7,614
edits
Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
North & Weingast (1989) (view source)
Revision as of 19:15, 29 September 2020
, 19:15, 29 September 2020no edit summary
{{Article
|Has page=North |Has page= Weingast (1989)
|Has bibtex key=
|Has article title=
|Has author=North |Has author= Weingast
|Has year=1989
|In journal=
|In volume=
|In number=
|Has pages=
|Has publisher=
}}
Return to [[BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]]
==Theory Questions: ==
=== What is the author's topic and hypothesis? ===
The key threat to the property rights system was the monarchy -- who was unable to credibly commit upholding property rights. In particular, wars would frequently starve the monarchy of revenue -- thus tempting the monarch to violate property rights and expropriate money from the population (mainly the nobility).
The authors show that the Glorious Revolution introduced an institutional arrangement that strengthened property rights. The key institutional feature was the Parliament, which provided a veto point against the monarch. These institutional changes limited the crown's ability to reneg on promises and legislate unilaterally.
Parliament was able to make this commitment credible by:
=== How does the author rule out alternative hypotheses? ===
The author very breifly mentionedsimultaneous rises in protestant religious institutions. Additionally, England is unique from its neigbors as it was the only country to guentee basic rights of citizens via the magna carta. This raises the question that the institutions created during the glorious revloution are only nessisary not sufficent requisets for economics growth.
=== How might these tests be run if one had quantitative evidence? ===
