Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
@book{gompers2008bridge, title={Bridge building in venture capital-backed acquisitions}, author={'''[[Gompers, P.A. and Xuan, Y. and Harvard Business School}, year={2008}, publisher={Harvard Business School}, abstract={This paper studies the role of common venture capital investors in alleviating asymmetric information between public acquirers and private venture capital(2006) -backed targets. We find that acquisition announcement returns are more positive for acquisitions in which both the target and the acquirer are financed by the same venture capital firm. Similarly, having a common investor increases both the likelihood that a transaction will be all equity-financed as well as the fraction of stock in the overall acquisition payment. The Role Of Venture Capitalists In addition, an acquisition is more likely to take place when there is a common venture capital investor linking the acquirer and the target. Our results suggest that common venture capital investors can form a bridge between acquiring and target firms that reduces asymmetric information associated with the transaction for both parties.}, filename={The Acquisition Of Private Companies]]''' ([[Media:Gompers Xuan School (20082006) - Bridge Building The Role Of Venture Capitalists In Venture Capital Backed AcquisitionsThe Acquisition Of Private Companies.pdf} }|pdf]])
}
@article{ivanov2010corporate,
title={Do Corporate Venture Capitalists Add Value to Start-Up Firms? Evidence from IPOs and Acquisitions of VC-Backed Companies},
author={Ivanov, V.I. and Xie, F.},
journal={Financial Management},
volume={39},
number={1},
pages={129--152},
year={2010},
publisher={Wiley Online Library},
abstract={We present evidence that corporate venture capitalists (CVCs) add value to start-up companies only when the start-ups have a strategic fit with the parent corporations of CVCs. We find that CVCs provide a variety of services and support that suit the specific needs of start-ups operating in different industries. CVC-backed start-ups are able to obtain higher valuations at the IPO than non-CVC-backed ones, and the value added by CVCs concentrates in start-ups with a strategic overlap with CVC parents. Entrepreneurial companies with strategic CVC backing also receive higher takeover premiums when they become acquisition targets.},
filename={Ivanov Xie (2010) - Do Corporate Venture Capitalists Add Value To Start Up Firms.pdf}
no edit summary
*[[VC Acquisitions Paper]]
This is the main VC Acquisitions Lit Review page. It details searches for papers related to the intersection of venture capital, acquisitions and explaining abnormal returns. The results are currently posted as BibTeX entries, sorted by topic. Each entry has an '''abstract''' amd a '''filename''' field included. The All of the papers have been downloaded are on Ed's Sauder workstation. However, the 'Key Papers' have their own wiki pages and their files are posted for download.
==Key Papers==
'''[[Masulis Nahata (2011) - Venture Capital Conflicts Of Interest]]''' ([[Media:Masulis Nahata (2011) - Venture Capital Conflicts Of Interest.pdf|pdf]])
@article{masulis2011venture,
title={Venture capital conflicts of interest: Evidence from acquisitions of venture-backed firms},
filename={Masulis Nahata (2011) - Venture Capital Conflicts Of Interest.pdf}
}
'''Working Paper Version''' ([[Media:Masulis Nahata Way (2006) - Venture Capital Conflicts Of Interest.pdf|pdf]])
@techreport{masulis2006venture,
title={Venture Capital Conflicts of Interest: Evidence from Acquisitions of Venture Backed Targets},
}
@article{gompers2006role,
title={The role of venture capitalists in the acquisition of private companies},
}
'''[[Gompers Xuan (2008) - Bridge Building In Venture Capital Backed Acquisitions]]''' ([[Media:Gompers Xuan (2008) - Bridge Building In Venture Capital Backed Acquisitions.pdf|pdf]])
@book{gompers2008bridge,
title={Bridge building in venture capital-backed acquisitions},
author={Gompers, P.A. and Xuan, Y.},
year={2008},
publisher={Harvard Business School},
