number of very large firms. Yet the revolutionary breakthroughs continue to come predominantly from small entrepreneurial enterprises, with large industry providing streams of incremental improvements that also add up to major contributions. Moreover, these firms voluntarily disseminate much of their innovative technology widely and rapidly, both as a major revenue source and in exchange for complementary technological property of other firms, including direct competitors. This helps to internalize the externalities of innovation and speeds elimination of obsolete technology. Some policy implications for industrialized and developing countries are also discussed.},
year = {2004},
publisher = {Springer},
copyright = {Copyright © 2004 Springer},
discipline={Econ, Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={general},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={This puts many of these firms in a legal position that can enable each to bring the manu- facturing process of the others to a halt. The most effective way to prevent the catastrophic conse- quences this threatens for each of them is the for- mation of a patent pool in which each makes use of its patents available to the other members of the pool, and even to outsiders (as a step to avoid intervention by the anti-monopoly authorities},
thicket_def={def13},
thicket_def_extract={Similar perils for the public interest arise in the last of the reasons for voluntary technology sharing - the problem of "patent thickets" and the widespread patent pools that have been formed to deal with the thicket problem. A complex piece of equipment, such as a computer, characteristically is made up of components each of which is covered by a surprisingly large number of patents, and the patents pertinent for such an item are often owned by a considerable number of different firms, many of them direct competitors in the final-product market. For example, Peter N. Detkin, vice president and assistant general counsel at Intel Corporation, estimates that there were more than 90,000 patents generally related to microprocessors held by more than 10,000 parties in 2002 (Federal Trade Commission, 2002, p. 667). This puts many of these firms in a legal position that can enable each to bring the manufacturing process of the others to a halt. The most effective way to prevent the catastrophic consequences this threatens for each of them is the formation of a patent pool in which each makes use of its patents available to the other members of the pool, and even to outsiders (as a step to avoid intervention by the anti-monopoly authorities...},
tags={Pool, Startups and Incumbents},
filename={Baumol (2004) - Entrepreneurial Enterprises Large Established Firms And Other Components.pdf}
}
@article{bawa2005nanotechnology,
title={The nanotechnology patent ‘gold rush’},
author={Bawa, R. and Bawa, SR and Maebius, S.B.},
journal={Journal of Intellectual Property Rights},
volume={10},
number={5},
pages={426--433},
year={2005},
abstract={During the past decade, a swarm of patent applications pertaining to nanotechnology has been arriving at all the major patent offices of the world, including the US Patent and Trademark office (USPTO). As companies develop products and processes and begin to seek commercial applications for their inventions, securing valid and defensible patent protection will be vital to their long-term survival. In the decades to come, with nanotechnology further maturing and the promised breakthroughs accruing, patents will generate licensing revenue, provide leverage in deals and mergers, and reduce the likelihood of infringement. Because development of nanotech-related products is extremely research intensive, without the market exclusivity offered by a US patent, development of these products and their commercial viability in the marketplace will be significantly hampered. In this paper, effects of 'nanopatent gold rush' that is underway by 'patent prospectors' as start-ups are highlighted whereby corporations compete to lock up broad patents in these critical early days. In fact, the entire US patent system is under greater scrutiny and strain, with the USPTO continuing to struggle with evaluating nanotech-related patent applications. It is unclear whether the nanotech industry will thrive like the information technology (IT) industry or get bogged down like the radio patent deadlock.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory},
industry={Nanotech},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Such patent proliferation of broad patents could ultimately result in 'patent thickets' that will require patent litigation to sort out, especially if areas of nanotechnology become financially lucrative. Given such a patent ladnscape for nanotechnology, expensive patent litigation is inevitable, with patent owners commanding some leverage with which to avoid a self-destructive patent war. The end result of all this is too familiar to the business and patent communities: (1) higher costs to consumers if and when products are commercialized; and (2) a drag on the innovation process itself.},
thicket_def={def14},
thicket_def_extract={Predatory inventors are individuals or corporations that patent every possible application around a novel early technology. If this approach becomes commmon... it could inevitably create nanotech patent thickets.},
tags={Licensing, Patenting strategy},
filename={Bawa Bawa Maebius (2005) - The Nanotechnology Patent Gold Rush.pdf}
}
@article{bawa2005will,
title={Will the Nanomedicine Patent Land Grab Thwart Commercialization?},
author={Bawa, Raj},
journal={Nanomedicine: nanotechnology, biology, and medicine},
volume={1},
pages={346--350},
year={2005},
abstract={},
discipline={Biology},
research_type={discussion},
industry={Nanomedicine},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Given such a patent landscape, expensive litigation is as inevitable as it was with the biotechnology industry, where extensive patent litigation resulted once the products became commercially successful. In most of the patent battles the larger entity with the deeper pocket s will rule the day even if the brightest stars and innovators are on the other side. ... Ultimately, this situation is all too familiar to the business and patent communities, in that it leads to higher costs to consumers, if and when products are commercialized [5], as well as deter ring the innovation process itself},
thicket_def={def1, Complementary inputs with infringement, Includes innovation loss},
thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets are broadly defined in academic discourse as "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology". Such patent thickets, as a result of multiple blocking patents, are considered to discourage and stifle innovation. Claims in such patent thickets have been characterized as boften broad, overlapping and conflicting — a scenario ripe for massive patent litigation battles in the future...},
tags={Commercialization},
filename={Bawa (2005) - Will The Nanomedicine Patent Land Grab Thwart Commercialization.pdf}
}
@article{bawa2007nanotechnology,
title={Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation and the Crisis at the US Patent Office},
author={Bawa, R.},
journal={Alb. LJ Sci. \& Tech.},
volume={17},
pages={699},
year={2007},
abstract={There is enormous excitement and expectation regarding nanotechnology's potential impact. However, securing valid and defensible patent protection will be critical here. Although early forecasts for nanotechnology commercialization are encouraging, there are bottlenecks as well. One of the major hurdles is an emerging thicket of patent claims, resulting primarily from patent proliferation, but also because of issuance of surprisingly broad patents by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Adding to this confusion is the fact taht the U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative's widely-cited definition of nanotechnology is inaccurate and irrelevant. This has also resulted in the PTO's flawed nanotechnology patent classification system. All of this is creating a chaotic, tangled patent landscape in vairous sectors of nanotechnology (e.g., nanoelectronics and nanomedicine) in which competing players are unsure as to the validity and enforceability of numerous issued patents. If this trend continues, it could stifle competition, limit access to some inventions and simply grind commercialization efforts to a halt. Therefore, reforms are urgently needed at the PTO to address problems ranging from poor patent quality and questionable examiniation practices to iinadequate search capabilities, rising attrition, poor employee morale, and a skyrocketing patent application backlog. Only a robust patent system will stimulate the development of commercially viable nanotechnology products.},
discipline={Policy Report},
research_type={Theory, Basic Facts about the industry },
industry={Nanotechnology},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Therefore, if the current dense patent landscape becomes more entangled and the patent thicket problem worsens, it may prove to be the major bottleneck to viable commercialization, negatively impacting the entire nanotechnology revolution. For investors, competing in this high-stakes patent game may prove too costly.},
thicket_def={refs, quotes shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets are broadly defined in acadmeic discourse as "a 'dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.'"... Such patent thickets, a result of multiple blocking patents, naturally discourage and stifle innovation...},
tags={too many rightsholders, cross-licensing, enforceability of patents, issues with patents in nanotechnology},
filename={Bawa (2007) - Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation And The Crisis At The Us Patent Office.pdf}
}
@article{beard2002patent,
title={Patent thickets, cross-licensing, and antitrust},
author={Beard, T.R. and Kaserman, D.L.},
journal={Antitrust Bull.},
volume={47},
pages={345},
year={2002},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory},
industry={general},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The patent thicket problem can be severe in certain technologically dynamic industries. Consider, for example, the semiconductor industry. In that industry, there reportedly are already over 250,000 patents in existence that, in principle, a new innovation potentially could infringe. In addition, there are several thousand additional patent applications typically in the process of review.' 4 As a result of these extant and forthcoming patents, it is virtually impossible for a firm to know, ex ante, whether a given microprocessor innovation will infringe a patent held by another firm. The patent thicket associated with this industry, then, is quite formidable, and it creates considerable uncertainty regarding the future legal status of any intellectual property created by R&D activities.},
thicket_def={def15},
thicket_def_extract={Where a highly complex product or process is covered by numerous interrelated patents, any holder of a patent that applies to that product or process potentially may block production and/or impede further technological developments, thereby jeopardizing the returns on other parties' prior investments. In such situations (i.e., where a given product is potentially affected by numerous patents owned by a number of different parties), the resulting uncertainty regarding unforeseen patent claims can dampen firms' incentives to invest in R&D activities. This potential for numerous interrelated patents to deter R&D investment has been called the patent thicket (or minefield) problem.},
tags={Cross-licensing, Anti-trust},
filename={Beard Kaserman (2002) - Patent Thickets Cross Licensing And Antitrust.pdf}
}
@article{bergman2007global,
title={The Global Stem Cell Patent Landscape: Implications for Efficient Technology Transfer and Commercial Development},
author={Bergman, K. and Graff, G.D.},
journal={Nature biotechnology},
volume={25},
number={4},
pages={419--424},
year={2007},
abstract={Characteristics of the complex and growing stem cell patent landscape indicate strategies by which public sector research institutions could improve the efficiency of intellectual property agreements and technology transfers in stem cells.},
discipline={Biotechnology},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={By blocking pathways to market and dampening investor interest in commercialization, a patent thicket has the potential to slow and skew the overall development of new technical applications.},
thicket_def={Def3},
thicket_def_extract={In a patent thicket, the existence of many overlapping patent claims can cause uncertainty about freedom to operate, impose multiple layers of transaction costs and stack royalty payments beyond levels that can be supported by the value of single innovations.},
tags={Clearinghouse},
filename={Bergman Graff (2007) - The Global Stem Cell Patent Landscape.pdf}
}
@article{bessen2003patent,
title={Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Taechnologies},
author={Bessen, J.},
journal={Available at SSRN 327760},
year={2003},
abstract={Patent race models assume that an innovator wins the only patent covering a product. But when technologies are complex, this property right is defective: ownership of a product’s technology is shared, not exclusive. In that case I show that if patent standards are low, firms build “thickets” of patents, especially incumbent firms in mature industries. When they assert these patents, innovators are forced to share rents under cross-licenses, making R&D incentives sub-optimal. On the other hand, when lead time advantages are significant and patent standards are high, firms pursue strategies of “mutual non-aggression.” Then R&D incentives are stronger, even optimal.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Mathematical},
industry={General, ICT},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={This paper argues that patent thickets can reduce R&D incentives even when there are no transaction costs, holdup or vertical monopoly problems.},
thicket_def={def29},
thicket_def_extract={The problem Baker describes is often called a “patent thicket.” These occur when each product may involve many patents, in contrast with the one-to-one correspondence between products and patents that is assumed in the patent race literature. Recent commentators suggest that lower patenting standards encourage patent thickets, creating difficulties for innovators (see Gallini, 2002, for a review).When innovators must negotiate with large numbers of patentholders, they may face excessive transaction costs (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998), “holdup,” and problems of vertical monopoly (Shapiro, 2001).},
tags={low innovation incentives, lack of lead time advantages, subsidize losers of innovation races},
filename={Bessen (2003) - Patent Thickets Strategic Patenting Of Complex Technologies.pdf}
}
@article{braun2007barriers,
title={Barriers to User Innovation: Moving Towards a Paradigm of 'Licence to Innovate'?},
author={Braun, V. and Herstatt, C.},
journal={International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management},
volume={7},
number={3},
pages={292--303},
year={2007},
abstract={Research into the phenomenon of user innovation has been sprouting in recent years like seeds after a rainy spring. Users have been found to be an important source of innovation in many different industries. An investigation of the barriers that users face when attempting to innovate is nevertheless lacking completely. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by discussing various factors that can prevent users from innovating. The evolution of the seed-breeding industry will be used for illustration purposes. We will argue that the barriers to user innovation seem to be progressing, potentially indicating that a paradigm change may be imminent.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={Agriculture},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The golden rice case finely illustrates the effect of such thickets on innovative researchers. Swiss scientists had developed a Vitamin A-enhanced rice that promised huge health benefits to millions of poor children in developing countries. Before they could share their development, however, the scientists had to work their way through 70 patents belonging to over 30 companies in addition to six restrictive material transfer agreements (Damodaran and Srivats, 2001).},
thicket_def={Def1},
thicket_def_extract={These developments certainly do not encourage user-innovation, as users wanting to amend existing products or to create new ones must navigate the IPR thicket. This refers to an overlapping set of IPRs, which requires those seeking to commercialise new technologies to obtain licences (Shapiro, 2001). It exists in many industries, such as in semiconductors and biotechnology (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998).},
tags={Barriers, Licensing},
filename={Braun Herstatt (2007) - Barriers To User Innovation.pdf}
}
@article{burk2003policy,
title={Policy Levers in Patent Law},
author={Burk, D.L. and Lemley, M.A.},
journal={Va. L. Rev.},
volume={89},
pages={1575--1696},
year={2003},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Particularly in areas like the semiconductor industry, com- panies need some means for "clearing" the patent thicket, such as cross-licensing all the rights needed for their complex product},
thicket_def={Def1},
thicket_def_extract={Closely related to the problem of complementarity is the prob- lem of horizontal overlaps between patents.122 Patents are fre- quently broader than the products the inventors actually make. Multiple patents often cover the same ground, sometimes as an in- tentional result of the patent system"' and sometimes because pat- ents regularly issue that are too broad or tread on the prior art.'24 Various parties may be able to lay claim to the same technologies or to aspects of the same technology. Carl Shapiro has termed this overlap of patent claims the "patent thicket},
tags={Various theories on Patent Policies},
filename={Burk Lemley (2003) - Policy Levers In Patent Law.pdf}
}
@article{calderini2006standardisation,
title={Standardisation in the ICT sector: The (complex) interface between antitrust and intellectual property},
author={Calderini, M. and Giannaccari, A.},
journal={Econ. Innov. New Techn.},
volume={15},
number={6},
pages={543--567},
year={2006},
publisher={Taylor \& Francis},
abstract={This article investigates the issue of standardisation in the ICT sector, analysing the most relevant aspects concerning intellectual property rights and anticompetitive strategies that can arise in standard setting organisations. The strategic dimension of this activity is also scrutinised, highlighting the different approaches followed by the United States and by the European Union. In this respect, after underlining the benefits of processes not lead by public structures, the article describes the fundamental role of internal regulations, which are necessary both for the purpose of having a sound process, and also reducing the risk of collusion and other anticompetitive conducts among members.},
discipline={Econ, Policy},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={ICT},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Obviously, this frequently results in high monetary and transaction costs. The entity of such costs is often so great as to discourage innovative activity in the downstream phases of the innovation process... Contrarily, in the presence of cumulative and systemic innovative activities, there are reasons to believe that too strict intellectual property rights would lead to perverse effects on innovative activity within the industry.},
thicket_def={refs shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={This network is defined a patent thicket (Shapiro, 2001). A patent thicket consists of a number of adjacent and overlapping property rights, which impose on whoever wishes to use certain intermediate goods to ask for licenses from several patent holders.},
tags={SSO, IP Rights, Definition of SSOs},
filename={Calderini Giannaccari (2006) - Standardisation In The Ict Sector.pdf}
}
@article{callaway2008patent,
title={Patent Incentives in the Semiconductor Industry},
author={Callaway, D.},
journal={Hastings Bus. LJ},
volume={4},
pages={135},
year={2008},
publisher={HeinOnline},
abstract={The semiconductor industry comprises organizations of all sizes, from single engineers contracting their work to companies as large and powerful as have ever existed. The rapid advancement of technology in the semiconductor field makes it a crucible for theories about the patent system as a whole. It is arguably desirable that as new technologies come to market, patents should be issued with appropriate scope so that other inventors retain incentive to innovate.' But it is not only the Patent Office which can offer or hinder incentives for inventors. The semiconductor industry is subjected to various incentives, both negative and positive, from Congress, the courts, and from within. Part A of this paper will survey the semiconductor industry and the incentives for patenting integrated circuits. Part B will look at disincentives, and problems that have arisen in the industry. Part C focuses particularly on patent issues relating to "interface circuits"--those circuits that directly connect a chip to the outside world},
discipline={Law},
research_type={theory},
industry={Semiconductor},
thicket_stance={Weakly Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The proliferation of the 555 by other companies illustrates the cutthroat nature of the semiconductor industry in its infancy. But today, more than ever, large semiconductor companies encourage their rivals to enter cross-licensing agreements.},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={Thickets only referenced in footnotes},
tags={555 Timer, History, Industry example},
filename={Callaway (2008) - Patent Incentives In The Semiconductor Industry.pdf}
}
@article{carrier2003resolving,
title={Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation},
author={Carrier, M.A.},
journal={Vand. L. Rev.},
volume={56},
pages={1047},
year={2003},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={A prominent example of a patent thicket is the semiconductor industry, in which hundreds, if not thousands, of patents can read onto a single product. 208 The patents typically cover "aspects of the circuitry design, materials used to achieve a certain outcome, and the broad array of methods used to manufacture the device."20 9 Consequently, companies such as IBM, Intel, and Motorola "find it all too easy to unintentionally infringe on a patent in designing a microprocessor, potentially exposing themselves to billions of dollars of liability and/or an injunction forcing them to cease production of key products."210 This concern is especially relevant for firms that have made "costly and rapidly-depreciating investments in wafer fabrication facilities, which inherently utilize a 'thicket' of innovations developed by many parties."},
thicket_def={def16},
thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro has defined a patent thicket as "an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees."20 3 Patent thickets have been associated most frequently with the semiconductor industry, but they also have been observed in the biotechnology, computer software, and Internet industries.},
tags={Pool, Bottlenecks},
filename={Carrier (2003) - Resolving The Patent Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation.pdf}
}
@article{carrier2004cabining,
title = {Cabining Intellectual Property through a Property Paradigm},
author = {Carrier, Michael A.},
journal = {Duke Law Journal},
volume = {54},
number = {1},
pages = {pp. 1-145},
abstract = {One of the most revolutionary legal changes in the past generation has been the "propertization" of intellectual property (IP). The duration and scope of rights expand without limit, and courts and companies treat IP as absolute property, bereft of any restraints. But astonishingly, scholars have not yet recognized that propertization also can lead to the narrowing of IP. In contrast to much of the literature, which criticizes the propertization of IP, this Article takes it as a given. For the transformation is irreversible, sinking its tentacles further into public and corporate consciousness (as well as the IP laws) with each passing day and precluding the likelihood that IP will return to the prepropertization era. This Article therefore ventures onto a new path, one that follows property into unexpected briar patches of limits. The secret here is that property is not as absolute as it is often claimed to be. After surveying fifty doctrines in property law, Professor Carrier synthesizes limits based on development, necessity, and equity. He then utilizes these limits to construct a new paradigm for IP. The paradigm facilitates the reorganization of defenses that courts currently recognize as well as a more robust set of defenses, which include (1) a new tripartite fair use doctrine in copyright law, (2) a new defense for public health emergencies and a recovered experimental use defense and reverse doctrine of equivalents in patent law, (3) a development-based limit to trademark dilution, and (4) a functional use defense for the right of publicity. By adopting the paradigm of property, IP has reopened the door to limits. Rediscovering these limits offers significant promise for the future of innovation and democracy.},
year = {2004},
publisher = {Duke University School of Law},
copyright = {Copyright © 2004 Duke University School of Law},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The danger inherent in these mechanisms is exacerbated when patents issue for products already on the market, because the owner of a newly issued patent holds a commanding position over manufacturers already in large-scale production, who cannot easily redesign their products and thus are forced to comply with the new patentee's demands},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={Intragenerational bottlenecks occur most frequently in the semiconductor industry and have also appeared in the biotechnology, computer software, and Internet industries.188 In such industries,there frequently arises a "patent thicket,"189 in which overlapping patent rights enable each patent holder with a patented input in the product to block the use of the product by all others},
tags={Nature of IP, Reverse Doctorine of Equivalents},
filename={Carrier (2004) - Cabining Intellectual Property Through A Property Paradigm.pdf}
}
@article{carrier2002antitrust,
