Difference between revisions of "Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers"
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{Article | {{Article | ||
|Has page=Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers | |Has page=Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers | ||
| − | |Has title= | + | |Has title=Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers |
|Has author= | |Has author= | ||
|Has year= | |Has year= | ||
Revision as of 12:12, 29 September 2020
| Article | |
|---|---|
| Has bibtex key | |
| Has article title | |
| Has year | |
| In journal | |
| In volume | |
| In number | |
| Has pages | |
| Has publisher | |
| © edegan.com, 2016 | |
Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012
Compensation of Enforcers
B&S propose two methods:
- Paying higher wages and monitoring performance to make honest behavior attractive enough.
- Making enforcers 'partners' of Victims in claiming compensation
Focus on method 1 -- Solve using backward induction. See paper for solution for [math]W_{1}^{*}[/math] and [math]W_{2}^{*}[/math]