abstract={This paper studies the role of common venture capital investors in alleviating asymmetric information between public acquirers and private venture capital-backed targets. We find that acquisition announcement returns are more positive for acquisitions in which both the target and the acquirer are financed by the same venture capital firm. Similarly, having a common investor increases both the likelihood that a transaction will be all equity-financed as well as the fraction of stock in the overall acquisition payment. In addition, an acquisition is more likely to take place when there is a common venture capital investor linking the acquirer and the target. Our results suggest that common venture capital investors can form a bridge between acquiring and target firms that reduces asymmetric information associated with the transaction for both parties.},
filename={Gompers Xuan (2008) - Bridge Building In Venture Capital Backed Acquisitions.pdf}
}
'''[[Benson Ziedonis (2010) - Corporate Venture Capital And The Returns To Acquiring Portfolio Companies]]''' ([[Media:Benson Ziedonis (2010) - Corporate Venture Capital And The Returns To Acquiring Portfolio Companies.pdf|pdf]])
@article{benson2010corporate,
title={Corporate venture capital and the returns to acquiring portfolio companies},
abstract={A prominent motive for corporate venture capital (CVC) is the identification of entrepreneurial-firm acquisition opportunities. Consistent with this view, we find that one of every five startups purchased by 61 top corporate investors from 1987 through 2003 is a venture portfolio company of its acquirer. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that takeovers of portfolio companies destroy significant value for shareholders of acquisitive CVC investors, even though these same investors are “good acquirers” of other entrepreneurial firms. We explore numerous explanations for these puzzling findings, which seem rooted in managerial overconfidence or agency problems at the program level.},
filename={Benson Ziedonis (2010) - Corporate Venture Capital And The Returns To Acquiring Portfolio Companies.pdf}
}
abstract={Given the level of involvement between a venture capitalist and a portfolio firm’s management, and a VC’s propensity to facilitate collaborations within its network, it is likely that a VC continues to affect a firm beyond a successful public offering. This could manifest itself in many ways, including the M&A decisions of management, with a VC facilitating and encouraging mergers and acquisitions within its network. This paper seeks to answer two questions. First, what role do venture capital firms play in the acquisition decisions of their previous IPOs? And second, what effect does this have on acquisition announcement returns? To do this, I focus on the acquisition activity of VC-backed IPOs, specifically their acquisitions of VC-backed private targets. I find that venture capitalists continue to affect firm M&A decisions well after the initial public offering, but that this is generally of benefit to acquiring firm shareholders. The information sharing that occurs between a VC and a firm’s management appears to result in value-enhancing acquisitions of VC-backed private targets. This paper documents a further mechanism through which venture capitalists can add value to corporations.},
filename={Jones (2008) - The Information Role Of Venture Capitalists.pdf}
}
'''[[Ivanov Xie (2010) - Do Corporate Venture Capitalists Add Value To Start Up Firms]]''' ([[Media:Ivanov Xie (2010) - Do Corporate Venture Capitalists Add Value To Start Up Firms.pdf|pdf]])
@article{ivanov2010corporate,
title={Do Corporate Venture Capitalists Add Value to Start-Up Firms? Evidence from IPOs and Acquisitions of VC-Backed Companies},
author={Ivanov, V.I. and Xie, F.},
journal={Financial Management},
volume={39},
number={1},
pages={129--152},
year={2010},
publisher={Wiley Online Library},
abstract={We present evidence that corporate venture capitalists (CVCs) add value to start-up companies only when the start-ups have a strategic fit with the parent corporations of CVCs. We find that CVCs provide a variety of services and support that suit the specific needs of start-ups operating in different industries. CVC-backed start-ups are able to obtain higher valuations at the IPO than non-CVC-backed ones, and the value added by CVCs concentrates in start-ups with a strategic overlap with CVC parents. Entrepreneurial companies with strategic CVC backing also receive higher takeover premiums when they become acquisition targets.},
filename={Ivanov Xie (2010) - Do Corporate Venture Capitalists Add Value To Start Up Firms.pdf}
}