title={Why Antitrust Should Defer to the Intellectual Property Rules of Standard-Setting Organizations: A Commentary on Teece \& (and) Sherry},
author={Carrier, M.A.},
journal={Minn. L. Rev.},
volume={87},
pages={2017-2034},
year={2002},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion, Commentary},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The clearing of patent thickets and fostering of cumulative innovation and new markets through SSOs offers perhaps the most powerful benefits for competition and innovation.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={SSOs, Role of Antitrust, IPR Reform},
filename={Carrier (2002) - Why Antitrust Should Defer To The Intellectual Property Rules Of SSOs.pdf}
}
@article{carrier2012roadmap,
title={A Roadmap to the Smartphone Patent Wars and FRAND Licensing},
author={Carrier, M.},
journal={CPI Antitrust Chronicle},
volume={2},
year={2012},
abstract={The smartphone industry today is characterized by a thicket of patents and wars based on those patents. Every day brings a new lawsuit or development between Apple, HTC, Microsoft, Motorola Mobility (“MMI”), Nokia, and Samsung. The lawsuits span numerous courts and several continents. And they often pit Apple or Microsoft on one side and manufacturers of Google’s Android operating system—HTC, MMI, and Samsung—on the other.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={ICT},
thicket_stance={Neutral},
thicket_stance_extract={The smartphone industry today is characterized by a thicket of patents and wars based on those patents.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={SSOs, FRAND, Smartphone, Antitrust},
filename={Carrier (2012) - A Roadmap To The Smartphone Patent Wars And Frand Licensing.pdf}
}
@article{choi2005live,
title={Live and Let Live: A Tale of Weak Patents},
author={Choi, J.P.},
journal={Journal of the European Economic Association},
volume={3},
number={2-3},
pages={724--733},
year={2005},
abstract={Patent protection has gradually expanded over time, and many patents of suspect value are routinely granted owing to the lack of rigorous scrutiny in the examination process. This has resulted in the recent explosion of patents granted and potentially creates a "patent thicket" that hinders future innovation. I investigate the question of whether the litigation process can be relied on to restore competition when an imperfect market outcome is sustained through patents of suspect value. The analysis undertaken in the paper points out the serious lack of private incentives to eliminate patents of suspect value through litigation. I also discuss potential measures to restore the soundness of the patent system.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The lack of rigorous scrutiny in the examination process- in conjunction with the recent explosion of patents granted- has led to a serious concern that the current patent system may impede, rather than promote, innovation by creating a "patent thicket"(Shapiro 2001; Gallini 2002; Bessen 2003).},
thicket_def={refs shapiro, gallini, bessen},
thicket_def_extract={The lack of rigorous scrutiny in the examination process- in conjunction with the recent explosion of patents granted- has led to a serious concern that the current patent system may impede, rather than promote, innovation by creating a "patent thicket"(Shapiro 2001; Gallini 2002; Bessen 2003).},
tags={patents of suspect value, litigation issues, substitute patents, exclusive rights to first invalidator, IPR Reform},
filename={Choi (2005) - Live And Let Live A Tale Of Weak Patents.pdf}
}
@article{chu2009effects,
title = {Effects of Blocking Patents on R&D: A Quantitative DGE Analysis},
author = {Chu, Angus C.},
journal = {Journal of Economic Growth},
volume = {14},
number = {1},
pages = {pp. 55-78},
abstract = {What are the effects of blocking patents on R&D and consumption? This paper develops a quality-ladder growth model with overlapping intellectual property rights and capital accumulation to quantitatively evaluate the effects of blocking patents. The analysis focuses on two policy variables (a) patent breadth that determines the amount of profits created by an invention and (b) the profit-sharing rule that determines the distribution of profits between current and former inventors along the quality ladder. The model is calibrated to aggregate data of the US economy. Under parameter values that match key features of the US economy and show equilibrium R&D underinvestment, I find that optimizing the profit-sharing rule of blocking patents would lead to a significant increase in R&D, consumption and welfare. Also, the paper derives and quantifies a dynamic distortionary effect of patent policy on capital accumulation.},
year = {2009},
publisher = {Springer},
copyright = {Copyright © 2009 Springer},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={This reasoning suggests that for the purpose of stimulating R&D, reducing the backloading effect of blocking patents would have been a less harmful policy instrument than increasing patent breadth. Even if the current level of R&D is socially optimal, it would be beneficial for the society to reduce the level of patent breadth and the backloading effect of blocking patents simultaneously to keep R&D constant.},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={Today, most basic and applied researchers are effectively standing on top of a huge pyramid... Of course, a pyramid can rise to far greater heights than could any one person... But what happens if, in order to scale the pyramid and place a new block on the top, a researcher must gain the permission of each person who previously placed a block in the pyramid, perhaps paying a royalty or tax to gain such permission? Would this system of intellectual property rights slow down the construction of the pyramid or limit its heights? ... To complete the analogy, blocking patents play the role of the pyramid's building blocks.Carl Shapiro (2001)},
tags={Blocking patents, Profit sharing rules},
filename={Chu (2009) - Effects Of Blocking Patents On R and D A Quantitative DGE Analysis.pdf}
}
@misc{competition2008pharmaceutical,
title={Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry-Preliminary Report},
author={Competition, DG},
year={2008},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy Report},
research_type={Empirical, Data Study of Large Originator Companies},
industry={Pharmaceutical},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={One commonly applied strategy is filing numerous patents for the same medicine (forming so called "patent clusters" or "patent thickets"). Documents gathered in the course of the inquiry confirm that an important objective of this strategy is to delay or block the market entry of generic medicines. In this respect the inquiry finds that individual blockbuster medicines are protected by up to 1,300 patents and/or pending patent applications EU-wide and that, as mentioned above, certain patent filings occur very late in the life cycle of a medicine...In their submissions, both generic and originator companies support the creation of a single Community patent to amend the current costly and burdensome system consisting of a bundle of national patents.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Pharmaceutical Generics and Originators, Patent Filings, Industry Analysis, European},
filename={Competition (2008) - Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary Report.pdf}
}
@article{cotter2008patent,
title={Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses},
author={Cotter, T.F.},
journal={J. Corp. L.},
volume={34},
pages={1151},
year={2008},
publisher={HeinOnline},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={In the next two Parts, however, I will argue that, ifpatent holdup is a serious problem in reality, certain reforms to patent law may be desirable, although the precise nature of those reforms will depend in large part on the comparative error costs of different approaches to calculating reasonable royalties.},
thicket_def={def18},
thicket_def_extract={In this regard, I present a definition of patent holdup as a type of opportunistic behavior on the part of patent owners that threatens to impose (1) static deadweight losses that are not justified by likely increases in dynamic efficiency, or (2) dynamic efficiency losses due to reduction in the incentive to participate in standard setting organizations or to engage in follow-up innovation.},
tags={IPR Reform, Patent Hold-up, Antitrust},
filename={Cotter (2008) - Patent Holdup Patent Remedies And Antitrust Responses.pdf}
}
@article{cowin2007policy,
title={Policy Options for the Improvement of the European Patent System},
author={Cowin, R. and Van der Eijck, W. and Lissoni, F. and Lotz, P. and Van Overwalle, G. and Schovsbo, J.},
journal={Scientific Technology Options Assessment (STOA) of the European Parliament},
year={2007},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy},
research_type={Empirical, Industry Data},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={To meet the challenges that the governance of the European patent system is facing because of the emergence of patent thickets the increasing number of patent applications and patenting for defensive and strategic reasons, three options were recommended. These were: (i) enhancing the patent awareness within the European Parliament; (ii) establishing a European Parliament Standing Committee on Patents, which should be linked with an External Advisory Body composed by experts, practitioners and stakeholders; and (iii) enhancing patent awareness within the Commission.},
thicket_def={def31},
thicket_def_extract={The sectors which are most affected by this phenomenon, at least in the US, are those whose process and product innovations rely upon complex technologies where an individual piece of equipment is the result of a very large number of components, all susceptible to patent protection. Here, the recent boom in patenting observed by many researchers is largely explained not by a firms’ drive to innovate more than before, but by a need to accumulate large enough “patent thickets”. These patent thickets work as a sort of insurance against possible legal actions from other companies. They are in effect therefore, a kind of defensive manoeuvre.},
tags={reforming patent thickets in europe, defensive use of thickets, IPR Reform},
filename={Cowin (2007) - Policy Options For The Improvement Of The European Patent System.pdf}
}
@article{d2009pools,
title={Pools, Thickets and Open Source Nanotechnology},
author={D'Silva, J.},
journal={European Intellectual Property Review},
volume={31},
number={6},
pages={300--306},
year={2009},
abstract={Discusses how to promote the development of nanotechnology by overcoming problems with the patent system. Considers how patent thickets and patent trolls may discourage innovative work. Describes the advantages of licensing patents by means of a patent pool. Examines to what extent inventors can benefit from the experience of the open-source software movement.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Nanotechnology},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={In most cases this will deter many smaller startups and research centres from attempting to traverse the patent thicket. Also broad, overlapping and conflicting thickets are likely to lead to lengthy and costly patent battles.},
thicket_def={def30},
thicket_def_extract={When multiple organisations each own individual patents that are collectively necessary for a particular technology, their competing intellectual property rights form a "patent thicket". (cites: Gavin Clarkson and David DeKorte, "The Problem of Patent Thickets in Convergent Technologies" [2006] Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1093, 181.)},
tags={patent pools, open sourcing},
filename={DSilva (2009) - Pools Thickets And Open Source Nanotechnology.pdf}
}
@article{denicolo2007do,
title = {Do Patents Over-Compensate Innovators?},
author = {Denicolò, Vincenzo},
journal = {Economic Policy},
volume = {22},
number = {52},
pages = {pp. 679+681-729},
abstract = {Is the current level of patent protection too high or too low? To address this issue, this paper reformulates the theoretical analysis of the optimal level of patent protection to take into account the empirical findings of the innovation production function literature. This literature finds a strong relationship between R&D spending and inventions and estimates an elasticity of the supply of inventions of 0.5 or more. Thepaper then assesses the current level of patent protection, exploiting estimates of the private and social returns to R&D taken from the empirical literature and other available sources. Although more research is needed for a more precise assessment, the evidence available suggests that patents do not overcompensate innovators.},
year = {2007},
publisher = {Wiley on behalf of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, Center for Economic Studies, and the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme},
copyright = {Copyright © 2007 Centre for Economic Policy Research, Center for Economic Studies and Maison des Sciences de l'Homme},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weakly Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={It is tempting to conclude that policy reform, if anything, should strengthen patent protection. At this stage, however, no policy conclusion can be anything but tentative. The assessment developed in this paper, while highly suggestive, is not truly compelling: reasonable interpretations of the same evidence (or lack thereof) might differ},
thicket_def={def19},
thicket_def_extract={In certain industries, such as telecommunications and biotechnology, production of new products often requires many complementary innovative components that are owned by different firms. The proliferation and fragmentation of intellectual property rights creates a 'patent thicket' that is often viewed as an obstacle to innovation. Two main problems may emerge. First, a proliferation of patents held by different owners increases transaction costs and might even prevent manufacturers from obtaining the right to develop the new products, creating the tragedy of the anticommons (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Second, with complementary patents there may be a problem of Cournot complements (Shapiro, 2001) that increases the deadweight loss to profit ratio. },
tags={Complementary Innovations},
filename={Denicolo (2007) - Do Patents Over Compensate Innovators.pdf}
}
@article{devlin2009indeterminism,
title = {Indeterminism and the Property-Patent Equation},
author = {Devlin, Alan},
journal = {Yale Law & Policy Review},
volume = {28},
number = {1},
pages = {pp. 61-106},
language = {English},
year = {2009},
publisher = {Yale Law & Policy Review, Inc.},
copyright = {Copyright © 2009 Yale Law & Policy Review, Inc.},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={More fundamentally still, the innumerable overlapping patents in certain high tech fields create an impenetrable "thicket" that frustrates quixotic conceptions of Coasian bargaining and acts only as an anticommons that paradoxically fore closes innovation.},
thicket_def={def20},
thicket_def_extract={More fundamentally still, the innumerable overlapping patents in certain high tech fields create an impenetrable "thicket" that frustrates quixotic conceptions of Coasian bargaining and acts only as an anticommons that paradoxically fore closes innovation. One's exclusion of another from his land is isolated; a single patentee's ability to enjoin production of a semiconductor chip that implicates thousands of patents creates powerful negative externalities. Given such distinctions, many view the worlds of patent law and traditional property as sufficiently distinct to be unworthy of direct analogy.},
tags={Comparison of real and intellectual property rights},
filename={Devlin (2009) - Indeterminism And The Property Patent Equation.pdf}
}
@article{dhar20071,
title={The Impact of Intellectual Property Rights in the Plant and Seed Industry},
author={Dhar, T. and Foltz, J.},
journal={Agricultural Biotechnolgy and Intellectual Property Protection: Seeds of Change},
pages={161},
year={2007},
publisher={CABI},
abstract={This work uses changes in intellectual property rights regimes for plants as a way to identify the value and cost to industries and society of the different components of property rights: exclusivity, research exemptions, and revelation of research outcomes. A simple model is described that can account for these differences in company choice of intellectual property versus keeping trade secrets. The data used include observations on multiple crop types over a span of 20+ years across 3 different intellectual property rights regimes. Differences in the replicability of crop types are shown to cause intellectual property rights to have diverse sets of incentives for research and property rights claims.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical},
industry={Agriculture},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={A 2002 court ruling in Madey v. Duke University greatly contracts the research exemption rules on US patents especially for universities making this patent thicket potentially more of a problem.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={A number of observers of patenting, particularly in the biological sciences, have suggested that patenting rules and overlapping claims have generated a "patent thicket" that has impeded innovation and made the R&D process more costly (Rai, 2001; Rai, 1999). Rai (2001) for example, argues that broad patents especially on upstream platform technologies represent a threat to competition and the cumulative process of innovation in the biopharmaceutical industry.},
tags={firm strategy, utility patents, revelation loss, IPR, trade secrets},
filename={Dhar Foltz (2007) - The Impact Of Intellectual Property Rights In The Plant And Seed Industry.pdf}
}
@article{eisenmann2008managing,
title = {Managing Proprietary and Shared Platforms},
author = {Eisenmann, Thomas R.},
journal = {California Management Review},
volume = {50},
number = {4},
pages = {pp. 31-53},
abstract = {In a platform-mediated network, users rely on a common platform (provided by one or more intermediaries) that encompasses infrastructure and rules required by users to transact with each other. A fundamental design decision for firms that aspire to develop platform-mediated networks is whether to preserve proprietary control or share their platform with rivals. A proprietary platform has a single provider that solely controls its technology (for example, Federal Express, Apple Macintosh, or Google). With a shared platform such as Visa, DVD, or Linux, multiple firms collaborate in developing the platform's technology and then compete in offering users different but compatible versions of the platform. This article examines factors that favor proprietary versus shared models when designing platforms and then explains how management challenges differ for proprietary and shared platform providers when mobilizing new networks.},
year = {2008},
publisher = {University of California Press},
copyright = {Copyright © 2008 University of California Press},
discipline={Management},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Television},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={A second type of IP-based claim can occur when shared platforms rely on many different patented technologies, each of which has no obvious substitute. Firms may find themselves in a patent "thicket," in which several parties are able to derail a shared platform by threatening to withhold necessary contributions.12 Each firm can issue an ultimatum, demanding a large share of the platform's added value},
thicket_def={Refs Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={A second type of IP-based claim can occur when shared platforms rely on many different patented technologies, each of which has no obvious substitute. Firms may find themselves in a patent "thicket," in which several parties are able to derail a shared platform by threatening to withhold necessary contributions.12 Each firm can issue an ultimatum, demanding a large share of the platform's added value},
tags={Shared Platform, Licensing},
filename={Eisenmann (2008) - Managing Proprietary And Shared Platforms.pdf}
}
@article{eisenstein2010up,
title={Up for Grabs},
author={Eisenstein, M.},
journal={Nature Biotechnology},
volume={28},
number={6},
pages={544--546},
year={2010},
publisher={Nature Publishing Group},
abstract={As recently as three months ago, it still all seemed so simple. Shinya Yamanaka, whose team at the University of Kyoto in Japan is generally acknowledged by the research community as the first to successfully reprogram differentiated cells into iPS cells1, was also the sole patent holder for the technology. But as with any other patent land grab, iPS cell intellectual property (IP) is beginning to look less and less like a one-horse race. Two other recently issued patents in the United States and United Kingdom (Table 1), each awarded to a different inventor with a potentially strong claim to priority, now stand alongside Yamanaka’s patent, which was exclusively issued in Japan. With this newly tangled IP landscape, questions are arising about the possible emergence of a patent thicket. On the other hand, early signs suggest that the iPS cell marketplace may evolve to provide ample room for many different contenders. Whereas for now companies are focused primarily on iPS cell cultivation as a means for deriving clinically relevant mature cells, companies may take advantage of recent data on transdifferentiation that suggest that this pluripotent midpoint may even be dispensable in the future2.},
discipline={Biology},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Stem Cells, Biology},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={As recently as three months ago, it still all seemed so simple. Shinya Yamanaka, whose team at the University of Kyoto in Japan is generally acknowledged by the research community as the first to successfully reprogram differentiated cells into iPS cells1, was also the sole patent holder for the technology. But as with any other patent land grab, iPS cell intellectual property (IP) is beginning to look less and less like a one-horse race. Two other recently issued patents in the United States and United Kingdom (Table 1), each awarded to a different inventor with a potentially strong claim to priority, now stand alongside Yamanaka’s patent, which was exclusively issued in Japan. With this newly tangled IP landscape, questions are arising about the possible emergence of a patent thicket.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={iPS industry, intercountry patents, international applications},
filename={Eisenstein (2010) - Up For Grabs.pdf}
}
@article{federal2003promote,
title={To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy},
author={Federal Trade Commission},
journal={Washington, DC},
year={2003},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy Report},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={General, Pharmaceutical, Biotechnology, ICT, Semiconductor},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={This process can deter follow-on innovation and unjustifiably raise costs to businesses and, ultimately, to consumers.},
thicket_def={def1, def21},
thicket_def_extract={This tends to create a “patent thicket” – that is, a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology... Questionable patents contribute to the patent thicket. In the context of a patent thicket, questionable patents can introduce new kinds of licensing difficulties, such as royalties stacked one on top of another, and can increase uncertainty about the patent landscape, thus complicating business planning. Questionable patents in patent thickets can frustrate competition by current manufacturers as well as potential entrants. Because a manufacturer needs a license to all of the patents that cover its product, firms can use questionable patents to extract high royalties or to threaten litigation...},
tags={FTC Report},
filename={FTC (2003) - To Promote Innovation.pdf}
}
@article{federal2011evolving,
title={The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition.”},
author={Federal Trade Commission},
journal={March, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf},
year={2011},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy Report},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={IT},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Furthermore, if the alleged infringer would face large switching costs due to sunk investments based on the patented technology, it may be forced to pay higher royalties than it would have negotiated prior to launch.30 These risks increase expected costs, reducing firms’ incentives to pursue innovative projects,31 while the associated expenses cause firms to reduce spending on R&D.},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={Indeed, IT products are often surrounded by “patent thickets” – densely overlapping patent rights held by multiple patent owners...},
tags={FTC Report},
filename={FTC (2011) - The Evolving IP Marketplace.pdf}
}
@article{feldman2004open,
title={The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?},
author={Feldman, R.},
journal={Minnesota Journal of Law, Science \& Technology},
volume={6},
year={2004},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory, Discussion},
industry={Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Scholars have used the term “patent thicket” to describe the problem of multiple overlapping rights that can hamper innovation by creating transaction barriers. Most scholars and those reporting from the field agree that large numbers of rights hamper research and innovation, particularly in the biotech field.21 One scholar, however, has challenged the notion.22 John Walsh argues that firms simply work around the problem of multiple rights for example, by moving offshore beyond the reach of the patent rights, inventing around the rights, and using public research tools.23 In particular, Walsh argues that academic researchers routinely ignore rights structures and that patent holders passively acquiesce.},
thicket_def={refs shapiro, lemley},
thicket_def_extract={Scholars have used the term “patent thicket” to describe the problem of multiple overlapping rights that can hamper innovation by creating transaction barriers. Most scholars and those reporting from the field agree that large numbers of rights hamper research and innovation, particularly in the biotech field.21 One scholar, however, has challenged the notion.22 John Walsh argues that firms simply work around the problem of multiple rights for example, by moving offshore beyond the reach of the patent rights, inventing around the rights, and using public research tools.23 In particular, Walsh argues that academic researchers routinely ignore rights structures and that patent holders passively acquiesce.},
