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[[Category:{{Project|Has project output=Content|Has sponsor=McNair Projects]]Center|Has title=Governance Measures|Has owner=|Has start date=|Has deadline=|Has keywords=|Has notes=|Has project status=Complete|Is dependent on=}} The ATI index can be constructed using the variables in the Takeover Defenses database marked with ATI towards the end of the line. The E index can be constructed using the variables in the RiskMetrics (ISS) Database marked with E index towards the end of the line. See the variable lists in the Availability section below.
Governance Measures (view source)
Revision as of 13:39, 21 September 2020
, 13:39, 21 September 2020no edit summary
=Measures=
abstract={We investigate how the market for corporate control (external governance) and shareholder activism (internal governance) interact. A portfolio that buys firms with the highest level of takeover vulnerability and shorts firms with the lowest level of takeover vulnerability generates an annualized abnormal return of 10% to 15% only when public pension fund (blockholder) ownership is high as well. A similar portfolio created to capture the importance of internal governance generates annualized abnormal returns of 8%, though only in the presence of “high” vulnerability to takeovers. The complementarity effect exists for firms with lower industry-adjusted leverage and is stronger for smaller firms.}
}
==Related Pages==
*[[Winner's Curse in Acquisitions (Academic Paper)]]
