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This page is for Ed and Ron to share their thoughts on VC Bargaining. Access is restricted to those with "Trusted" access.
==Thoughts==
*We shouldn't include effort from the entrep. - we want a model that has no contract theory, just bargaining.
==A Basic Model==
:<math>V_t=V_{t-1} + f(x_t) - k \,</math>
with
:<math>V_0=0, f(0)=0, f'>0, f''<0, k>0 \,</math>
should do us just fine. Having <math>k>0\,</math> will force a finite number of rounds as the optimal solution providing there is a stopping constraint on <mathV_t\,</math> (so players don't invest forever).
There are two simple methods that come to mind:
:<mathf'(0) >0, f''<0, \exist z* s.t. \forall z > z* f'(z)<0\,</math>
Or we could force and exit once
:<math\sum_t (x_t) \ge \overline{x}\,</math>
In each period there is Rubenstein finite bargaining, with potentially different patience, and one player designated as last. This will give a single period equilibrium outcome with the parties having different bargaining strength.