tags={open source biotechnology, academic research tools},
filename={Feldman (2004) - The Open Source Biotechnology Movement Is It Patent Misuse.pdf}
}
@article{galasso2007broad,
title={Broad Cross-license Agreements and Persuasive Patent Litigation: Theory and Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry},
author={Galasso, A.},
journal={LSE STICERD Research Paper No. EI45},
year={2007},
abstract={In many industries broad cross-license agreements are considered a useful method to obtain freedom to operate and to avoid patent litigation. In this paper I study the previously neglected dynamic trade-off between litigating and cross-licensing that firms face to protect their intellectual property. I present a model of bargaining with learning in which firms’ decisions to litigate or crosslicense depend on their investments in technology specific assets. In particular the model predicts that where firms’ sunk costs are higher, their incentive to litigate and delay a cross-license agreement is lower. In addition, the bargaining game shows how firms with intermediate values of asset specificity tend to engage in inefficient "persuasive litigation". Using a novel dataset on the US semiconductor industry I obtain empirical results consistent with those suggested by the model. Combining model intuition with some empirical figures, I evaluate possible effects of the currently debated patent litigation reform.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical, Econometric Model},
industry={General, Semiconductors},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={In particular, Shapiro (2001) has argued that a "patent thicket" has appeared that renders it difficult to commercialize a new technology. In some industries the number of intellectual property rights a firm requires to produce a new product is so large, and their ownership is so dispersed, that it is quite easy to unintentionally infringe on a patent. In this environment there is, therefore, a hold-up problem: when the manufacturer starts selling its product a patentee might show up threatening to shut production down unless it is paid high royalties.},
thicket_def={refs shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={During the past few years various scholars1 and industry representatives have drawn attention to specific inefficiencies generated by the patent system in several industries. In particular, Shapiro (2001) has argued that a "patent thicket" has appeared that renders it difficult to commercialize a new technology},
tags={Cross-licensing},
filename={Galasso (2007) - Broad Cross License Agreements And Persuasive Patent Litigation.pdf}
}
@article{gallini2011private,
title={Private Agreements for Coordinating Patent Rights: The Case of Patent Pools},
author={Gallini, N.},
journal={Economia e Politica Industriale},
year={2011},
publisher={FrancoAngeli Editore},
abstract={Inventors and users of technology often enter into cooperative agreements for sharing their intellectual property in order to implement a standard or to avoid costly litigation. Over the past two decades, U.S. antitrust authorities have viewed pooling arrangements that integrate complementary, valid and essential patents as having procompetitive benefits in reducing prices, transactions costs, and the incidence of legal suits. Since patent pools are cooperative agreements, they also have the potential of suppressing competition if, for example, they harbor weak or invalid patents, dampen incentives to conduct research on innovations that compete with the pooled patents, foreclose competition from downstream product or upstream input markets, or raise prices on goods that compete with the pooled patents. In synthesizing the ideas advanced in the economic literature, this paper explores whether these antitrust concerns apply to pools with complementary patents and, if they do, the implications for competition policy to constrain them. Special attention is given to the application of the U.S. Department of Justice-Federal Trade Commission Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995) and its companion Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007) to recent patent pool cases.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={These developments over the past few decades have led some economists and legal experts to conclude – contrary to conventional belief – that the strengthening of patent rights has frustrated, rather than supported, incentives to innovate},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={A patent thicket arises when there are overlapping patent rights that must be identified and licensed in order for an innovator to bring a new product or technology to market...},
tags={Pools},
filename={Gallini (2011) - Private Agreements For Coordinating Patent Rights.pdf}
}
@article{ganslandt2009intellectual,
title={Intellectual property rights and competition policy},
author={Ganslandt, M.},
year={2009},
publisher={Emerald Group Publishing Limited},
abstract={Intellectual property rights and competition policy are intimately related. In this paper I survey the economic literature analyzing the interaction between intellectual property law and competition law and how the boundary between these two policies is drawn in practice. Recognizing that intellectual property rights and competition law can interact in many different ways, the presentation focuses on several key issues. The economic literature on the interaction between competition law and intellectual property rights shows that these regulatory systems are consistent in terms of basic principles. Significant tensions exist, however, and it is difficult to balance IPR and competition law in practice. The significant differences in approach between the United States and the European Union simply reflect the underlying reality that efforts to achieve a sensible balance do not result in policy harmonization.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={IT, Biotech},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Patent thickets may, therefore, impede the ability of firms to conduct research effectively (Eisenberg 1989)... Shapiro (2001) argues that problems with patent thickets become especially thorny in conjunction with the risk of hold-up, which is the danger that new products will inadvertently infringe on patents issued after these products were designed. In terms of empirical evidence, the problem may be insignificant in practice, at least at the general level. Walsh et al. (2003) find that drug discovery has not been substantially impeded by the multiplicity of patented prior inventions and they find little evidence that university research has been impeded by concerns about patents on research tools.},
thicket_def={Def1, Def22},
thicket_def_extract={In addition, the significant increase in the multiplicity of patents, referred to as “patent thickets” and “patent floods”, are considered by many to impede the ability of firms to conduct R&D activity effectively (Eisenberg 1989; Shapiro 2001)... A second issue relevant for sequential innovations is so-called “patent thickets”. In some industries, particularly biotechnology and information technologies, it is common that a new entrant, in order to engage in research or production, must obtain a large number of licenses from existing and previous innovators and producers. This problem raises the cost of product commercialization and may create substantial entry barriers for new firms.},
tags={IPR Reform, Antitrust},
filename={Ganslandt (2009) - Intellectual Property Rights And Competition Policy.pdf}
}
@article{gaule2006towards,
title={Towards Patent Pools in Biotechnology?},
author={Gaul{\'e}, P.},
journal={Innovation Strategy Today},
volume={2},
number={2},
pages={123--143},
year={2006},
abstract={},
discipline={Management, Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The strength of the anti-commons thesis rests on two assumptions that are very difficult to test: (1) that developing commercial biomedical products requires access to many different IP rights and (2) that negotiating access with different patent owners is prohibitively difficult and costly. On the first point, the number of biotechnology patents has certainly increased dramatically over the last decade, although by itself that does not necessarily imply greater fragmentation. Walsh et al. (2003) report from interviews with biotechnology industry IP practitioners that preliminary freedom to operate searches can sometimes find hundreds of patents relevant to a candidate product but that on closer inspection “there may be, in a complicated case, about 6-12 that they have to seriously address, but that more typically the number was zero.” Enough anecdotal evidence exists, however, to suggest that the fragmentation of rights in biotechnology is sometimes a serious concern.},
thicket_def={Def32},
thicket_def_extract={The IP rights situation described above was arguably a classical case of a patent thicket with fragmented IP rights and uncertainty about technology ownership},
tags={patent pools, cross-licensing},
filename={Gaule (2006) - Towards Patent Pools In Biotechnology.pdf}
}
@article{gilbert2004antitrust,
title={Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution},
author={Gilbert, R.J.},
journal={Stanford Technology Law Review},
volume={2004},
year={2004},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion, Equations},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Antitrust, patent pools, competition, IPR Reform},
filename={Gilbert (2004) - Antitrust For Patent Pools A Century Of Policy Evolution.pdf}
}
@article{gilbert2010ties,
title={Ties That Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent Pools},
author={Gilbert, R.J.},
journal={Antitrust Law Journal},
year={2010},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Patent thickets are common to many high-technology industries in which the manufacture, use, or sale of a device or process may require rights to hundreds of patents.7 Overlapping patent rights raise numerous potential economic problems. Transaction costs of licensing can be high because licensees must identify, search out, and negotiate with numerous separate licensors. Litigation risks can be high because an incomplete portfolio of patent licenses can expose a firm to potentially large infringement damages.},
thicket_def={Refs Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={A “patent thicket,” in which many independent patent holders have rights that cover a technology, is one example of the anticommons.},
tags={Patent Pools},
filename={Gilbert (2010) - Ties That Bind Policies To Promote Good Patent Pools.pdf}
}
@article{goozner2006innovation,
title={Innovation in Biomedicine: Can Stem Cell Research Lead the Way to Affordability?},
author={Goozner, M.},
journal={PLoS medicine},
volume={3},
number={5},
pages={e126},
year={2006},
publisher={Public Library of Science},
abstract={},
discipline={Biology},
research_type={Policy, Discussion, Industry Statistics},
industry={Biology, Stem Cell},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={While many researchers, especially in academia, find ways around patent restrictions, and many companies have no trouble executing license agreements, there are cases where “patent thickets” have discouraged other researchers from pursuing similar or subsequent lines of inquiry.},
thicket_def={refs heller eisenberg, refs eisenberg},
thicket_def_extract={While many researchers, especially in academia, find ways around patent restrictions, and many companies have no trouble executing license agreements, there are cases where “patent thickets” have discouraged other researchers from pursuing similar or subsequent lines of inquiry.},
tags={Incentives, Patent Proliferation, License Agreements, Patent Pool, Open Source},
filename={Goozner (2006) - Innovation In Biomedicine.pdf}
}
@article{hall2007patents,
title={Patents and Patent Policy},
author={Hall, B.H.},
journal={Oxford Review of Economic Policy},
volume={23},
number={4},
pages={568--587},
year={2007},
abstract={A patent is the legal right of an inventor to exclude others from making or using a particular invention. This right is sometimes termed an “intellectual property right” and is viewed as an incentive for innovation. This article surveys the evidence on patent effectiveness in encouraging innovation and reviews the current controversies in patent policy.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Discussion},
industry={ICT, Biology},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The first of the problems Barr describes is clearly a case of mutually assured destruction that leaves the firms in question no better (and no worse) off than if they were not accumulating massive numbers of patents for defensive purposes, and yet at the same time is a very costly strategy. Increasing the administrative costs of patents to firms or reforms within the industry itself to discourage this behavior would seem to be the obvious solution, since it would be in the interest of all firms involved to reduce spending on this activity.},
thicket_def={Def4},
thicket_def_extract={During the U.S. Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice hearings on the patent system and antitrust policy in 2002, a number of industry representatives expressed concerns about the difficulty of negotiating the patent thicket in their area and the risk of being “held-up” ex post by a patent on a technology that was only a small component of their product.},
tags={General Patent Discussion},
filename={Hall (2007) - Patents And Patent Policy.pdf}
}
@article{hemphill2003preemptive,
title={Preemptive Patenting, Human Genomics, and the US Biotechnology Sector: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights with Societal Welfare},
author={Hemphill, T.A.},
journal={Technology in Society},
volume={25},
number={3},
pages={337--349},
year={2003},
abstract={Within the biotechnology sector of the US economy, aggressive patenting, i.e. preemptive patenting, of human genomic research results are practiced by private-sector firms, the academic community, and non-profit organizations. Preemptive patenting has traditionally been practiced by the private sector as a competitive strategy, being driven by economic considerations. Recently, academics and patients/consumers have instituted preemptive patenting strategies as a way of ensuring access to genomic sequences for, respectively, research study purposes and life-enhancing access to diagnostic gene testing. To reduce this non-economic motivation for preemptive patenting by these nontraditional competitors, it is recommended that the biotechnology industry initiate a strategy of its own which will: (1) relax firm patent enforcement of genomic sequences that are essential for academic researchers to use in their studies; and (2) provide for a ‘means-test’ approach that incorporates a ‘staggered’ fee-schedule for academic researchers to charge their subjects, i.e. patients, for gene tests and diagnostic results.},
discipline={Policy},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={To forestall imitative activity and strengthen patent rights, firms often attempt to create a ‘patent thicket,’ i.e. obtaining patents not just on one central product or process, but on a host of related products or processes [11]. Firms that try to compete with the inventing firm will find their attempts to duplicate the central product or process blocked by the inventing firm’s grip on alternative technologies. Many of the firm’s patents on related products or processes may never be used or licensed; such ‘sleeping patents’ are held only to raise the costs of entry or imitation by potential rivals.},
thicket_def={def33},
thicket_def_extract={To forestall imitative activity and strengthen patent rights, firms often attempt to create a ‘patent thicket,’ i.e. obtaining patents not just on one central product or process, but on a host of related products or processes [11].},
tags={preemptive patenting, consumer welfare, international affairs, strategic value},
filename={Hemphill (2003) - Preemptive Patenting Human Genomics And The Us Biotechnology Sector.pdf}
}
@article{holman2005biotechnology,
title={Biotechnology's Prescription for Patent Reform},
author={Holman, C.M.},
journal={J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L.},
volume={5},
pages={i},
year={2005},
abstract={On June 8, 2005, Congressman Lamar Smith introduced H.R. 2795, the “Patent Reform Act of 2005,” aimed at improving the quality and certainty of issued patents, simplifying the patent procurement process, harmonizing U.S. law with international practice, and reining in abusive patent enforcement practices. Congress has set the legislation aside for the time being, but will likely revisit the issue again shortly. The biotechnology industry, one of the fastest growing sectors in the United States economy, strongly opposes many of the proposed reforms. This paper considers the Congressional testimonies of the Biotechnology Industry Organization (“BIO”) and other representatives of biotechnology’s interests, and finds that the industry’s adamant opposition to many of the proposals is driven largely by a belief that biotechnology patents function primarily as tools for securing investment funding, and the fear that investment in biotechnology will be adversely impacted if investors perceive that patent reform has weakened the rights of patent owners and inventors. The paper also considers how the biotechnology sector might be impacted if the proposed reforms are enacted into law, and describes some recent biotechnology cases wherein the outcome might have been different if the reforms had already been in place.},
discipline={Law, Policy Report},
research_type={Discussion, Written Theory},
industry={Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={If in fact a patent thicket is significantly impeding biotechnology research and development, one might expect that organizations representing the interests of biotechnology, such as BIO, WARF, and Genentech, would be advocating for reforms that would address the problem. Indeed, the biotechnology industry has never been shy about advocating for legislative action to address its concerns.112 But instead, these groups tend to be among the most adamant defenders of the status quo and strong patent rights. One might infer from this that a patent thicket is not in fact substantially impeding biotechnology.},
thicket_def={refs Heller Eisenberg},
thicket_def_extract={Various commentators have proposed that a proliferation of patents poses a serious threat to biotechnology research by creating a patent thicket, sometimes referred to as a “patent anticommons.”106 The theory is especially associated with articles published by Heller and Eisenberg in 1998, and Eisenberg and Rai in 2002.107},
tags={Critique on Reform Proposals, Continuation, First innovator, Injunction, IPR Reform },
filename={Holman (2005) - Biotechnologys Prescription For Patent Reform.pdf}
}
@article{holman2006clearing,
title={Clearing a Path through the Patent Thicket},
author={Holman, C.},
journal={Cell},
volume={125},
number={4},
pages={629--633},
year={2006},
publisher={Elsevier},
abstract={Patents do not always promote innovation, particularly when they restrict access to fundamental scientific discoveries and the tools of basic research. However, there are legal and policy approaches that may help to ameliorate problems associated with patenting these sorts of inventions.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion, Commentary},
industry={General, Research},
thicket_stance={Weakly Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={Although upstream patents have been widely criticized, and there are a number of cases where specific patents clearly seem to have impeded innovation, there is little objective evidence to support a conclusion that patents constitute a widespread substantial obstacle to biomedical R&D, particularly in the academic sector.},
thicket_def={Refs heller/eisenberg, rai/eisenberg},
thicket_def_extract={Upstream patents have been criticized on a number of counts. For example, it has been proposed that the proliferation of patents covering research tools has resulted in a “patent thicket,” rendering it virtually impossible to conduct biomedical research without inadvertently infringing upon a host of conflicting patent claims (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Rai and Eisenberg, 2002)},
tags={patents of dubious quality, research use, public domain},
filename={Holman (2006) - Clearing A Path Through The Patent Thicket.pdf}
}
@article{holman2008trends,
title={Trends in Human Gene Patent Litigation},
author={Holman, C.M.},
journal={Science},
volume={322},
number={5899},
pages={198--199},
year={2008},
publisher={American Association for the Advancement of Science},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy},
research_type={Commentary, Discussion, Industry Statistics},
industry={Biotechnology, Genetics},
thicket_stance={Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={However, for the most part, fears expressed concerning human gene patents have not been manifested overtly in patent litigation. Human gene patent litigation invariably has involved an alleged infringer engaged in substantial commercial activities focused specifically on the single gene that is the subject of the asserted patent, the antithesis of a patent thicket scenario (14). Some have speculated that DNA microarray technology is particularly at risk of becoming entangled in a thicket (6). However, I found no instance in which a human gene patent was asserted against the manufacturer or user of microarray technology, although microarray companies have experienced substantial patent litigation involving nongene patents since the mid-1990s.},
thicket_def={refs heller eiseneberg, barton},
thicket_def_extract={Some have postulated that a “thicket” of patents will impede basic biomedical research and will stifle development and utilization of technologies that involve the use of multiple genetic sequences; DNA microarrays are a prime example (5, 6)},
tags={Gene patent litigation, frequency of litigation},
filename={Holman (2008) - Trends In Human Gene Patent Litigation.pdf}
}
@article{holman2012debunking,
title={Debunking the Myth that Whole-Genome Sequencing Infringes Thousands of Gene Patents},
author={Holman, C.M.},
journal={Nature biotechnology},
volume={30},
number={3},
pages={240--244},
year={2012},
publisher={Nature Publishing Group},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Commentary, Discussion},
industry={Biology, Genetics},
thicket_stance={Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={There is also good reason to think that even the claims most likely to be infringed, reciting short fragments of genomic DNA, or broadly defined methods of testing for genetic variation, would not necessarily be infringed by all forms of WGS, particularly next-generation technologies that do not amplify genes. A company that provides WGS services, but that leaves the job of analyzing the sequence data for clinically important variations to others, would be particularly unlikely to be found liable for infringing any of these gene patents.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Whole Genome Sequencing, Infringement},
filename={Holman (2012) - Debunking The Myth That Whole Genome Sequencing Infringes Thousands Of Gene Patents.pdf}
}
@article{horn2003alternative,
title={Alternative approaches to IP management: One-stop technology platform licensing},
author={Horn, L.},
journal={Journal of commercial biotechnology},
volume={9},
number={2},
pages={119--127},
year={2003},
publisher={Palgrave Macmillan},
abstract={As a pioneering, one-stop technology platform licensing enterprise, MPEG LA is presented as a template for patent pooling. By providing the marketplace with fair, reasonable, non- discriminatory access to a portfolio of worldwide essential patents under a single licence, this example of a one-stop technology platform licensing programme enables widespread implementation, interoperability and use of fundamental broad-based technologies covered by many patents owned by many patent owners. This paper will: (1) present observations from MPEG LA’s unique experience and perspective including a description of the necessary elements and principles on which such efforts are based, what works and why; and (2) describe efforts to apply this innovative licensing model to the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries within the larger context of historical patent pooling as a solution to biotechnology bottlenecks.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Technology, Biotechnology, Pharmaceutical},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={In addition, there has been enormous growth in the number of issued patents containing progressively narrower claims. Therefore, licences under multiple patents owned by multiple patent owners are required. In the absence of a patent pool, the transaction costs required to identify the blocking patents and conclude negotiations for a licence under each of them (assuming the patent owners are even willing to enter into licence negotiations), to say nothing of paying multiple royalties, are too costly for the average user – with the result that technological advancement, adoption and use are impeded; freedom of technological movement is restricted; the potential for conflict is increased; and traditional one-on-one licensing arrangements fall short.},
thicket_def={refs shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={Therefore, if the ‘thicket’2 of essential IP rights underlying their use cannot be accessed under reasonable terms and conditions (eg cost) applied evenly to all similarly situated competitors, the best of standards often go unused.},
tags={technology platform licensing, standards pools},
filename={Horn (2003) - Alternative Approaches To IP Management.pdf}
}
@article{hussinger2006silence,
title={Is Silence Golden? Patents versus Secrecy at the Firm Level},
author={Hussinger, K.},
journal={Economics of Innovation and New Technology},
volume={15},
number={8},
pages={735--752},
year={2006},
publisher={Taylor \& Francis},
