Difference between revisions of "Entezarkheir (2010) - Patent Thickets And Market Value An Empirical Analysis"
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Revision as of 18:17, 19 March 2013
- This page is referenced in the Patent Thicket Literature Review
- This page is listed on the PTLR Core Papers page
Reference
- Entezarkheir, M. (2010), "Patent Thickets and Market Value: An Empirical Analysis", Working Paper
@misc{entezarkheir2010patent,
title={Patent Thickets and Market Value: An Empirical Analysis},
author={Entezarkheir, M.},
year={2010},
abstract={The pro-patent shift of the United States has created a patent thicket. This has made the use of other firms innovations more costly, due to higher transaction costs and the possibility of hold up. Using a panel data on publicly traded US manufacturing firms from 1979 to 1996, this study finds a negative impact from the patent thicket on the market value of the firm. I also find that firms with larger patent portfolios experience a smaller effect, likely because stronger bargaining position lowers the occurrence of the hold-up problem for these firms. The advantage of larger firms is even more prominent following the pro-patent shift. My results also capture heterogeneity in the impact of the patent thicket across industries.},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Entezarkheir (2010) - Patent Thickets And Market Value An Empirical Analysis.pdf}
}
File(s)
Abstract
The pro-patent shift of the United States has created a patent thicket. This has made the use of other firms innovations more costly, due to higher transaction costs and the possibility of hold up. Using a panel data on publicly traded US manufacturing firms from 1979 to 1996, this study finds a negative impact from the patent thicket on the market value of the firm. I also find that firms with larger patent portfolios experience a smaller effect, likely because stronger bargaining position lowers the occurrence of the hold-up problem for these firms. The advantage of larger firms is even more prominent following the pro-patent shift. My results also capture heterogeneity in the impact of the patent thicket across industries.