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Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control (view source)
Revision as of 14:54, 23 October 2011
, 14:54, 23 October 2011no edit summary
* Proposals are fully characterized by <math>b\in B</math> and net benefits are <math>z_{i}=b_{i}-T/n</math>.
* Payoffs are discounted: <math>\delta^{\tau}z_{i}=U_{i}(z,\tau)</math>. Extensive form is the same as before for closed rule.
Structure of game:
* P is drawn (which implies a ratio of B/T).
* A random legislator is chosen to distribute B. Note that per the above, all T are distributed equally no matter what.
* Legislators vote against the status quo, in which everyone gets nothing and is taxed nothing.
Stationarity implies members are paid their continuation value in equilibrium in exchange for their votes. <math>\delta v(g,t), \forall t\in\Tau</math>