abstract={In the 1990s, patenting schemes changed in many respects: upcoming new technologies accelerated the shift from price competition towards competition based on technical inventions, a worldwide surge in patenting took place, and the ‘patent thicket’ arose as a conse- quence of strategic patenting. This study analyzes the importance of patenting versus secrecy as an effective alternative to protect intellec- tual property in the inventions’ market phase. The sales figure with new products is introduced as a new measure for the importance of IP protection tools among product innovating firms. Focusing on the German manufacturing in 2000, it turns out that patents are impor- tant to protect intellectual property in the market, whereas secrecy seems to be rather important for early-stage inventions.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={empirical, econometric model},
industry={General, Manufacturing},
thicket_stance={neutral},
thicket_stance_extract={A further development is that patents gained in value by their ability to be linked with other patents, which encourages patenting of marginal inven- tions. The resulting complex network of single patents that bears many legal pitfalls for patent applicants was given the name ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2001). These developments put into question an increased number of patents motivated by an increased need for IP protection and hint at the strategic value of patents to have driven the patent surge. To summarize: on the one hand, recent changes in patenting schemes have caused an elevated need for patents as an IP protection tool. On the other hand, they gained in importance as strategic instruments.},
thicket_def={refs shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={The resulting complex network of single patents that bears many legal pitfalls for patent applicants was given the name ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2001). These developments put into question an increased number of patents motivated by an increased need for IP protection and hint at the strategic value of patents to have driven the patent surge.},
tags={patenting secrecy, firm strategy},
filename={Hussinger (2006) - Is Silence Golden Patents Versus Secrecy At The Firm Level.pdf}
}
@article{iyama2005uspto,
title={The USPTO's Proposal of a Biological Research Tool Patent Pool Doesn't Hold Water},
author={Iyama, S.},
journal={Stanford Law Review},
pages={1223--1241},
year={2005},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Written Theory},
industry={Biology},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={But how likely is it that a patent thicket for biological research will develop? According to the NIH working group on research tools, a thicket of research tool patents has already begun to form...The cumulative result of these actions is the initial formation of a patent thicket for research tools. The negative consequence of an extensive research tool patent thicket and its accompanying licensing scheme is the potential chilling effect on innovation.},
thicket_def={refs shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={Under this metaphor, a patent thicket arises when each block is granted separate yet concurrent exclusivity rights. The so-called thicket is the resulting nexus of concurrent and overlapping IP rights that one must navigate in order to practice any evolutionary form of science.},
tags={Patent pool, antitrust},
filename={Iyama (2005) - The Usptos Proposal Of A Biological Research Tool Patent Pool Doesnt Hold Water.pdf}
}
@article{jacob2009patents,
title={Patents and Pharmaceuticals},
author={Jacob, Robin},
year={2009},
journal={A paper given on 29th November at the Presentation of the Directorate-General of Competition’s Preliminary Report of the Pharma-sector inquiry},
abstract={},
discipline={Public, Policy},
research_type={Commentary},
industry={Pharmaceutical},
thicket_stance={Neutral},
thicket_stance_extract={Every patentee of a major invention is likely to come up with improvements and alleged improvements to his invention. By the time his main patent has expired there will be a thicket of patents intended to extend his monopoly. Some will be good, others bad. It is in the nature of the patent system itself that this should happen and it has always happened. There is nothing new about “evergreening”, only the name and the implication which flows from the word, that there is something sinister going on and that it has only recently been discovered.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={competition},
filename={Jacob (2009) - Patents And Pharmaceuticals.pdf}
}
@article{jensen2004achieving,
title={Achieving the Optimal Power of Patent Rights},
author={Jensen, P.H. and Webster, E.},
journal={Australian Economic Review},
volume={37},
number={4},
pages={419--426},
year={2004},
publisher={Wiley Online Library},
abstract={In this paper, we identify three policy instruments governments have at their disposal to affect the power of patent rights to prevent imitation: the size of the inventive step used to make the patent granting decision, the rigour of the patent examination process and the predisposition of the courts to affirm the patent office's decision. We develop a simple framework to analyse the effects of changing these policy instruments on ex ante investment in invention in the light of recent concerns about the potential effects of socially undesirable patents.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Written Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The patent owner may do this by creating a thicket of pantents, so other parties are swamped with so much complex technical documentation that they cannot separate the chaff from the wheat. Developing patent thickets is relatively easy to do in this regime since the patent examination process is cursory...the average cost of dispute resolution will be high},
thicket_def={def35},
thicket_def_extract={The patent owner may do this by creating a thicket of pantents, so other parties are swamped with so much complex technical documentation that they cannot separate the chaff from the wheat. Developing patent thickets is relatively easy to do in this regime since the patent examination process is cursory...the average cost of dispute resolution will be high},
tags={Designing patent system},
filename={Jensen Webster (2004) - Achieving The Optimal Power Of Patent Rights.pdf}
}
@article{kato2004patent,
title={Patent Pool Enhances Market Competition},
author={Kato, A.},
journal={International Review of Law and Economics},
volume={24},
number={2},
pages={255--268},
year={2004},
abstract={This article investigates a pool of substitute patents that enable firms to reduce marginal costs of production. Contrary to the general belief, it is shown that a pool of substitute patents may promote competition under certain conditions, thereby enhancing social welfare in the product market. The intuition is that when firms compete in licensing fees, resultant low licensing fees discourage firms from licensing to outside firms. This leads to fewer licensees than when a patent pool is formed.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Model, Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={In the field of economics, patent pools are analyzed by Shapiro (2000). He considers the role of patent pools in “patent thicket,” which means that there are so many patents issued that a single new patent will likely infringe on some other patents. This situation discourages and retards research, development and commercialization.},
thicket_def={Refs Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={In the field of economics, patent pools are analyzed by Shapiro (2000). He considers the role of patent pools in “patent thicket,” which means that there are so many patents issued that a single new patent will likely infringe on some other patents. This situation discourages and retards research, development and commercialization.},
tags={patent pools, substitute patents, welfare},
filename={Kato (2004) - Patent Pool Enhances Market Competition.pdf}
}
@article{kesselheim2005university,
title={University-based Science and Biotechnology Products},
author={Kesselheim, A.S. and Avorn, J.},
journal={JAMA: the journal of the American Medical Association},
volume={293},
number={7},
pages={850--854},
year={2005},
publisher={Am Med Assoc},
abstract={The pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries have long relied on pat- enting as the primary means of allocating ownership and control over new discoveries. Yet, patent protection is a double-edged sword that has major implications for the future of innovation in biomedical science in the United States. Excessive “upstream” patenting of genes and molecular targets could hinder further research by creating a need for expensive and inefficient cross-licensing. However, limiting such basic science patenting could allow pri- vate entities to use the results of years of costly publicly funded research to produce and market lucrative products without compensating university- or public sector–based innovators. Academic and other nonprofit research cen- ters would, therefore, be deprived of revenue for pursuing novel therapeu- tics or other seminal research work that may not be patentable. Recent court cases illustrate the inherent conflicts in allocating ownership and control of basic biomedical discoveries. Several options exist to avoid the complex prob- lems of overlapping basic science patents while still rewarding pivotal discoveries and encouraging further innovation. These include establishing ba- sic science patent pools and mandating arbitration arrangements that would assign credit and royalties for biotechnology innovations that depend on prior research that was performed, financed, or both in the public sector.},
discipline={Biology},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Biotechnology, Pharmaceutical},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Basic investigations conducted at universities and academic medical cen- ters, usually publicly funded, often pro- duce key insights about the mecha- nisms underlying physiological function and disease states. Private corpora- tions can then commercialize these insights by designing and marketing new therapeutics or other medical tech- nologies based on them. In this chain of development, allowing patenting of each incremental innovation could risk generating a dense thicket of overlap- ping intellectual rights and thus hinder research efforts.},
thicket_def={quotes shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={Basic investigations conducted at universities and academic medical cen- ters, usually publicly funded, often pro- duce key insights about the mecha- nisms underlying physiological function and disease states. Private corpora- tions can then commercialize these insights by designing and marketing new therapeutics or other medical tech- nologies based on them. In this chain of development, allowing patenting of each incremental innovation could risk generating a dense thicket of overlap- ping intellectual rights and thus hinder research efforts.},
tags={University research, upstream patents, defining lineage of products},
filename={Kesselheim Avorn (2005) - University Based Science And Biotechnology Products.pdf}
}
@article{kieff2011removing,
title = {Removing Property from Intellectual Property and (Intended?) Pernicious Impacts on Innovation and Competition},
author = {Kieff, F. Scott},
journal = {Supreme Court Economic Review},
volume = {19},
number = {1},
pages = {pp. 25-50},
year = {2011},
abstract = {Commentators have poured forth a loud and sustained outcry over the past few years that sees property rule treatment of intellectual property (IP) as a cause of excessive transaction costs, thickets, anticommons, hold-ups, hold-outs, and trolls, which unduly tax and retard innovation, competition, and economic growth. The popular response has been to seek a legislative shift towards some limited use of weaker, liability rule treatment, usually portrayed as “just enough” to facilitate transactions in those special cases where the bargaining problems are at their worst and where escape hatches are most needed. This essay is designed to make two contributions. First, it shows how a set of changes in case law over just the past few years have hugely re-shaped the patent system from having several major, and helpful, liability-rule pressure-release valves, into a system that is fast becoming almost devoid of significant property rule characteristics, at least for those small entities that would most need property rule protection. The essay then explores some harmful effects of this shift, focusing on the ways liability rule treatment can seriously impede the beneficial deal-making mechanisms that facilitate innovation and competition. The basic intuition behind this bad effect of liability rules is that they seriously frustrate the ability for a market-challenging patentee to attract and hold the constructive attention of a potential contracting party (especially one that is a larger more established party) while preserving the option to terminate the negotiations in favor of striking a deal with a different party. At the same time, liability rules can have an additional bad effect of helping existing competitors to coordinate with each other over ways to keep out new entrants. The essay is designed to contribute to the literature on IP in particular, as well as the broader literatures on property and coordination, by first showing how a seemingly disconnected set of changes to the legal rules impacting a particular legal regime like the patent system can have unintended and sweeping harmful consequences, and then by exploring why within the more middle range of the spectrum between the two poles of property rules and liability rules, a general shift towards the property side may be preferred by those seeking an increase in access and competition.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={In the vast majority of the intellectual property (IP) literature, property rule treatment of IP is said to cause excessive transaction costs, thickets, anticommons, hold-ups, hold- outs, and trolls, unduly taxing and retarding innovation, competition, and economic growth.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Recent Trends in Case Law about Patents and Liability},
filename={Kieff (2011) - Removing Property From Intellectual Property And Intended.pdf},
}
@article{kim2004vertical,
title={Vertical Structure and Patent Pools},
author={Kim, S.H.},
journal={Review of Industrial Organization},
volume={25},
number={3},
pages={231--250},
year={2004},
publisher={Springer},
abstract={It is well known that patent pools can enhance efficiency by eliminating the com- plements problem. This paper investigates how the presence of vertically integrated firms affects the economic impact of a patent pool. Without a patent pool, the presence of integrated firms may either increase or decrease the final product price as there are two countervailing effects – reduced double marginalization and raising rivals’ costs. However, when there is a patent pool, vertical integration always lowers the final product price. In conclusion, the economic efficiency arguments for patent pools are enhanced when some firms are vertically integrated.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Mathematical},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={When distinct firms are selling inputs – all of which are required for pro- duction of the final product – they fail to internalize the effect that their royalty rates have on the demand for other inputs. This results in each patent holder setting too high a royalty rate. A ‘‘patent pool’’ has begun to attract widespread attention as a solution to both the transaction cost and com- plements problems. },
thicket_def={Refs shapiro and heller/eisenberg},
thicket_def_extract={The proliferation of fragmented and overlapping patent rights is increasingly being recognized as a serious problem; referred to as a ‘‘patent thicket’’ (or ‘‘anticommons’’ by Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Besides the additional transaction costs incurred in navigating a patent thicket, Shapiro (2001) has called attention to another source of inefficiency – the complements problem. When distinct firms are selling inputs – all of which are required for pro- duction of the final product – they fail to internalize the effect that their royalty rates have on the demand for other inputs. This results in each patent holder setting too high a royalty rate. },
tags={vertical integration, patent pools, raising rivals' costs, double marginalization},
filename={Kim (2004) - Vertical Structure And Patent Pools.pdf}
}
@article{king2007clearing,
title={Clearing the Patent Thicket: The Supreme Court and Congress Undertake Patent Reform},
author={King, S.M.},
journal={Intell. Prop. \& Tech. LJ},
volume={9},
pages={13--13},
year={2007},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Commentary, Discussion},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={All three developments have led to what is perceived as a marked increase in junk patents, as well as what Carl Shapiro has termed a “patent thicket”—overlapping sets of patent rights leading to a maze of cross-licensing agreements, as well as the rise of hold-up litigation.},
thicket_def={Refs Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={All three developments have led to what is perceived as a marked increase in junk patents, as well as what Carl Shapiro has termed a “patent thicket”—overlapping sets of patent rights leading to a maze of cross-licensing agreements, as well as the rise of hold-up litigation.},
tags={supreme court, cases, patent reform},
filename={King (2007) - Clearing The Patent Thicket.pdf}
}
@article{kwon2012patent,
title={Patent Thicket, Secrecy, and Licensing},
author={Kwon, I.},
journal={The Korean Economic Review},
volume={28},
number={1},
pages={27--49},
year={2012},
abstract={This paper considers a patent portfolio race where firms compete for complementary patents, called a patent thicket. When firms have an option to keep their innovation secret, this paper shows that there exists an equilibrium where firms’ patent propensity is strictly between zero and one. In such an equilibrium, stronger patent protection reduces the firms’ investment in innovation. Moreover, this result does not change even when a licensing contract is feasible.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={ICT},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Thus, on the one hand, firms would try to build up their patent portfolio, or patent thicket, to defend their product. On the other hand, such potential patent lawsuits would eventually reduce the R&D investment, called the hold-up problem.},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={A growing number of studies have emphasized the negative effect of the hold-up problem when firms compete for a portfolio of complementary patents, called apatent thicket (e.g., Bessen 2004, Hall and Ziedonis 2001, Shapiro 2001).},
tags={Economic model trying to solve the holdup problem by licensing},
filename={Kwon (2012) - Patent Thicket Secrecy And Licensing.pdf}
}
@techreport{lampe2009patent,
title={Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the 19th-century Sewing Machine Industry},
author={Lampe, R.L. and Moser, P.},
year={2009},
institution={National Bureau of Economic Research},
abstract={Members of a patent pool agree to use a set of patents as if they were jointly owned by all members and license them as a package to other firms. Regulators favor pools as a means to encourage innovation: Pools are expected to reduce litigation risks for their members and lower license fees and transactions costs for other firms. This paper uses the example of the first patent pool in U.S. history, the Sewing Machine Combination (1856-1877) to perform the first empirical test of the effects of a patent pool on innovation. Contrary to theoretical predictions, the sewing machine pool appears to have discouraged patenting and innovation, in particular for the members of the pool. Data on stitches per minute, as an objectively quantifiable measure of innovation, confirm these findings. Innovation for both members and outside firms slowed as soon as the pool had been established and resumed only after it had dissolved.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={Sewing},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Almost one hundred years later, patent pools have re-emerged as a remedy for industries that are plagued by litigation and patent blocking, which occurs when owners of competing patents prevent the commercialization of new technologies.},
thicket_def={Refs shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Patent pools, incentives to innovation},
filename={Lampe Moser (2009) - Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation.pdf}
}
@techreport{lampe2012patent,
title={Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from 20 US Industries under the New Deal},
author={Lampe, R.L. and Moser, P.},
year={2012},
institution={National Bureau of Economic Research},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical, Econometric Model},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={For example, the creation of a pool may reduce the need for member firms to create patent thickets by reducing the threat of litigation (e.g., Shapiro 2001; Gilbert 2004).},
thicket_def={refs shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={We also investigate whether part of the observed decline may be driven by a reduction in lower-quality or “strategic” patents. For example, the creation of a pool may reduce the need for member firms to create patent thickets by reducing the threat of litigation (e.g., Shapiro 2001; Gilbert 2004)},
tags={patent pools, effects on innovation},
filename={Lampe Moser (2012) - Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation.pdf}
}
@article{lanjouw2004protecting,
title = {Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?},
author = {Jean O. Lanjouw and Mark Schankerman},
journal = {Journal of Law and Economics},
volume = {47},
number = {1},
pages = {pp. 45-74},
abstract = {Abstract This paper studies the determinants of patent suits and settlements during 1978–99 by linking information from the U.S. patent office, the federal courts, and industry sources. We find that litigation risk is much higher for patents that are owned by individuals and firms with small patent portfolios. Patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade, or other characteristics that facilitate “cooperative” resolution of disputes, are much less likely to prosecute infringement suits. However, postsuit outcomes do not depend on these characteristics. These findings show that small patentees are at a significant disadvantage in protecting their patent rights because their greater litigation risk is not offset by more rapid resolution of their suits. Our empirical estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can help in developing private patent litigation insurance to mitigate the adverse affects of high enforcement costs.},
year = {2004},
publisher = {The University of Chicago Press for The Booth School of Business of the University of Chicago and The University of Chicago Law School},
copyright = {Copyright © 2004 The University of Chicago},
discipline={Law, Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Carl Shapiro emphasizes that firms rely heavily on cross-licensing arrangements and patent pools as a way of mitigating these problems of the anticommons (fragmented property rights).47 But small firms are effectively blocked from using these arrangements unless cash payments are accepted for participation, and typically they are not.},
thicket_def={References Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Litigation issues for small firms},
filename={Lanjouw Schankerman (2004) - Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Are Small Firms Handicapped.pdf}
}
@article{layne2011join,
title={To join or not to join: examining patent pool participation and rent sharing rules},
author={Layne-Farrar, Anne and Lerner, Josh},
journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization},
volume={29},
number={2},
pages={294--303},
year={2011},
abstract={In recognition that participation in modern patent pools is voluntary, we present empirical evidence on participation rates and the factors that drive the decision to join a pool, including the pro?t sharing rules adopted by the pool's founders. In most participation contexts, the at-risk group is extremely dif?cult, if not impossible, to identify. For pools centered on technologies that result from a standard-setting process, in contrast, we are able to identify a relatively unambiguous population of patents eligible for inclusion but that have not been included in the pool. We ?nd that vertically integrated ?rms, with patents and downstream operations, are more likely to join a patent pool and among those ?rms that do join, those with relatively symmetric patent contributions (in terms of value) to a standard appear more likely to accept numeric patent share rules for dividing royalty earnings},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={LayneFarrar Lerner (2011) - To Join Or Not To Join.pdf}
}
@article{leaffer2009patent,
title={Patent Misuse and Innovation},
author={Leaffer, M.},
journal={J. High Tech. L.},
volume={10},
pages={142},
year={2009},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Written Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Single company acquisition of a dense web of overlapping patents-patent thickets15-may create a seemingly impenetrable web which a company must hack its way through in order to commercialize new technology.1 6 As the number of issued patents skyrocket, companies more frequently enter into arrangements with competitors "not only to recover their investment from creating patented products but also to avoid the patent landmines that line the path of innovation."},
thicket_def={def34},
thicket_def_extract={A firm with a large patent portfolio enveloping a competitor's key technologies-one that could be termed a "patent thicket"-has the potential to use it to suppress competition in the ultimate goods market.142 As stated above, patent thickets may encompass patents of dubious merit.143 Unfortunately, it is costly to innovate around assertions of infringement},
tags={antitrust, patent misuse},
filename={Leaffer (2009) - Patent Misuse And Innovation.pdf}
}
@article{lee2006examining,
title={Examining the Viability of Patent Pools for the Growing Nanotechnology Patent Thicket},
author={Lee, A.},
journal={Nanotech. L. \& Bus.},
volume={3},
pages={317},
year={2006},
