Difference between revisions of "Snyder (1991) - On Buying Legislatures"
imported>Bo (New page: [http://www.edegan.com/wiki/images/d/da/On_Buying_Legislatures_by_James_Snyder.pdf pdf of paper]) |
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[http://www.edegan.com/wiki/images/d/da/On_Buying_Legislatures_by_James_Snyder.pdf pdf of paper] | [http://www.edegan.com/wiki/images/d/da/On_Buying_Legislatures_by_James_Snyder.pdf pdf of paper] | ||
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| + | ==Abstract== | ||
| + | |||
| + | This paper analyzes a simple spatial voting model that includes lobbyists who | ||
| + | are able to buy votes on bills to change the status q u o . T h e key results a r e : | ||
| + | (i) if lobbyists can discriminate across legislators when buying votes, then | ||
| + | they will pay the largest bribes to legislators wh o a r e slightly opposed t o the | ||
| + | proposed change, rather than t o legislators who strongly support o r strongly | ||
| + | oppose the change; (ii) equilibrium policies exist, and with q u a d r a t i c | ||
| + | preferences these equilibria always lie between t h e average of t h e lobbyists’ | ||
| + | ideal points a n d the median of the legislators’ ideal points; a n d (iii) | ||
| + | “moderate” lobbyists, whose positions on a policy issue a r e close t o the | ||
| + | median of the legislators’ ideal points, will prefer the issue t o be salient, while | ||
| + | more extreme lobbyists will generally prefer the issue t o be obscure. | ||
Revision as of 02:01, 26 September 2011
Abstract
This paper analyzes a simple spatial voting model that includes lobbyists who are able to buy votes on bills to change the status q u o . T h e key results a r e : (i) if lobbyists can discriminate across legislators when buying votes, then they will pay the largest bribes to legislators wh o a r e slightly opposed t o the proposed change, rather than t o legislators who strongly support o r strongly oppose the change; (ii) equilibrium policies exist, and with q u a d r a t i c preferences these equilibria always lie between t h e average of t h e lobbyists’ ideal points a n d the median of the legislators’ ideal points; a n d (iii) “moderate” lobbyists, whose positions on a policy issue a r e close t o the median of the legislators’ ideal points, will prefer the issue t o be salient, while more extreme lobbyists will generally prefer the issue t o be obscure.