abstract={A patent pool is a cooperative arrangement between several patent holders, all of them necessary and fundamental to the creation of a product or process, where all of the patents can be licensed at a single price. They are an attractive option for fragmented patent landscapes, where they are created in hopes of avoiding the high cost associated with acquiring numerous licensing agreements, avoid widespread patent disputes, and help create a standard, amongst other reasons. This issue is especially relevant to the emerging scientific field of nanotechnology, where there is widespread concern about the fragmentation of the intellectual property landscape. This paper aimed to develop a general list of criteria to aid in determining whether patent pools are a viable option for a market by examining relevant literature and conducting interviews; it was then applied to the dendritic nanotechnology’s drug delivery and pharmaceutical applications. The completed list had nine criteria and, when applied to the dendritic nanotechnology market, concludes that a patent pool will not be necessary for the continued advancement of this application. The primary reason is that a huge amount of patents are in control of one company alone, Dendritic Nanotechnologies, and seem to be the primary source for the most highly sought after dendritic patents.},
discipline={Management},
research_type={Written Theory},
industry={Nanotechnology},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={They are often viewed as the “simplest solution” to intellectual property rights (IPR) bottlenecks with multiple stakeholders that have overlapping sets of IP (a.k.a patent thickets) or are uncertain if there is possible infringement of patent issues (a.k.a. Patent Hold-Up).},
thicket_def={def37},
thicket_def_extract={...to intellectual property rights (IPR) bottlenecks with multiple stakeholders that have overlapping sets of IP (a.k.a patent thickets)},
tags={patent pool, nanotechnology},
filename={Lee (2006) - Examining The Viability Of Patent Pools For The Growing Nanotechnology Patent Thicket.pdf}
}
@article{lei2009patents,
title={Patents versus Patenting: Implications of Intellectual Property Protection for Biological Research},
author={Lei, Z. and Juneja, R. and Wright, B.D.},
year={2009},
abstract={A new survey shows scientists consider the proliferation of intellectual property protection to have a strongly negative effect on research.},
discipline={Biology},
research_type={Survey, Regression},
industry={Biology},
thicket_stance={Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={Our respondents do not encounter an anticommons or a patent thicket. Rather, they believe that institutionally mandated MTAs put sand in the wheels of a lively system of intradisciplinary exchanges of research tools. Seeing no countervailing effect on the supply of these tools, they conclude that patenting impedes the progress of research.},
thicket_def={cites Shapiro and heller/eisenberg},
thicket_def_extract={This question has been of particular concern for the biological sciences, where production and exchange of biological ‘research tools’ are important for ongoing scientific progress. Recent studies addressing this issue in the United States1,2, Germany3, Australia4 and Japan5 find that “patent thickets”6 or an “anticommons”7 rarely affect the research of academic scientists.},
tags={research access, open source, IP Rights},
filename={Lei Juneja Wright (2009) - Patents Versus Patenting.pdf}
}
@article{lemley2006patent,
title={Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking},
author={Lemley, M. and Shapiro, C.},
year={2006},
abstract={We study several interconnected problems that arise under the current U.S. patent system when a patent covers one component or feature of a complex product. This situation is common in the information technology sector of the economy. Our analysis applies to cases involving reasonable royalties, but not lost profits. First, we show using bargaining theory that the threat to obtain a permanent injunction greatly enhances the patent holder’s negotiating power, leading to royalty rates that exceed a natural benchmark range based on the value of the patented technology and the strength of the patent. Such royalty overcharges are especially great for weak patents covering a minor feature of a product with a sizeable price/cost margin, including products sold by firms that themselves have made substantial R&D investments. These royalty overcharges do not disappear even if the allegedly infringing firm is fully aware of the patent when it initially designs its product. However, the hold-up problems caused by the threat of injunctions are reduced if courts regularly grant stays to permanent injunctions to give defendants time to redesign their products to avoid infringement when this is possible. Second, we show how hold-up problems are magnified in the presence of royalty stacking, i.e., when multiple patents read on a single product. Third, using third-generation cellular telephones and Wi-Fi as leading examples, we illustrate that royalty stacking can become a very serious problem, especially in the standard-setting context where hundreds or even thousands of patents can read on a single product standard. Fourth, we discuss the use of “reasonable royalties” to award damages in patent infringement cases. We report empirical results regarding the measurement of “reasonable royalties” by the courts and identify various practical problems that tend to lead courts to over-estimate “reasonable royalties” in the presence of royalty stacking. Finally, we make suggestions for patent reform based on our theoretical and empirical findings.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={ICT},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The fact that a great many patents can read on a single product, and that this is common in certain critical industries, creates numerous practical problems for the operation of the patent system.},
thicket_def={def1, cites Heller and Eisenberg(1998)},
thicket_def_extract={Royalty stacking, patent thickets, and the related “anti-commons” problem have been a source of concern in the semiconductor and biotechnology industries for some time},
tags={Royalty-stacking, hold-up},
filename={Lemley Shapiro (2006) - Patent Holdup And Royalty Stacking.pdf}
}
@article{lemley2005probabilistic,
title={Probabilistic Patents},
author={Lemley, M.A. and Shapiro, C.},
journal={The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
volume={19},
number={2},
pages={75--98},
year={2005},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General, Pharmaceutical},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Similarly, patent thickets can have deleterious effects on both competition and innovation.},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={In a number of key industries, particularly semiconductors (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) and computer software (Bessen and Hunt, 2004), companies file numerous patent applications on related components that are integrated into a single functional product.The result is a "patent thicket," in which hundreds of patents can apply to a single product (Shapiro, 2001; FTC, 2003).},
tags={cross-licensing, uncertainty},
filename={Lemley Shapiro (2005) - Probabilistic Patents.pdf}
}
@article{lemley2005patenting,
title={Patenting Nanotechnology},
author={Lemley, M.A.},
journal={Stanford Law Review},
pages={601--630},
year={2005},
abstract={Universities and companies are rushing to the patent office in record numbers to patent nanotechnology inventions. This rush to the patent office is so signficant that many law firms have established nanotechnology practice groups and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has now created a new technology class designed to track nanotechnology products. Three big differences between the emerging science of nanotechnology and other inventions make the role of patents more significant in this arena than elsewhere. First, this is almost the first new field in a century in which the basic ideas are being patented at the outset. In many of the most important fields of invention over the past century - computer hardware, software, the Internet, even biotechnology- the basic building blocks of the field were either unpatented or teh patents were amde available to all users by government regulation. In others, patents were delayed by interferences for so long that the industry developed free from their influence. In nanotechnology, by contrast, companies and universities alike are patenting early and often. A second factor distinguishing nanotechnology is its unique cross-industry structure. Unlike other new industries, in which the patentees are largerly actual or at least potential participants in the market, a significant number of nanotechnology patentees will own rights not just in the industry in which they participate, but in other industries as well.This overlap may signficantly affect thier incentives to license the patents. Finally, a large number of the basic nanotechnology patents have been issued to universities, which have become far more active in patenting in the last twenty-five years. While universities have no direct incentive to restrict competition, their interests may or may not align with the optimal implementation of building-block nanotechnology inventions. The result is a nascent market in which a patent thicket is in theory a serious risk. Whether it will prove a problem in practice depends in large part on how efficient the licensing market turns out to be.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Nanotechnology},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The dispersion of overlapping patents across too many firms can also create an anticommons or thicket problem, making effective use of the technology difficult, if not impossible},
thicket_def={def1, refers potential of building-block patents to stifle downstream innovation and difficulty of acquiring licenses from patent holders},
thicket_def_extract={Some fear that ownership of nanotechnology patents is too fragmented, risking the development of a patent "thicket."},
tags={Thoughts on the potential effect of patent thickets on the nanotech industry},
filename={Lemley (2005) - Patenting Nanotechnology.pdf}
}
@article{lerner2005theeconomics,
title = {The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond},
author = {Lerner, Josh and Tirole, Jean},
journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
volume = {19},
number = {2},
pages = {pp. 99-120},
abstract = {This paper reviews our understanding of the growing open source movement. We highlight how many aspects of open source software appear initially puzzling to an economist. As we have acknowledge, our ability to answer confidently many of the issues raised here questions is likely to increase as the open source movement itself grows and evolves. At the same time, it is heartening to us how much of open source activities can be understood within existing economic frameworks, despite the presence of claims to the contrary. The labor and industrial organization literatures provide lenses through which the structure of open source projects, the role of contributors, and the movement's ongoing evolution can be viewed.},
year = {2005},
publisher = {American Economic Association},
copyright = {Copyright © 2005 American Economic Association},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion, Written Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Firms can also address these problems in non-open-source ways, such as patent pools, standard-setting organizations, and self-imposed commitments. In a patent pool, firms blend their patents with those of other firms. These pools allow users to access a number of firms’ patents simultaneously, thereby avoiding the “patent thicket.”},
thicket_def={def38},
thicket_def_extract={Second, open source avoids the problem of a “patent thicket” when multiple firms have overlapping intellectual property rights, and at least one party attempts to extract a high fee for its particular contribution.},
tags={open source, patent pools},
filename={Lerner Tirole (2005) - The Economics Of Technology Sharing Open Source And Beyond.pdf}
}
@article{lerner2003structure,
title={The Structure and Performance of Patent Pools: Empirical Evidence},
author={Lerner, J. and Strojwas, M. and Tirole, J.},
journal={Working paper},
year={2003},
abstract={},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical, Regression},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Numerous commentators have suggested that the proliferation of these awards has had socially detrimental consequences: overlapping intellectual property rights may make it difficult for inventors to commercialize new innovations. (Gallini [2002] reviews this literature.)},
thicket_def={def39},
thicket_def_extract={A more benign alternative is that firms enter into patent pools to solve the “patent thicket” problem: the presence of overlapping intellectual property holdings that make it difficult for third parties to license patent holdings and develop new technologies.},
tags={Pools},
filename={Lerner Strojwas Tirole (2003) - The Structure And Performance Of Patent Pools Empirical Evidence.pdf}
}
@techreport{lerner2003cooperative,
title={Cooperative marketing agreements between competitors: evidence from patent pools},
author={Lerner, Josh and Tirole, Jean and Strojwas, Marcin},
year={2003},
institution={National Bureau of Economic Research} abstract={On numerous occasions, rival firms seek to market goods together, particularly in hightechnology industries. This paper empirically examines one such institution: the patent pool. The analysis highlights five findings consistent with the theoretical predictions: (a) pools involving substitute patents are unlikely to allow pool members to license patents independently, consistent with our earlier theoretical work; (b) independent licensing is more frequently allowed when the number of members in the pool grows, which may reflect the increasing challenges that reconciling users’ differing technological agendas pose in large pools; (c) larger pools are more likely to have centralized control of litigation, which may reflect either the fact that the incentives for individual enforcement in large pools are smaller or that large pools are more likely to include small players with limited enforcement capabilities; (d) third party licensing is more common in larger pools, consistent with suggestions that such pools were established primarily to resolve the bargaining difficulties posed by overlapping patent holdings; and (e) during the most recent era, when an intense awareness of antitrust concerns precluded many competitionharming patent pools, more important patents were selected for pools and patents selected for pools were subsequently more intensively referenced by others. },
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Lerner Tirole Strojwas (2003) - Cooperative Marketing Agreements Between Competitors.pdf}
}
@article{lerner2007design,
title={The design of patent pools: The determinants of licensing rules},
author={Lerner, Josh and Strojwas, Marcin and Tirole, Jean},
journal={The RAND Journal of Economics},
volume={38},
number={3},
pages={610--625},
year={2007},
abstract={Patent pools are an important but little-studied economic institution. In this article, we first make a set of predictions about the licensing terms associated with patent pools. The theoretical framework predicts that (i) pools consisting of complementary patents are more likely to allow members to engage in independent licensing and (ii) the requirement that firms license patents to the pool (grantbacks) should be associated with pools that consist of complements and allow independent licensing. We then examine the terms of 63 pools, and show that licensing rules are consistent with these hypotheses. },
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Lerner Strojwas Tirole (2007) - The Design Of Patent Pools The Determinants Of Licensing Rules.pdf}
}
@techreport{lerner2002efficient,
title={Efficient Patent Pools},
author={Lerner, J. and Tirole, J.},
year={2002},
institution={National Bureau of Economic Research},
abstract={The paper builds a tractable model of a patent pool, an agreement among patent owners to license a set of their patents to one another or to third parties. It Þrst provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a patent pool to enhance welfare. It shows that requiring pool members to be able to independently license patents matters if and only if the pool is otherwise welfare reducing, a property that allows the antitrust authorities to use this requirement to screen out unattractive pools. The paper then undertakes a number of extensions: cases where patents differ in importance, where asymmetric blocking patterns exist, and where licensors are also licencees. We also undertake some initial explorations of the impact of pools on innovation. We conclude by showing that the analysis has broader applicability than pools, as it is also relevant to a number of co-marketing arrangements.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Innovations in computer hardware, software, and biotechnology often build on a number of other innovations owned by a diverse set of owners and as a result ?patent thicket" problems - overlapping patent claims that preclude the adoption of new technologies - can be severe.},
thicket_def={def40},
thicket_def_extract={Innovations in computer hardware, software, and biotechnology often build on a number of other innovations owned by a diverse set of owners and as a result ?patent thicket" problems - overlapping patent claims that preclude the adoption of new technologies - can be severe.},
tags={Patent pools, welfare},
filename={Lerner Tirole (2002) - Efficient Patent Pools.pdf}
}
@incollection{lerner2008public,
title={Public Policy Toward Patent Pools},
author={Lerner, J. and Tirole, J.},
booktitle={Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 8},
pages={157--186},
year={2008},
publisher={University of Chicago Press},
abstract={The past two decades have seen an explosion of patent awards and litigation across a wide variety of technologies, which numerous commentators have suggested has socially detrimental conseuqences. Patent pools, in which owners of intellectual property share patent rights with each other and third parties, have been proposed as a way in which firms can address this patent-thicket problem. The paper discusses the current regulatory treatment of patent pools and highlights why a more nuanced view than focusing on the extreme cases of perfect complements and perfect substitutes is needed. It also highlights the importance of regulators' stance towward independent licensing, grantback policies, and royalty control. We also present case-study and large-sample empirical evidence.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General, Policy},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Many observers have suggested that patent-thicket problems where key patents are widely held affect many emerging industries. Patent thickets may lead to three problems. First, royalty stacking may result: each individual patent holder may charge a royalty that seems reasonable when viewed in isolation, but together they represent an unreasonable burden. Second, even if other firms agree to license their patents at a modest rate, a hold-out problem may result if a single firm then sets a high license fee for its technology Finally, the very process of arranging the needed licenses may prove to be time consuming. Patent pools thus offer a one-stop shop through which these problems can be avoided.},
thicket_def={def41},
thicket_def_extract={Many observers have suggested that patent-thicket problems - where key patents are widely held affect many emerging industries},
tags={patent pools, licensing, grantback, royalties, substitutes and complements, welfare},
filename={Lerner Tirole (2008) - Public Policy Toward Patent Pools.pdf}
}
@article{lerner2007impact,
title={What is the Impact of Software Patent Shifts? Evidence from Lotus v. Borland},
author={Lerner, J. and Zhu, F.},
journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization},
volume={25},
number={3},
pages={511--529},
year={2007},
abstract={Economists have debated the extent to which strengthening patent protection spurs or detracts from technological innovation. This paper examines the reduction of software copyright protection in the Lotus v. Borland decision. If patent and copyright protections are substitutes, weakening of one form should be associated with an increased reliance on the other. We find that the firms affected by the diminution of copyright protection disproportionately accelerated their patenting in subsequent years. But little evidence can be found for any harmful effects on firms' performance and incentive to innovate: in fact, the increased reliance on patents is correlated with growth in measures such as sales and R&D expenditures.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical, Regression, Model},
industry={Software, Technology},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The environment is a complex one: many other changes, such as the widespread dissemination of the Internet, may have differentially affected firms during this period. While our result contradicts the claim by Bessen and Hunt (2004) that software patents substitute for R&D at the firm level, increased reliance on patenting could at the same time contribute to patent thickets that slow down overall innovation in the industry. Therefore, the patent thicket problem – an overlapping set of patent rights requiring those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees (Shapiro, 2001) – could still exist},
thicket_def={refs shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={Therefore, the patent thicket problem – an overlapping set of patent rights requiring those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees (Shapiro, 2001) – could still exist},
tags={uncertainty, patent and copyright protections},
filename={Lerner Zhu (2007) - What Is The Impact Of Software Patent Shifts.pdf}
}
@techreport{llanes2009anticommons,
title={Anticommons and Optimal Patent Policy in a Model of Sequential Innovation},
author={Llanes, G. and Trento, S.},
year={2009},
abstract={When innovation is sequential, the development of new products depends on the access to previous discoveries. As a consequence the patent system affects both the revenues and the cost of the innovator. We construct a model of sequential innovation in which an innovator uses n patented inputs in R&D to invent a new product. We ask three questions: (i) what is the net effect of patents on innovation as technologies become more complex (n increases)? (ii) are patent pools welfare enhancing? (iii) what is the optimal response of patent policy as technological complexity increases? We find that the answers to these questions depend on the degree of complementarity and substitutability between the inputs used in research.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={Biomedical, Biotechnology, ICT},
thicket_stance={Neutral},
thicket_stance_extract={When the inputs are complements, the profitability of the innovation is decreasing in the technological complexity. In the limit (when n -> infinity), when the degree of substitutability is below a threshold level, which is higher than 1, the innovation is never profitable. This paper therefore gives a formal treatment of the tragedy of the anticommons. On the other hand, when the inputs are substitutes, the profitability of the innovation is increasing in technological complexity. Even in this case, when n -> infinity, the cost of gathering all the inputs for the innovation is always too high from a social point of view and thus the probability of innovation is suboptimal.},
thicket_def={def5},
thicket_def_extract={As the number of inputs needed in research increases, the innovator faces a patent thicket and is threatened by the possibility of hold-up, namely the risk that a useful innovation is not developed because of lack of agreement with the patent holders. This problem has been dubbed the tragedy of the anticommons (Heller 1998, Heller and Eisenberg 1998).},
tags={patent pool, licensing},
filename={Llanes Trento (2009) - Anticommons And Optimal Patent Policy In A Model Of Sequential Innovation.pdf}
}
@article{lin2001research,
title={Research Versus Development: Patent Pooling, Innovation and Standardization in the Software Industry},
author={Lin, D.},
journal={J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L.},
volume={1},
pages={274--309},
year={2001},
abstract={Despite the impressive pace of modern invention, a certain “patent thicket” effect that may be impeding what has become an increasingly difficult road to the commercialization of new technologies. Specifically, as new technologies build upon old technologies, they necessarily become increasingly complex, and as a result, are often subject to the protection of multiple patents, covering both the new cumulative technologies as well as old foundational technologies. The difficulties of acquiring licenses (e.g. hold-out problems) for all such patents has the potential to stifle the development and commercialization of these new technologies. As such, patent pooling, once condemned as facilitating antitrust violations in past eras, has been reintroduced as a practice that, if properly structured, has potentially strong pro-competitive benefits. Patent pooling has the potential to reduce the level of research and invention in new technologies that can compete with an incumbent standard. Recent patent jurisprudence and lenient federal antitrust agency of recent patent pooling proposals seem to create an environment that encourages the resurgence of patent pooling.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Written Theory},
industry={Software, Technology},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Despite the impressive pace of modern invention, commentators have observed a certain “patent thicket” effect that may be impeding what has become an increasingly difficult road to the commercialization of new technologies.1 Specifically, as new technologies build upon old technologies, they necessarily become increasingly complex, and as a result, are often subject to the protection of multiple patents, covering both the new cumulative technologies as well as old foundational technologies.2 The difficulties of acquiring licenses (e.g., hold-out problems) for all such patents has the potential to stifle the development and commercialization of these new technologies.},
thicket_def={Refs Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={Despite the impressive pace of modern invention, commentators have observed a certain “patent thicket” effect that may be impeding what has become an increasingly difficult road to the commercialization of new technologies.1 Specifically, as new technologies build upon old technologies, they necessarily become increasingly complex, and as a result, are often subject to the protection of multiple patents, covering both the new cumulative technologies as well as old foundational technologies.2 The difficulties of acquiring licenses (e.g., hold-out problems) for all such patents has the potential to stifle the development and commercialization of these new technologies.},
tags={Open standards, SSO, },
filename={Lin (2001) - Research Versus Development.pdf}
}
@article{lin2011licensing,
title={Licensing Strategies in the Presence of Patent Thickets},
author={Lin, L.},
journal={Journal of Product Innovation Management},
volume={28},
number={5},
pages={698--725},
year={2011},
abstract={Many key industries (e.g., biomedical, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and information technologies) are characterized by cumulative innovations, where the introduction of a new product or service often requires many complementary technologies. When these technologies are protected by intellectual property rights owned by many firms, patent thickets exist, which researchers have argued may hinder the development of cumulative innovations. Specifically, patent thickets may lead to excessive royalty burdens for potential licensees, which is called ‘‘royalty stacking,’’ and if such costs are passed on to consumers, prices of products based on cumulative technologies will be driven up, dubbed as ‘‘double marginalization.’’ The literature, however, does not address these issues under different forms of licensing contracts. This article develops a game-theoretic model where a downstream firm seeks to license N patents that read on its product from upstream firms. It discusses a variety of licensing forms widely used in practice and attempts to discover whether royalty stacking and double marginalization occur under these forms of licenses. It also studies the impact of bargaining power between parties. It is found that when patent ownership becomes more fragmented, neither royalty stacking nor double marginalization occurs under profit-based royalty, fixed fee, and hybrid licenses. Such problems occur only under pure quantity-based or pure revenue-based royalty licenses when the downstream firm’s bargaining power is low. It is also shown that no matter how fragmented the ownership structure of patent is, hybrid licenses consisting of a fixed fee and a quantity- or revenue-based royalty rate lead to the same market outcomes as a fully integrated firm that owns all the patents and the downstream market. This article has interesting implications for both research and practice. First, the results show that even under the same patent ownership structure, different forms of licenses lead to quite different market outcomes. Therefore, it is suggested that firms and policy makers pay more attention to contractual forms of licenses when trying to minimize the negative impact of patent thickets. Second, the extant literature has largely assumed that quantity-based royalties are used, where double marginalization is the most severe. In practice, revenue-based royalties are most common, under which double marginalization is much milder. Third, the results show that patent pools can be most effective in mitigating royalty stacking and double marginalization when quantity-based or revenue-based royalties are the sole or primary payment form, especially when downstream firms have low bargaining power.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory, Mathematical},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={When these technologies are protected by intellectual property rights owned by many firms, patent thickets exist, which researchers have argued may hinder the development of cumulative innovations. Specifically, patent thickets may lead to excessive royalty burdens for potential licensees, which is called ‘‘royalty stacking,’’ and if such costs are passed on to consumers, prices of products based on cumulative technologies will be driven up, dubbed as ‘‘double marginalization.’’},
thicket_def={Refs Heller/Eisenberg/Lessig/Shapiro/Bessen and Maskin},
thicket_def_extract={Related, and often overlapping, patents owned by many entities are often described as ‘‘patent thickets’’ and researchers have argued that patent thickets can be detrimental to innovation, especially in information industries such as software (see, among others, Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Lessig, 2001; Shapiro, 2001; Bessen and Maskin, 2009).},
tags={Patent Pools, Licensing, Royalties, double marginalization, upstream, downstream},
filename={Lin (2011) - Licensing Strategies In The Presence Of Patent Thickets.pdf}
}
@article{liu2008internal,
title={Internal Sequential Innovations: How does Interrelatedness Affect Patent Renewal?},
author={Liu, K. and Arthurs, J. and Cullen, J. and Alexander, R.},
journal={Research Policy},
volume={37},
number={5},
pages={946--953},
year={2008},
abstract={The value of patented innovations has attracted substantial research attention, especially in the context of patent renewal. However, research often assumes that a firm’s patented innovations are independent from each other.We draw upon evolutionary economics and suggest that some of a firm’s patents share important genealogical relationships, which we refer to as internal sequential innovations.We propose internal sequential innovations are more valuable and therefore more likely to be renewed than stand-alone innovations. We examine our hypotheses from a dataset of US pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents. The results confirm our hypotheses at both the patent and the firm levels.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={Pharmaceutical, Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={Assumed Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={With the power of the intellectual regime, internal sequential innovations offer a larger thicket of protection that can define the underlying technologies in a set of overlapping patents},
thicket_def={def6},
thicket_def_extract={With the power of the intellectual regime, internal sequential innovations offer a larger thicket of protection that can define the underlying technologies in a set of overlapping patents. That is, a sequence of patents revolving around the same technological trajectory can define the intellectual property more precisely and protect it with an enlarged degree of coverage. The holder of such patented innovations can thereafter exclude competitors from the collective scope of the claims laid out in all of the sequential patents (Wagner and Parchomovsky, 2005). In contrast, stand-alone innovations are more likely to be invented around and the underlying intellectual property has a higher hazard of being appropriated (Shapiro, 2000).},
tags={Internal sequential innovations, renewals},
filename={Liu (2008) - Internal Sequential Innovations.pdf}
}
@article{macdonald2004means,
title={When Means Become Ends: Considering the Impact of Patent Strategy on Innovation},
author={Macdonald, S.},
journal={Information Economics and Policy},
volume={16},
number={1},
pages={135--158},
year={2004},
abstract={The patent is supposed to be a means to an end, that end being innovation. Whether the innovation comes from the protection the patent affords the inventor, or from the dissemination of the information of invention the patent allows, the patent is not meant to be an end in itself. This seems to be changing, the patent acquiring a strategic value increasingly independent of innovation. If this development has gone largely unnoticed, it may be because the patent system tends to be viewed from the entrenched perspectives of lawyers and economists, and of a number of interest groups that justify their reliance on the system in terms of the innovation it is supposed to encourage. These groups have never included small firms and developing countries in whose name they frequently defend the patent system. They may have some difficulty justifying a system whose strategic value is so divorced from its value for innovation.},
discipline={Management},
research_type={Discussion, Commentary},
industry={Strategy, General},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The pharmaceutical industry has been instrumental in creating a patent system for the pharmaceutical industry, appropriate to the orderly innovation of that industry. Acceptance of the innovation myth has meant that this logic is rarely challenged. Thus, for instance, development may relate to many patents, not just one (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). The costs of navigating through mazes of overlapping patent rights – through patent thickets – are likely to be considerable (Shapiro, 2001), and are likely to be an obstacle to innovation.},
thicket_def={refs shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={The costs of navigating through mazes of overlapping patent rights – through patent thickets – are likely to be considerable (Shapiro, 2001)...},
tags={strategic use of patents},
filename={Macdonald (2004) - When Means Become Ends.pdf}
}
@article{mallo2008patent,
title={Patent-related Barriers to Market Entry for Generic Medicines in the European Union: A Review of Weaknesses in the Current European Patent System and Their Impact on Market Access of Generic Medicines},
author={Mallo, L. and Roox, K. and Pike, J. and Brown, A. and Becker, S. and Thaler, G.},
journal={Journal of Generic Medicines: The Business Journal for the Generic Medicines Sector},
volume={5},
number={4},
pages={255--280},
year={2008},
publisher={SAGE Publications},
abstract={Patents are effective tools for promoting innovation in the pharmaceutical sector. Originator companies should be able to recoup their R & D investments during the term of the basic patent / SPC on an active pharmaceutical substance. Generic competition should be available immediately after expiry of that term. The chances of market entry for generic medicines companies in all markets the day following expiry of the main basic patent in all European Union markets is, however, not possible or, at best, is extremely diffi cult. Due to a diminishing number of newly registered products and contracting product pipelines, originator companies may be tempted to unjustly prolong the patent monopoly of existing products. The result is known as the ‘ evergreening ’ of a basic patent with the help of follow-on patents to keep generic competitors off the market. These follow-on patents are often weak or trivial and, upon careful examination, it is clear that they should never have been granted. Patent quality is therefore of the utmost importance. The European patent system should only reward true inventions and should discourage patent applications for ordinary innovation. An important way of reducing the incidence of poor quality follow-on patents is to remedy certain structural defi ciencies and weaknesses in the current examination procedure. Priority must be given to ensuring that the European Patent Offi ce (EPO) has the resources it needs to continue to improve the quality of patent examiners, along with their training and remuneration, and to increase the number of more experienced senior examiners in order to give every patent application the deliberate, expert review it deserves. This would lead to a more stringent application of the patentability requirements and fewer trivial patents. Applicants should be more rigorously required to provide patent applications of the highest quality accompanied by all relevant information at the start of the examination process. Similarly, they should be under obligation to disclose all information known to them that is material to the patentability of their invention. Furthermore, better third-party participation would also help to avoid inappropriate follow-on patents from being granted. When such patents are granted, an immediate review should be possible to avoid the assertion of ultimately invalid patents to hinder generic competition. This would require an acceleration of the current opposition proceedings that today can take many years. The structure established under the European Patent Convention only provides for a common and single European patent application and granting system by the EPO. A European patent is not a unitary patent, but essentially a bundle of national patents. As a result, questions of patent infringement and validity are governed by various national laws and are handled by the national courts operating under different procedural rules. This purely national litigation system results in a complex arena of multiple patent litigation involving high costs, forum shopping and diverging, even contradictory, court decisions. The lack of a central judiciary composed of experienced patent judges is regarded as one of the major defects in the current patent system. An effective solution would be the creation of a central European patent court that would deal with questions of invalidity and infringement at a pan-European level. Until this has been achieved, specialised national patent courts should be created with technically skilled judges with powers to reach a decision within an acceptable timeframe. Furthermore, the standard for obtaining an interim injunction should be returned to its roots as an equitable remedy since injunctions today are often used simply as a litigious tactic. This change would require a litigant to establish the existence of irreparable harm that cannot be compensated by monetary damages before a court would take the far-reaching step of enjoining a product. Finally, measures should be taken to ensure that originator companies do not use other means to unjustly prolong their monopoly by, for example, introducing a system of patent linkage, obtaining improperly granted SPCs, deploying inaccurate marketing campaigns for promoting ‘ new ’ products with no substantial added therapeutic value as innovative products, etc.},
discipline={Policy},
research_type={Commentary, Discussion},
industry={Pharmaceutical},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Certain structural deficiencies and weaknesses in the current examination procedure, however, result in the grant of patents of variable quality, giving a patent owner / originator company facing expiry of a basic product patent the opportunity to create what is known as a ‘patent thicket’ (see below). The most obvious structural issues are discussed below.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Evergreening},
filename={Mallo (2008) - Patent Related Barriers To Market Entry For Generic Medicines In The European Union.pdf}
}
@article{meniere2008patent,
title={Patent Law and Complementary Innovations},
author={M{\'e}ni{\`e}re, Y.},
journal={European Economic Review},
volume={52},
number={7},
pages={1125--1139},
year={2008},
abstract={The patent system was initially designed to provide incentives to develop stand-alone innovations in fi?elds such as mechanics, chemicals or pharmaceuticals. Its application is therefore problematical in more recent ?elds such as biotechnology and ICT industries, where innovation patterns are different. A well-known problem concerns cumulative innovations. Patent law must then trade off the rights granted to upstream patent owners with the incentives to develop subsequent innovations (Scotchmer, 1991; Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998; Denicolò, 2000). Another issue concerns complementary innovations, which are the focus of the paper. When ?final products embody several complementary innovations, the scattering of patents between various owners jeopardizes the commercial exploitation of the products because of negotiation and royalty stacking issues (Merges & Nelson, 1990; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001). In biotechnology, this is the case of therapeutic proteins or genetic diagnostic tests that require the use of multiple patented gene fragments (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). It is also very frequent in ICT industries such as electronics, computer hardware and software, where ?firms have to navigate "patent thickets" (Shapiro, 2001). Shapiro (2001) reports, for example, that in the semi-conductor industry ?rms receive ?thousands of patents each year and manufacturers can potentially infringe on hundreds of patents with a single product". The situation is similar in the U.S. software industry, where there are ?potentially dozens or hundreds of patents covering individual components of a product?(FTC, 2003). I study the problem of the production of complementary innovations in a model of dynamic R&D competition between two ?firms, and argue that in some cases complementary innovations should not be patentable as such, but bundled with other innovations prior to patenting. To do so I consider two complementary innovations and examine whether they should be patented separately or as a bundle. This approach echoes several papers on cumulative innovations where patentability requirements are de?ned as the need to develop two or more successive innovations before obtaining a patent (Scotchmer and Green, 1990; Hunt, 1995; O?Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998; Denicolò, 2000). As regards complementary innovations, the optimal patenting rule depends on a trade-off between the pro?fit loss due to scattered complementary patents, and the possible bene?fit of patent disclosure. The scattering of complementary patents between different owners creates a double marginalization issue. Since each patentee behaves as a monopolist, the Cournot (1838) theorem predicts that prices do not maximize the ?rms?pro?ts (Shapiro, 2001; Lerner & Tirole, 2005)1 . The requirement that complementary innovations be bundled prior to patenting can be a way to prevent this pro?t loss. However, small innovations are not disclosed when innovations have to be bundled prior to patenting (Scotchmer and Green, 1990). As a result, ?firms lose the possibility to quit the race after a ?first innovation has been patented, which leads to R&D cost duplications. I show that patent disclosure has a positive social effect, although it does not permit a fully effi cient coordination between ?firms. In this context, bundling innovations prior to patenting can be more effi cient if innovations can be devel- oped quickly. As I argue in the Conclusion, this condition is consistent with the legal de?nition of the "inventive step" patentability requirement. The paper is structured in six sections. First, the model is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 then considers the case in which innovations can be patented separately, while Section 4 focuses on the case in which they must be bundled prior to patenting. Section 5 compares the social outcomes of the two require- ments. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses the policy implications of the model.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={ICT, Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The present paper upholds policy arguments that emphasize the importance of a severe application of this patentability requirement as a means to limit the size of "patent thickets" and to promote innovation in sectors where complementary innovations are frequent (Jaffe, 2000; Barton, 2003; FTC, 2003)... When ?final products embody several complementary innovations, the scattering of patents between various owners jeopardizes the commercial exploitation of the products because of negotiation and royalty stacking issues (Merges & Nelson, 1990; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001)},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={It is also very frequent in ICT industries such as electronics, computer hardware and software, where ?rms have to navigate "patent thickets" (Shapiro, 2001).},
tags={Patent disclosure, bundling and separate patents, },
filename={Meniere (2008) - Patent Law And Complementary Innovations.pdf}
}
@article{maskus2006reforming,
title={Reforming US Patent Policy: Getting the Incentives Right},
author={Maskus, K.E.},
journal={Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization},
volume={1},
number={4},
pages={127--153},
year={2006},
publisher={MIT Press},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy},
research_type={Commentary, Discussion},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={In addition to the costs of individual patents, researchers have to contend with “patent thickets.” That is, complex technologies, such as biomedical research tools,embody a number of technological inputs, many of which are patented. A different company, in turn, could own each patent. Negotiating these thickets raises the cost of securing rights. Weaker patent standards encourage patent proliferation and an enlargement of the thickets for research in areas such as biotechnology, agricultural chemicals, and pharmaceuticals...That suggests patent thickets and transactions costs may slow down the diffusion of scientific research.},
thicket_def={def42},
thicket_def_extract={In addition to the costs of individual patents, researchers have to contend with “patent thickets.” That is, complex technologies, such as biomedical research tools,embody a number of technological inputs, many of which are patented.},
tags={TRIPS, patent proliferation, IPR Reform},
filename={Maskus (2006) - Reforming Us Patent Policy Getting The Incentives Right.pdf}
}
@article{masur2010costly,
title={Costly Screens and Patent Examination},
author={Masur, J.S.},
journal={Journal of Legal Analysis},
volume={2},
number={2},
pages={687--734},
year={2010},
publisher={Oxford University Press},
abstract={The United States Patent and Trademark Office has acquired a well-deserved reputation for inefficacy and inefficiency. Proposals for reforming the patent office have thus focused on improving the quality of patent review while decreasing its cost. Yet this view overlooks the valuable function performed by the high costs associated with obtaining a patent: these costs serve as an effective screen against low-value patents. Moreover, due to asymmetries in patent values, the costly screen is likely to select against socially harmful patents in disproportionate numbers. Although the patent office is the most prominent forum in which this type of costly screening operates, it is not the only one. In a variety of other contexts, the private costs of navigating an administrative process may complement the process itself in screening out unwanted participants.},
discipline={Law, Policy},
research_type={Discussion, Commentary},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Third, there are patents of low private value and low (or negative) social value; this class of patents includes both discarded, unenforced patents that increase the search costs and risk imposed on commercial firms—the "patent thicket", in popular parlance (Shapiro 2001)—and worthless, largely unenforceable patents usable only for extracting nuisance settlements (see Section 2.2.).},
thicket_def={Refs Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={Third, there are patents of low private value and low (or negative) social value; this class of patents includes both discarded, unenforced patents that increase the search costs and risk imposed on commercial firms—the ‘‘patent thicket,’’ in popular parlance (Shapiro 2001)...},
tags={Screening Patents, administrative costs of patents},
filename={Masur (2010) - Costly Screens And Patent Examination.pdf}
}
@article{merges2006introductory,
title={Introductory Note to Brief of Amicus Curiae in eBay v. MercExchange},
author={Merges, R.P.},
journal={Berkeley Tech. LJ},
volume={21},
pages={997--1016},
year={2006},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Commentary, Discussion},
industry={General, Technology},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={As noted above, the existence of the patent thicket and the problem of low quality patents make it especially easy for trolls to acquire patents that arguably cover one of the hundreds or thousands of processes incorporated in a single high technology product. The troll waits until a company with deep pockets makes irreversible investments in the arguably infringing technology. The troll may even revise the terms of the patent (through a patent "reissuance" or "continuation") in light of the target's investment in order to strengthen the infringement claim. The troll then uses the threat of an injunction shutting down production to demand a significant share of the total profit associated with the product. This gamesmanship results in no social benefit and a great deal of harm.},
thicket_def={refs Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={As the Federal Trade Commission recently explained, innovation in the computer and Internet industry is often incremental and cumulative, and the pace of change is rapid.4 The net result is that each marketable product in this industry may incorporate--often in an incidental, tangential, and sometimes unintentional way-hundreds or even thousands of patented processes. This is commonly described as a "patent thicket": "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology." Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120-21 (Adam Jaffee et al. eds., 2001); see also To Promote Innovation 2:27-31, 3:2, 34-35, 52-53},
tags={Patent Trolls, injunction},
filename={Merges (2006) - Introductory Note To Brief Of Amicus Curiae In Ebay V MercExchange.pdf}
}
@article{mertes2010managing,
title={Managing the Patent Thicket and Maximizing Patent Lifetime in Vaccine Technology},
author={Mertes, M.M.M. and St{\"o}tter, G.},
journal={Human Vaccines},
volume={6},
number={10},
pages={860--863},
year={2010},
publisher={Landes Bioscience},
abstract={Patents are exclusive rights for a limited period of time that are granetd to provide an incentive for innovation and in exchange for the public disclosure of an invention. Patenting in the medical field, especially in the field of human vaccine technologies, is full of pitfalls, because the products that finally access the market are often covered by a multitude of exclusive IP rights. This commentary gives an overview on obstacles in vaccine patenting and how to overcome them, and intends to provide a patenting guideline for researchers.},
discipline={Law, Policy},
research_type={Discussion, Commentary},
industry={Vaccine, Biology},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Managing the patent thicket in the fields of vaccine technology is challenging as one product may be covered by a plurality of exclusive IP rights that have to be considered when developing a product and building up a patent portfolio. Consequently, licensing is a key point in the vaccine industry.If a basic patent is held by a powerful patent holder refusing to grant a license under reasonable commercial terms or abuses a market-dominating position, it should be examined, whether the requirements to request a compulsory license are fulfilled.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={licensing, patent portfolio},
filename={Mertes Stotter (2010) - Managing The Patent Thicket And Maximizing Patent Lifetime In Vaccine Technology.pdf}
}
@article{meurer2002business,
title={Business Method Patents and Patent Floods},
author={Meurer, M.J.},
journal={Wash. UJL \& Pol'y},
volume={8},
pages={309--342},
year={2002},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion, Commentary},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Furthermore, a thicket of patents may stultify development of technology because of the cost of securing patent licenses from the large numbers of patent owners.},
thicket_def={def43},
thicket_def_extract={Furthermore, a thicket of patents may stultify development of technology because of the cost of securing patent licenses from the large numbers of patent owners.},
tags={patent pools, business methods patents, patent floods},
filename={Meurer (2002) - Business Method Patents And Patent Floods.pdf}
}
@book{muris2001competition,
title={Competition and Intellectual Property Policy: The Way Ahead},
author={Muris, T.J.},
year={2001},
publisher={US FTC},
abstract={},
discipline={Policy},
research_type={Speech},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weakly Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={Moreover, even if there were a "patent thicket" problem, others state that firms have found a range of means to overcome these obstacles, including cross-licenses and patent pooling.},
thicket_def={Quotes Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={According to Professor Carl Shapiro, a "patent thicket" has formed, which he describes as "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology."},
tags={Competition, FTC, Antitrust, IPR Reform},
filename={Muris (2001) - Competition And Intellectual Property Policy The Way Ahead.pdf}
}
@article{napoleon2009impact,
title={Impact of Global Patent and Regulatory Reform on Patent Strategies for Biotechnology},
author={Napoleon, V.J.},
journal={Pitt. J. Tech. L. \& Pol'y},
volume={9},
pages={1--31},
year={2009},
abstract={},
discipline={Law, Policy},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Pharmaceutical companies typically grow a patent thicket seeking a wide range of chemical variants and analogs, methods of synthesizing the drug, chemical intermediates in this synthesis, different crystal forms, different finished dosage forms and various methods of use. 62 Obtaining permission from various patent holders for use of patents can prove to be difficult particularly if the patent holder’s objective in creating the thicket is to block innovation by outsiders. Because useful innovation in biotechnology requires multiple inventive steps and technologies, we could conceivably witness cumulative innovation with infringement on many patents which ultimately serves as a drag on innovation and commercialization.},
thicket_def={Quotes Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={This pattern, however, has created what some would characterize as a “Patent Thicket” 59 in biotechnology. That is, emerging from the overabundance of patent filings and associated activity is “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights”},
tags={International Patent System, IPR Reform},
filename={Napoleon (2009) - Impact Of Global Patent And Regulatory Reform On Patent Strategies For Biotechnology.pdf}
}
@article{nielsen2006compulsory,
title={Compulsory Patent Licensing: Is It a Viable Solution in the United States},
author={Nielsen, C.M. and Samardzija, M.R.},
journal={Mich. Telecomm. \& Tech. L. Rev.},
volume={13},
pages={509},
year={2006},
abstract={As technology continues to advance at a rapid pace, so do the number of patents that cover every aspect of making, using, and selling these innovations. In 1996, to compound the rapid change of technology, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that business methods are also patentable. Hence in the current environment, scores of patents, assigned to many different parties, may cover a single electronic device or software—making it increasingly impossible to manufacture an electronic device without receiving a cease and desist letter or other notice from a patentee demanding a large royalty or threatening an injunction. Companies, particularly those in the high technology sector, have been asserting for some time now that they are under constant threat of lawsuits that threaten to shut them down. As a result, numerous radical changes to the U.S. Patent Act and patent practice before the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office have been proposed. Certain proposed changes, however, are meeting with resistance because of a reliance on long term patent protection and exclusivity of patent rights by different industries. Notwithstanding, certain foreign governments have already enacted provisions making it possible to obtain a compulsory patent license in the event that a patentee is not practicing his invention or is simply refusing to license the rights to his invention for a reasonable royalty fee.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Many of the patents overlap and block the use of other patents, thereby creating a “patent thicket”—a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.”3 It is hypothesized that patent thickets increase transactional costs and stifle innovation by making it more expensive and difficult to bring new developments to the market.},
thicket_def={Quotes Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={Many of the patents overlap and block the use of other patents, thereby creating a “patent thicket”—a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.”},
tags={Compulsory Licensing, Royalties},
filename={Nielsen Samardzija (2006) - Compulsory Patent Licensing.pdf}
}
@article{paredes2006written,
title={Written Description Requirement in Nanotechnology: Clearing a Patent Thicket},
author={Paredes, J.P.},
journal={J. Pat. \& Trademark Off. Soc'y},
volume={88},
pages={489},
year={2006},
abstract={Nanotechnology is an emerging technology, and as an emerging technology, there are certain intellectual property issues surrounding the appropriate protection for nanotechnology. Broadly speaking, nanotechnology is the manufacture of structures and manipulation of matter within dimensions below 100 nanometers, where unique phenomena enable novel applications. At the nanoscale, the physical, chemical, and biological properties of materials differ in fundamental and valuable ways from the properties of individual atoms and molecules or bulk matter.' Researchers and companies are attempting at applying these novel properties to a wide-range of applications and industries.' One important intellectual property issue in addressing nanotechnology is the patenting of innovative techniques and compositions of matter which are necessary for downstream innovation. The notion of a patent thicket is where an overlapping set of patent rights requires that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees. If you get monopoly rights down at the bottom, "you may stifle competition that uses those patents later on and so the breadth and utilization of patent rights can be used not only to stifle competition, but also have adverse effects in the long run on innovation." The patent thicket problem in nanotechnology has been suggested by a recent report by LuxResearch (hereinafter "LuxReport"), indicating that many patents have been filed relating to nanomaterials with their claims overlapping.While many companies will want to use these nanomaterials, the LuxReport states these companies will be forced to license patents from many different sources. Potentially, there will be significant transactional costs for further nanotechnology developments due to these overlapping claims. Moreover, the quality of these nanotechnology patents has been repeatedly called into question," so the navigation of a patent thicket will have to be around these questionable patents. The legal principles in the written description requirement could clear some of this patent thicket by narrowing overlapping claims in nanotechnology during examination, litigation, and especially in postgrant procedures. This paper generally discusses 1) the background of the nanomaterials in the LuxReport and the patent thicket; 2) the legal principles within the written description requirement; 3) why the written description requirement should be used; 4) the application of the legal principles within the written description requirement to nanomaterials discussed in the LuxReport; and 5) proposals for the written description requirement for the USPTO, the Federal Circuit, and postgrant procedures.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Nanotechnology},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={While many companies will want to use these nanomaterials, the LuxReport states these companies will be forced to license patents from many different sources. Potentially, there will be significant transactional costs for further nanotechnology developments due to these overlapping claims. Moreover, the quality of these nanotechnology patents has been repeatedly called into question," so the navigation of a patent thicket will have to be around these questionable patents.},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={The notion of a patent thicket is where an overlapping set of patent rights requires that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees},
tags={Written Description Requirement for Patent Grant Procedures},
filename={Paredes (2006) - Written Description Requirement In Nanotechnology.pdf}
}
@article{rai2003engaging,
title = {Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform},
author = {Rai, Arti K.},
journal = {Columbia Law Review},
volume = {103},
number = {5},
pages = {pp. 1035-1135},
abstract = {The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, charged with adjudicating appeals in patent cases, has adopted an unusual approach that arrogates power over fact finding while it simultaneously invokes rule-formalism. Although the Federal Circuit's approach may be justified by the fact-finding and policy application deficiencies of the trial courts and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), it has had a negative impact on innovation policy and has resulted in a patent system that is sorely in need of reform. This Article argues that because of the interdependence of the various institutions within the patent system, reform of the system must be both multi-institutional and closely attentive to the institutional competence of the system's actors. Although Congress should clearly bolster the PTO's fact-finding abilities, giving plenary responsibility over factual questions to the PTO would not be cost effective. Accordingly, Congress should endow the system with improved fact-finding expertise through the institution of specialized trial courts. As for actual policy formulation, each of the available institutional options--the legislature, the PTO, and the courts--has substantial associated liabilities. On balance, however, the Federal Circuit is probably best positioned to formulate patent policy, so long as the fact-finding expertise of inferior institutions is bolstered and additional appellate mechanisms are instituted. By paying attention to institutional design and revising our institutions accordingly, we can achieve the patent system we should have had all along.},
year = {2003},
publisher = {Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.},
copyright = {Copyright © 2003 Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion, Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Neutral},
thicket_stance_extract={Defensive patenting has become particularly prominent in certain industries like the semiconductor industry, where innovation is cumulative, and a thicket of relevant patents often exists. See Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. Econ. 101, 104 (2001). In such industries, firms gain freedom to operate through defensive patenting. Indeed, within the semiconductor industry, it appears that much of the increase in patenting per R&D dollar over the last two decades has been the consequence of defensive patenting. See id. (noting that firms "appear to be engaged in 'patent portfolio races' aimed at reducing concerns about being held up by external patent owners and at negotiating access to external technologies on more favorable terms"). According to Hall and Ziedonis, this increase in defensive patenting "is causally related to the pro-patent shift in the U.S. legal environment in the 1980s." Id. I discuss this alleged "pro-patent" shift infra Part III.B.},
thicket_def={References Heller/Eisenberg, Multiple overlapping patents},
thicket_def_extract={Moreover, the guidelines on utility incorporate, at least implicitly, economic concerns that setting the utility standard too low could impede scientific progress by creating a transaction-cost-heavy thicket of patents on basic research},
tags={IPR Reform},
filename={Rai (2003) - Engaging Facts And Policy.pdf}
}
@article{reitzig2007sharks,
title={On Sharks, Trolls, and Their Patent Prey—Unrealistic Damage Awards and Firms’ Strategies of “Being Infringed”},
author={Reitzig, M. and Henkel, J. and Heath, C.},
journal={Research Policy},
volume={36},
number={1},
pages={134--154},
year={2007},
abstract={Patent trolls (or sharks) are patent holding individuals or (often small) firms who trap R&D intensive manufacturers in patent infringement situations in order to receive damage awards for the illegitimate use of their technology. While of great concern to management, their existence and impact for both corporate decision makers and policy makers remains to be fully analyzed from an academic standpoint. In this paper we show why patent sharks can operate profitably, why they are of growing concern, how manufacturers can forearm themselves against them, and which issues policy makers need to address. To do so, we map international indemnification rules with strategic rationales of small patent-holding firms and large manufacturers within a theoretical model. Our central finding is that the courts’ unrealistic consideration of the trade-offs faced by inadvertent infringers is a central condition for sharks to operate profitably.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={We further argued that the increasing technology monitoring efforts for victims of trolls, namely large manufacturing R&D intensive firms, due to ballooning numbers of patent applications, probably led to the increase of sharks’ relevance for innovators. It facilitates 'trapping’ manufacturers by ‘hiding’ patented technologies in confusing patent thickets—a second necessary condition for sharks to operate. oreover, the strengthening of patent holder’s rights in certain jurisdictions (e.g. the US) most likely enabled sharks to operate more profitably, too.},
thicket_def={def7},
thicket_def_extract={As both articles show, the “strategic use” of patents (the two most important types being blocking and cross-licensing with patent ‘thickets’ playing a major role for the latter), has classically been discussed from the perspective of those patent holders who either engage in the production of their own technological goods or consider themselves professional intellectual property suppliers who repeatedly interact with manufacturers.},
tags={Patent Trolls and Sharks and their operations},
filename={Reitzig Henkel Heath (2007) - On Sharks Trolls And Their Patent Prey.pdf}
}
@inproceedings{rubinfeld2004strategic,
title={The Strategic Use of Patents: Implications for Antitrust},
author={Rubinfeld, D.L. and Maness, R.},
booktitle={Antitrust, Patent and Copyright Conference},
year={2004},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Retail},
thicket_stance={Neutral},
thicket_stance_extract={The competitive offensive advantage associated with a patent thicket can be high. It follows, of course, that there is also a substantial defensive advantage as well. The result may be a “race” to grow one’s IP portfolio. Unfortunately, however, it is not clear whether that race will be “to the top” (i.e., in the social interest), or “to the bottom” (i.e., harmful from a social point of view).},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={Shapiro (2001) characterizes a patent thicket as a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.”},
tags={Patent Thickets strategic use in negotiation and business strategy},
filename={Rubinfeld Maness (2004) - The Strategic Use Of Patents Implications For Antitrust.pdf}
}
@article{rey2012abuse,
title={Abuse of Dominance and Licensing of Intellectual Property},
author={Rey, P. and Salant, D.},
journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization},
year={2012},
abstract={This paper examines the impact of the licensing policies of one or more upstream owners of essential intellectual property (IP hereafter) on the downstream firms that require access to that IP, as well as on consumers and social welfare. The paper considers a model in which there is product differentiation downstream. License fees and fixed entry costs determine the number of downstream competitors and thus variety. We first consider the case where there is a single upstream owner of essential IP. Increasing the number of licenses enhances product variety, which creates added value, but it also intensifies downstream competition, which dissipates profits. We derive conditions under which the upstream IP monopoly will then want to provide an excessive or insufficient number of licenses, relative to the number that maximizes consumer surplus or social welfare.When there are multiple owners of essential IP, royalty stacking can reduce the number of the downstream licensees, but also the downstream equilibrium prices the consumers face.The paper derives conditions determining whether this reduction in downstream price and variety is beneficial to consumers or society. Finally, the paper explores the impact of alternative licensing policies. With fixed license fees or royalties expressed as a percentage of the price, an upstream IP owner cannot control the intensity of downstream competition. In contrast, volumebased license fees (i.e., per-unit access fees), do permit an upstream owner to control downstream competition and to replicate the outcome of complete integration. The paper also shows that vertical integration can have little impact on downstream competition and licensing terms when IP owners charge fixed or volume-based access fees.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Patent thickets have long been a concern due to the potential for delaying deployment of products and adversely affecting consumers.},
thicket_def={def9},
thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets, layers of licenses a firm needs to be able to offer products that embody technologies owned by multiple firms, and licensing policies have drawn increasing scrutiny from policy makers. Patent thickets involve complementary products, which gives rise to double marginalization - the so-called royalty stacking problem - and has the potential to retard diffusion of new technologies and reduce consumer welfare.},
tags={Optimal licensing policies regarding downstream competition, fixed access fees},
filename={Rey Salant (2012) - Abuse Of Dominance And Licensing Of Intellectual Property.pdf}
}
@article{shapiro2003antitrust,
title={Antitrust limits to patent settlements},
author={Shapiro, C.},
journal={RAND Journal of Economics},
pages={391--411},
year={2003},
abstract={Patents, patent litigation, and patent settlements increasingly influence competition. Settlements of patent disputes come in many forms,including licensing and cross-licensing agreements, patent pools, mergers, and joint ventures. While frequently procompetitive, such settlements can stifle competition and harm consumers. I propose a specific antitrust rule limiting such settlements: a settlement must leave consumers at least as well off as they would have been from ongoing patent litigation. After establishing that profitable settlements satisfying this constraint generally exist, I show how this antitrust rule can be used to evaluate three types of settlements: mergers, patent pools, and negotiated entry dates.},
discipline={econ},
research_type={theory},
industry={general},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={As described in Shapiro (2001), more and more companies are facing a patent thicket requiring them to obtain multiple licenses to bring their products safely to market.},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={As described in Shapiro (2001), more and more companies are facing a patent thicket requiring them to obtain multiple licenses to bring their products safely to market.},
tags={Mergers, Patent Pools, Negotiated Entry Dates, Settlement effects},
filename={Shapiro (2003) - Antitrust Limits To Patent Settlements.pdf}
}
@article{sabety2004nanotechnology,
title={Nanotechnology innovation and the patent thicket: Which IP policies promote growth},
author={Sabety, T.},
journal={Alb. LJ Sci. \& Tech.},
volume={15},
pages={477},
year={2004},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Nanotechnology, Radio},
thicket_stance={Neutral},
thicket_stance_extract={On the one hand, the fear of the patent thicket has been raised: "[i]f you get monopoly rights down at the bottom, you may stifle competition that uses those patents later on and so . . . the breadth and utilization of patent rights can be used not only to stifle competition, but also have adverse effects in the long run on innovation."9On the other hand, encouraging private investment in commercialization has also been raised: "[b]y enabling corporations to negotiate exclusive licenses of promising technologies [that were publicly funded],... [this] encourage[s] them to invest in the additional research, development, and manufacturing capabilities needed to bring new products to market." The information technology industry did not suffer severe patent deadlock in its early years while the radio industry did},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro defines "patent thicket" as "an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees."},
tags={licensing, government funding},
filename={Sabety (2004) - Nanotechnology Innovation And The Patent Thicket.pdf}
}
@article{santore2010patent,
title = {Patent Pools as a Solution to Efficient Licensing of Complementary Patents? Some Experimental Evidence},
author = {Rudy Santore and Michael McKee, and David Bjornstad},
journal = {Journal of Law and Economics},
volume = {53},
number = {1},
pages = {pp. 167-183},
year = {2010},
publisher = {The University of Chicago Press for The Booth School of Business of the University of Chicago and The University of Chicago Law School},
abstract = {Abstract Production requiring licensing groups of complementary patents implements a coordination game among patent holders, who can price patents by choosing among combinations of fixed and royalty fees. Summed across patents, these fees become the total producer cost of the package of patents. Royalties, because they function as excise taxes, add to marginal costs, resulting in higher prices and reduced quantities of the downstream product and lower payoffs to the patent holders. Using fixed fees eliminates this inefficiency but yields a more complex coordination game in which there are multiple equilibria, which are very fragile in that small mistakes can lead the downstream firm to not license the technology, resulting in inefficient outcomes. We report on a laboratory market investigation of the efficiency effects of coordinated pricing of patents in a patent pool. We find that pool-like pricing agreements can yield fewer coordination failures in the pricing of complementary patents.},
discipline={Law, Econ},
research_type={Theory, Empirical},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={More recently, a National Academy of Sciences (2006) committee studied the issue, concluding that even though evidence of blocking or market failures has yet to emerge, the anticommons or patent thickets may well emerge as profit opportunities in biomedical markets grow.},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={Shapiro (2001) broadens the concept as a “patent thicket” in which possible outcomes include excessively high fees for the use of the patent set, uncertainty regarding potential patent infringement, and, in the limit, holdup problems.},
tags={patent pools},
filename={Santore McKee Bjornstad (2010) - Patent Pools As A Solution To Efficient Licensing Of Complementary Patents.pdf}
}
@article{schmidt2007negotiating,
title={Negotiating the RNAi Patent Thicket},
author={Schmidt, C.},
journal={Nature biotechnology},
volume={25},
number={3},
pages={273--280},
year={2007},
publisher={New York, NY: Nature Pub. Co., 1996-},
abstract={Patent disputes haven’t materialized in the RNAi field yet, but once products near the market, it might be a different story. Charlie Schmidt investigates.},
discipline={Biology},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Biology},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={RNA Interface, Licensing, Royalties},
filename={Schmidt (2007) - Negotiating The Rnai Patent Thicket.pdf}
}
@article{schmidt2008complementary,
title={Complementary Patents and Market Structure},
author={Schmidt, K.},
year={2008},
publisher={CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7005},
abstract={Many high technology goods are based on standards that require access to several patents that are owned by different IP holders. We investigate the royalties chosen by IP holders under different market structures. Vertical integration of an IP holder and a downstream producer solves the double mark-up problem between these firms. Nevertheless, it may raise royalty rates and reduce output as compared to non-integration. Horizontal integration of IP holders (or a patent pool) solves the complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always encourages entry and innovation.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={This “patent thicket” (Shapiro, 2001) gives rise to a complements problem: each patent holder does not internalize the negative external effect on the revenues of the other patent holders when setting his royalties, so the sum of all royalties will be inefficiently high.},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={This “patent thicket” (Shapiro, 2001) gives rise to a complements problem: each patent holder does not internalize the negative external effect on the revenues of the other patent holders when setting his royalties, so the sum of all royalties will be inefficiently high.},
tags={patent pools},
filename={Schmidt (2008) - Complementary Patents And Market Structure.pdf}
}
@article{schneider2008fences,
title={Fences and competition in patent races},
author={Schneider, C.},
journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization},
volume={26},
number={6},
pages={1348--1364},
year={2008},
abstract={This paper studies the behaviour of ?firms facing the decision to create a patent fence, de?fined as a portfolio of substitute patents. We set up a patent race model, where ?firms can decide either to patent their inventions, or to rely on secrecy. It is shown that fi?rms build patent fences, when the duopoly profi?ts net of R&D costs are positive. We also demonstrate that in this context, a fi?rm will rely on secrecy when the speed of discovery of the subsequent invention is high compared to the competitor?s. Furthermore, we compare the model under the First-to-Invent and First-to-File legal rules. Finally, we analyze the welfare implications of patent fences.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={While the issue of "thickets" of complementary technologies in cumulative innovations has been extensively analyzed2, as well as the institutional solutions to overcome this problem (Lerner and Tirole, 2005 and Shapiro, 2001), little attention has been paid to fencing patents so far.},
thicket_def={def10},
thicket_def_extract={More precisely, ?firms will patent a coherent group of inventions, which form what is sometimes called a patent "bulk", aimed at protecting one product. The "bulk" can either be a "fence" of substitute patents or a "thicket" of complementary patents (see Reitzig, 2004 and Cohen et al., 2000).},
tags={patent fences, },
filename={Schneider (2008) - Fences And Competition In Patent Races.pdf}
}
@article{schmalensee2009standard,
title={Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists And Competition Policy},
author={Schmalensee, R.},
journal={The Journal of Industrial Economics},
volume={57},
number={3},
pages={526--552},
year={2009},
publisher={Wiley Online Library},
abstract={Using a simple model of patent licensing followed by product-market competition, this paper investigates several competition policy questions related to standard-setting organizations (SSOs). It concludes that competition policy should not favor patent-holders who practice their patents against innovation specialists who do not, that SSOs should not be required to conduct auctions among patent-holders before standards are set in order to determine post-standard royalty rates (though less formal ex ante competition should be encouraged), and that antitrust policy should not allow or encourage collective negotiation of patent royalty rates. Some recent policy developments in this area are discussed.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Weakly Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={One might argue that the rate of innovation or at least of patenting is in fact too high in some sectors, particularly those in which the patent thicket problem is severe. A problem 26 with this argument is that the returns to major innovations would be reduced by collective negotiation, not just the returns to the minor advances that contribute more to patent thickets than to real progress. },
thicket_def={References Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={Standard Setting, Antitrust Policy},
filename={Schmalensee (2009) - Standard Setting Innovation Specialists And Competition Policy.pdf}
}
@article{serafino2007survey,
title={Survey of patent pools demonstrates variety of purposes and management structures},
author={Serafino, D.},
journal={Knowledge Ecology International. http://keionline. org/content/view/69/1},
year={2007},
abstract={The collective management of intellectual property rights is a term used to describe methods of managing large portfolios of intellectual property assets, including patents, copyrights, trademarks, know-how and data. Patent pools are one such mechanism. A “patent pool” is an agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or to third parties.2 In its 2001 White Paper on Patent Pools, the USPTO said, “A patent pool allows interested parties to gather all the necessary tools to practice a certain technology in one place, e.g, ‘one-stop shopping,’ rather than obtaining licenses from each patent owner individually.”3 The following paper provides a summary of features of 35 patent pools organized or proposed from 1856 to the present. Each of the patent pools was organized in response to a particular set of policy objectives and circumstances. Their purposes were heterogeneous. Some were organized in order to promote the interests of monopolists or cartels. Others were organized to promote competition and benefit the users of patents. There are pools that manage the patents on standards for new information technologies, that enhance R&D for new biomedical or biotechnology agricultural products, or that seek to promote other objectives. Some pools are organized by patent owners, others by manufacturers, and yet others by non-profit institutions, including governments. There is no single reason for creating a patent pool and no single way to manage a patent pool.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Written Theory, Empirics},
industry={General, Technology},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The Supreme Court ruled in 1947 that the division of the market by territory violated American antitrust laws, and included the contract between National Lead and DuPont in this ruling, which read, in part...The court also determined that “the agreement to license present and future patents and to share know-how contributed to a patent thicket that created a barrier to new entry and allowed DuPont and National Lead to control the domestic industry for titanium dioxide products.”},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={patent pools},
filename={Serafino (2007) - Survey Of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety Of Purposes And Management Structures.pdf},
}
@article{shand2007trends,
title={Trends in Intellectual Property and Nanotechnology: Implications for the Global South},
author={Shand, H. and Wetter, K.J.},
journal={Journal of Intellectual Property Rights},
volume={12},
pages={111--117},
year={2007},
abstract={The race is on to win exclusive monopoly patents on nano-scale materials, devices and processes. The US National Science Foundation predicts that the immensely broad power and scope of nano-scale technologies will revolutionize manufacturing across all industry sectors - capturing a $1 trillion market within six or seven years. Although industry analysts assert that nanotech is in its infancy, patent thickets on fundamental nano-scale materials, tools and processes are already creating thorny barriers for would-be innovators. Industry analysts warn that, 'IP roadblocks could severely retard the development of nanotechnology.' After a decade of confusion and controversy over biotech patents, South governments are now facing a newer, bigger technology wave. By 1 July 2013 even 'least developed' countries will be obligated by the World trade Organization's Trade-Related Asapects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) to acccommodate nanotechnology-related inventions. Despite rosy predictions that nanotech will provide a technical fix for health, sustainable energy, and environmental security in the South, researchers in the developing world are likely to find that participation in the proprietary 'nanotech revolution' is highly restricted by patent tolbooths, obliging them to pay royalties and licensing fees to gain access.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Nanotechnology},
thicket_stance={Weak Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Although industry analysts assert that nanotech is in its infancy, patent thickets on fundamental nano-scale materials, tools and processes are already creating thorny barriers for would-be innovators.},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={TRIPS, Developing Countries},
filename={Shand Wetter (2007) - Trends In Intellectual Property And Nanotechnology.pdf}
}
@article{siebert2006licensing,
title={How licensing resolves hold-up: Evidence from a dynamic panel data model with unobserved heterogeneity},
author={Siebert, Ralph and Von Graevenitz, Georg},
year={2006},
abstract={},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={}, ,
filename={Siebert VonGraevenitz (2006) - How Licensing Resolves Hold Up.pdf}
}
@article{somaya2003strategic,
title = {Strategic Determinants of Decisions Not to Settle Patent Litigation},
author = {Somaya, Deepak},
journal = {Strategic Management Journal},
volume = {24},
number = {1},
pages = {pp. 17-38},
abstract = {Settlement outcomes in patent litigation are modeled as resulting from strategies pursued by firms with their patented technologies. Hypotheses are derived for two types of influences: the use of patents as isolating mechanisms to protect valuable strategic stakes, and their 'defensive' role in obtaining access to external technologies through mutual hold-up. Parameter estimates from a sample selection probit model provide support for the strategic stakes hypotheses, while the evidence for mutual hold-up is inconclusive. Interindustry comparisons show that nonsettlement of patent suits in both research medicines and computers is increased by strategic stakes and, in addition, mutual hold-up appears to play an important role in computer patent suits.},
year = {2003},
publisher = {Wiley},
copyright = {Copyright © 2003 Wiley},
abstract={Settlement outcomes in patent litigation are modeled as resulting from strategies pursued by firms with their patented technologies. Hypotheses are derived for two types of influences: the use of patents as isolating mechanisms to protect valuable strategic stakes, and their 'defensive' role in obtaining access to external technologies through mutual hold-up. Parameter estimates from a sample selection probit model provide support for the strategic stakes hypotheses, while the evidence for mutual hold-up is inconclusive. Interindustry comparisons show that nonsettlement of patent suits in both research medicines and computers is increased by strategic stakes and, in addition, mutual hold-up appears to play an important role in computer patent suits.},
discipline={Econ, Management},
research_type={Theory, Empirical, Econometric Model},
industry={ICT, Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={When strong, watertight patents are available, as in pharma ceuticals, firms may be able to rely on them to isolate key commercial opportunities (Merges, 1998). On the other hand, in systems products industries, thickets of patents may be necessary to foil attempts to invent around the patent, and obtain a robust patent position. Moreover, defen sive patenting?the building of large patent port folios may become necessary if rivals, aided by a strong enforcement regime, are able to effectively threaten to hold up a firm's commercial operations (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001).},
thicket_def={Strategic Value, Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents},
thicket_def_extract={When strong, watertight patents are available, as in pharma ceuticals, firms may be able to rely on them to isolate key commercial opportunities (Merges, 1998). On the other hand, in systems products industries, thickets of patents may be necessary to foil attempts to invent around the patent, and obtain a robust patent position. Moreover, defen sive patenting?the building of large patent port folios may become necessary if rivals, aided by a strong enforcement regime, are able to effectively threaten to hold up a firm's commercial operations (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001).},
tags={negotiating},
filename={Somaya (2003) - Strategic Determinants Of Decisions Not To Settle Patent Litigation.pdf}
}
@article{somaya2011innovation,
title={Innovation in Multi-Invention Contexts: Mapping Solutions to Technological and Intellectual Property Complexity},
author={Somaya, D. and Teece, D. and Wakeman, S.},
journal={California Management Review},
volume={53},
number={4},
pages={47--79},
year={2011},
publisher={JSTOR},
abstract={},
discipline={Management},
research_type={Written Theory},
industry={General},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Scholars such as Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg, Carl Shapiro, and others have drawn attention—arguably too much attention—to the transactional problems created for innovators by such dispersed ownership and the density (or so-called thickets) of patents.58 Less attention has been paid by those authors to the equally important role of patents for supporting innovation in multi-invention settings. Innovators and entrepreneurs are often among the most enthusiastic supporters of the patent system because they perceive it as providing safeguards from misappropriation of their inventions.59 Research has also shown that innovators are often able to devise “working solutions” to navigate patent access concerns, and that patents may in turn be crucial for enabling transactions in technology.60},
thicket_def={References Heller/Eisenberg},
thicket_def_extract={Indeed, the plethora of IP implicated, and the resulting complex licensing required, has led some academics to despair that some sections of the economy have—or are about to—experience a “tragedy of the anticommons” (i.e., no one will use the patented technology because licensing the required technologies is simply too challenging or too expensive).},
tags={multi-invention, negotiation, licensing, strategy},
filename={Somaya Teece Wakeman (2011) - Innovation In Multi Invention Contexts.pdf}
}
@article{tullis2005application,
title={Application of the Government License Defense to Federally Funded Nanotechnology Research: The Case for a Limited Patent Compulsory Licensing Regime},
author={Tullis, T.K.},
journal={UCLA L. Rev.},
volume={53},
pages={279},
year={2005},
abstract={Nanotechnology's potential impact on worldwide industries has nations around the world investing billions of dollars for research in order to capture a part of the projected trillion dollar market for nanotechnology products in 2010. The current rush to patent nanotechnologies may lead to an overcrowded nanotechnology patent thicket that could deter critical innovation and continued product development in the United States. At this early stage of nanotechnology's life cycle, increasing numbers of broad and potentially overlapping patents are being issued--while few nonexclusive licenses are being offered. Furthermore, the lack of significant case law provides little guidance on proper nanotechnology patent scope and validity, while the decline of legal defenses such as experimental use leaves innovators exposed to potential infringement liability for even the most fundamental of scientific research studies. In this Comment, the author proposes that the U.S. government exercises the full extent of its rights under the twenty-five year old Bayh-Dole Act and develop the government license defense to create a limited patent compulsory licensing regime for the fruits of federally funded research. The author argues that recipients of the billions of dollars in federal nanotechnology research funds should provide broad, nonexclusive licenses to the privatized patent rights they obtain as a result of public funding. Ultimately, a well-formulated government license defense, which assesses the extent to which an "infringing" act against a federally funded patent falls along a spectrum of fair use, would provide a means for overcoming the innovation-impeding effects of absolute exclusion rights.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Nanotechnology},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The development of such a patent thicket could deter further innovation, 6 and the active enforcement by nanotechnology patent holders of their exclusivity rights ultimately could result in the creation of a nanotechnology anticommons-a situation in which a scarce resource becomes prone to underuse because there are too many owners holding the right to exclude others from that resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use.},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={Unfortunately, the rush to secure worldwide intellectual property rights in nanotechnology could lead to the development of a "patent thicket." This term, coined by intellectual property scholars, refers to an overlapping set of patent rights that requires researchers, inventors, and entrepreneurs seeking to commercialize new technologies to obtain licenses from multiple patentees.},
tags={government license defense},
filename={Tullis (2005) - Application Of The Government License Defense To Federally Funded Nanotechnology Research.pdf}
}
@article{taylor2003american,
title={American Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and African Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change},
author={Taylor, M.R. and Cayford, J.},
journal={Harv. JL \& Tech.},
volume={17},
pages={321},
year={2003},
abstract={},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory},
industry={Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The patent thicket is a problem because useful innovation in biotechnology requires multiple inventive steps and technologies. The field of biotechnology is particularly dependent on the cumulative work of many researchers, and therefore is vulnerable to the “anticommons” problem mentioned earlier.},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={This pattern — the increasing number of patents, increasing patent breadth, and the issuance of patents on more basic discoveries — has created what some call a patent thicket in biotechnology: “an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees},
tags={patent policies negative effects on African agriculture},
filename={Taylor Cayford (2003) - American Patent Policy Biotechnology And African Agriculture.pdf}
}
@article{van2006clearing,
title={A Clearing House for Diagnostic Testing: the Solution to Ensure Access to and Use of Patented Genetic Inventions?},
author={Van Zimmeren, E. and Verbeure, B. and Matthijs, G. and Van Overwalle, G.},
journal={Bulletin of the World Health Organization},
volume={84},
number={5},
pages={352--359},
year={2006},
publisher={SciELO Public Health},
abstract={In genetic diagnostics, the emergence of a so-called “patent thicket” is imminent. Such an overlapping set of patent rights may have restrictive effects on further research and development of diagnostic tests, and the provision of clinical diagnostic services. Currently, two models that may facilitate access to and use of patented genetic inventions are attracting much debate in various national and international fora: patent pools and clearing houses. In this article, we explore the concept of clearing houses. Several types of clearing houses are identified. First, we describe and discuss two types that would provide access to information on the patented inventions: the information clearing house and the technology exchange clearing house. Second, three types of clearing houses are analysed that not only offer access to information but also provide an instrument to facilitate the use of the patented inventions: the open access clearing house, the standardized licences clearing house and the royalty collection clearing house. A royalty collection clearing house for genetic diagnostic testing would be the most comprehensive as it would serve several functions: identifying patents and patent claims essential to diagnostic testing, matching licensees with licensors, developing and supplying standardized licences, collecting royalties, monitoring whether users respect licensing conditions, and providing dispute resolution services such as mediation and arbitration. In this way, it might function as an effective model for users to facilitate access to and use of the patented inventions. However, it remains to be seen whether patent holders with a strong patent portfolio will be convinced by the advantages of the royalty collection clearing house and be willing to participate.},
discipline={Policy Report},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Genetics},
thicket_stance={Weakly Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Moreover, there are factors that may lead to the emergence of a patent blocking problem in genetics in the future: increased awareness among researchers; and growing rate of patent enforcement caused by the strategic enforcement of their rights by patent holders and the proliferating complexity of biomedical research requiring a broader range and greater number of inputs of which a growing number is patented.},
thicket_def={def1},
thicket_def_extract={This pattern — the increasing number of patents, increasing patent breadth, and the issuance of patents on more basic discoveries — has created what some call a patent thicket in biotechnology: “an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees.},
tags={patent pools, clearing houses},
filename={VanZimmeren (2006) - A Clearing House For Diagnostic Testing.pdf}
}
@article{verbeure2006patent,
title={Patent Pools and Diagnostic Testing},
author={Verbeure, B. and van Zimmeren, E. and Matthijs, G. and Van Overwalle, G.},
journal={TRENDS in Biotechnology},
volume={24},
number={3},
pages={115--120},
year={2006},
abstract={There is increasing concern that overlapping patents in the field of genetics will create a costly and legally complex situation known as a patent thicket, which, along with the associated issues of accumulating royalty payments, can act as a disincentive for innovation. One potential means of preventing this is for the patent holders to enter into a so-called patent pool, such as those established in the electronics and telecommunications industries. Precedents for these also exist in the field of genetics, notably with the patents pertaining to the SARS genome. In this review, we initially address the patent pool concept in general and its application in genetics. Following this, we will explore patent pools in the diagnostic field in more detail, and examine some existing and novel examples of patent pools in genetics.},
discipline={Policy Report},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={Biotechnology},
thicket_stance={Weakly Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={There is increasing concern that overlapping patents in the field of genetics will create a costly and legally complex situation known as a patent thicket, which, along with the associated issues of accumulating royalty payments, can act as a disincentive for innovation.},
thicket_def={def24},
thicket_def_extract={Patent thicket. The intellectual property portfolios of several companies that form a dense web of overlapping intellectual property right},
tags={patent pools},
filename={Verbeure (2006) - Patent Pools And Diagnostic Testing.pdf}
}
@article{wang2010rise,
title={Rise of the Patent Intermediaries},
author={Wang, A.W.},
journal={Berkeley Tech. LJ},
volume={25},
pages={159},
year={2010},
abstract={Patents are evolving from purely exclusionary instruments into intellectual property assets that play a part in business strategy and have value as transactional goods. Businesses operating in the intellectual property marketplace have experienced an unprecedented explosion of activity involving these intangible but valuable assets. The new market for intellectual property has inspired entrepreneurial legal professionals and business professionals alike to create new companies and expand existing ones to act as middlemen, encouraging the continued proliferation of patent transactions. These entities operate and thrive in the intermediary market between buyers and sellers of intellectual property as well as auxiliary markets related to the protection of intellectual property.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={ICT},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={In this age of patent thickets, an organization must tread carefully lest it infringe countless patents just by doing business (cites Heller Eisenberg's Anticommons)},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro defines a patent thicket as a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.” Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001)},
tags={},
filename={Wang (2010) - Rise Of The Patent Intermediaries.pdf}
}
@article{wagner2003information,
title = {Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control},
author = {Wagner, R. Polk},
journal = {Columbia Law Review},
volume = {103},
number = {4},
pages = {pp. 995-1034},
year = {2003},
publisher = {Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.},
abstract = {This Essay challenges a central tenet of the recent criticism of intellectual property rights: the suggestion that the control conferred by such rights is detrimental to the continued flourishing of a public domain of ideas and information. In this Essay, Professor Wagner argues that such theories understate the significance of the intangible nature of information, and thus overlook the contribution that even perfectly controlled intellectual creations make to the public domain. In addition, this Essay shows that perfect control of propertized information--an animating assumption in much of the contemporary criticism--is both counterfactual and likely to remain so. These findings suggest that increasing the appropriability of information goods is likely to increase, rather than diminish, the quantity of "open" information. Further, the benefits of control in fostering coordination and enabling flexibility in arrangements are essential elements of promoting progress in a changing world.},
filename={Wagner (2003) - Information Wants To Be Free.pdf}
discipline={Law},
research_type={Theory, Discussion},
industry={ICT},
thicket_stance={Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={Control-talk is of "the second enclosure movement," the lurking "tragedy of the anticommons," or the dangers of "patent thickets" -not to mention the phenomenon of litigation efforts (or perhaps social movements?) sporting their own slogans (and logos), such as "Free the Mouse," "Create Like It's 1790," or "When Copyright Attacks."},
thicket_def={def25},
thicket_def_extract={"Patent thickets" refer to the fact that in many areas of technology, great numbers of related patents exist at any particular time, and many might have applicability to any commercial product.},
tags={information, drm, control},
filename={Wagner (2003) - Information Wants to be Free}
}
